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
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
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
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JAPAN AND AMERICA



JAPAN AND AMERICA

A CONTRAST

BY

CARL CROW

AUTHOR OF "AMERICA AND THE PHILIPPINES," ETC.




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
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JAPAN AND AMERICA



JAPAN AND AMERICA— A CONTRAST

CHAPTER I

PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC

SEPARATED only by an ocean, which with the advance in navigation grows narrower each year, are Japan and the United States, two countries which in history, ideals, civilization, culture, have nothing in common. The governments of the two countries represent the extremes of political ideas, the one a democracy, the other an autocracy. So different are the institutions of the two peoples that neither can without danger to itself adopt the ideals and culture of the other. While the influx of a large number of Japanese to the United States would create new labor problems and seriously threaten American institutions, the migration of a similar number of Americans to Japan would prove equally serious to that country. Japanese, with their lower requirements of living, their lax ideas

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of morality, and their deficient political development, would seriously threaten the survival of American institutions in any community in which they settled in large numbers and acquired American citizenship. Americans, with their superior command of capital, larger experience in organization and management, as well as their inherent animosity to the form of government by which Japan is ruled, would, if resident there in large numbers, not only threaten the Japanese by their industrial competition, but menace the very existence of the government itself.

The Americanization of Japan would mean the end of the Japanese state as it exists to-day and would make necessary a reconstruction much more difficult than that by which Japan has within the lifetime of living men emerged from seclusion and become a world power; with the Japanization of America we would give up all the things our grandfathers fought for. Neither of these eventualities is probable or possible, but the problems which they involve are projected on us in minor degree with every increase in immigration or intercourse between the two peoples. In its menacing possibilities the problem of immigration is as serious for Japan as for America, and if Japan were threatened by the influx of a large number

of Americans who would purchase land and set themselves up in competition with native laborers, we might expect to hear of a much greater outpouring of protests and restrictive legislation there than has been occasioned here by Japanese immigration. The circumstance that America offers to Japanese opportunities which Japan does not offer to Americans has compelled America to take certain defensive actions which Japan can forgo, because Americans never have and never will go to Japan in large numbers.¹

This is but one of the many complex problems of the Pacific which are pressing for solution. Though never seeking a quarrel with Japan and though having no ambitions for possessions in the Pacific any more extensive than those we now hold, a number of events of the present generation have in a striking and unmistakable way placed

¹ The American population of Japan is about 1,700, the total American and European population of the country being less than 10,000. Of the American population probably half may be classified as missionaries, members of missionaries' families, teachers, or members of the diplomatic and consular service. There are also a number not engaged in any occupation who make Japan their home. Certainly less than one-third are making their living in Japan in the sense that they derive their income directly or indirectly from the Japanese. More than one-half though living in the country are supported by salaries paid in America. The Japanese population of the United States is about 100,000, practically all of whom derive a living from America and in competition with Americans.

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Japan and the United States as the champions of opposing and conflicting aims and interests. The conflict of interests of the two countries is not a possible development of the future; it is an immediate and at-present-existing fact, which no amount of peace-advocate logic can reason away. In the course of time one of the two countries must recede from its present position. We must give up some of our cherished traditions and renounce policies in which all Americans have taken a just pride, or Japan must give up imperial ambitions which are dear to all Japanese and have dominated state policy for years.

This book is not written to exaggerate the problems or to alarm Americans. It is the sincere wish of the author that the problems find a peaceful solution and that the ocean which separates Japan from the mainland of America remain pacific in fact as well as in name. But a solution is not to be found until the problem is stated in definite terms, nor does it aid toward a better understanding of the situation to give the Japanese credit for a sentiment they do not possess, and attribute to them a code of morality which is as strange to them as is *hari kari* to us.

If the Japan which really exists on the other side of the Pacific were the Japan which exists in the

minds of many Americans, there would be no serious problem of the Pacific, nor would there be an excuse for this addition to the voluminous literature on the country. The Japan of the wonderful cherry blossoms, the fascinating geishas, and magnificent Fujiyama is told of in a thousand pretty books and is graven on the hearts of ten thousand travelers. It is a beautiful and a wonderful country. But this is not the real Japan with which Americans of this war-cursed age are concerned. Cherry blossoms, geishas—the kind of stuff postcards are made of—are useful to entertain a bored tourist and supply him with thrills and impressions, but of no more importance to America than the cathedral chimes which break the stillness of Russia's white night, or of the golden-skinned maidens who grace the dirty streets of Tehuantepec.

The Japan which we should know is the Japan of farms and factories and fishermen, ruled by a little group of ambitious statesmen and dominated by the imperialistic aims which dominated Germany. It is a Japan which has at its command all the superior forces of Western civilization, modern battleships, a trained army, a highly organized industrial system, but in its uses of these forces is subject to none of the restraints which

govern other powers. The history of the world would have been quite different but for the fact that modern weapons of warfare were not perfected until civilization had taught a certain moderation in their use. Kublai Khan, Hideyoshi, or Tammerlane, if possessed of the weapons and modern forces held by a secondary power to-day, would have devastated the earth. In Japan we see a power still partially under the influence of barbaric traditions of warfare and conquest and yet possessed of all the weapons and powers of the most enlightened countries. A study of her modern history shows that she maintains a double standard of conduct—one for use with strong nations, the other for use with weak ones. Japan shows to Western nations a studied and careful observance of Western traditions and codes, and yet in her relations with weaker Asiatic powers relapses into the use of brutal tactics which reveal a code of action and a national psychology as strange to the American of to-day as the strangest, wildest story ever brought from Asia, the land of fakes and fables.

It is this Japan we must reckon with in the settlement of our differences, not the Japan of sentiment and imagination. In the following pages the author will attempt to measure the power of this

Japan and the restraints on that power; note the points at issue between Japan and the United States; and state the methods which past history has taught us we may expect Japan to use in accomplishing her aims.

CHAPTER II

THE REAL ESTATE POINT OF VIEW

WE Americans have often been accused of bragging too insistently about the size and the potential wealth of our national domain, a habit we have doubtless inherited from our grandfathers, who had little else to brag about. The temptation to measure our acreage against that of less bulky nations is always strong, for it can always be done with the certainty that it will show our own superiority. The temptation is never so strong as when Japan is under discussion, for against no other power can we array such an impressive showing of greater acreage of fields and forests and greater extent of mines.

The Empire of Japan is composed of several thousand islands, only five of which are as large as the State of Connecticut, the others being so small that none of them is of any importance and hundreds are not inhabited. Of the five islands which may be said to make up Japan, Honshu, the largest, is the same size as Kansas

(81,000 square miles); Hokkaido, next in area, is about the size of South Carolina (30,000 square miles); Kyushu and Formosa together are about equal to the area of Maine, while Shikoku is smaller than New Jersey. The entire area of the Empire is only 600 square miles greater than the area of California (158,360 square miles).

However, while the area of this small kingdom is about the same as that of California, the extent of its fields is much less. In California one-third of the total area is under cultivation, while in Japan the cultivated area is only one-eighth. A large part of the untilled portion is covered with mountains and hills often surpassingly beautiful but always unproductive. Even the native grass which softens the outlines of the hills and decks the valleys in green, is coarse and hard, and like many other things in Japan is more decorative than useful. It adds to the beauty of the landscape but will cut the intestines of sheep which graze on it. Mountainous Switzerland contains six times the proportion of agricultural land that is to be found in Japan, where the fields under cultivation cover but 20,000 square miles. That is the area from which the present population of 60 millions is fed except as they are able to purchase food from other countries and supplement the

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produce of the farms with fish and seaweed from the neighboring waters. Nearly the entire population lives near this source of food supply. There is no part of Japan more than one hundred miles from the sea coast and only one small section in the interior of the main island is more than fifty miles distant. Both in quantity and quality of fish, few waters are richer than those which surround the beautiful island empire.

Until a comparatively few years ago Japan had no foreign commerce and no manufacturing industries of any importance, the country being essentially agricultural. The workers of the country have always been farmers and fishermen and, despite the recent progress in manufacturing, the farming population is still predominant and farming remains the most important industry. The farms are naturally very small, averaging less than three and one-half acres. This average includes the areas of upland pastures and plains, which take up fully one-third of what is counted as the cultivated area.

It has often been pointed out that the population of Japan is not so dense as in Belgium or England. But Belgium and England are almost wholly arable; Japan is almost wholly mountainous. If we eliminate from the figures of area the

unproductive lands of each country, the population per square mile works out, approximately: England, 466; Belgium, 702; Japan, 2688. A population of 2688 on every square mile of arable land—less than a quarter of an acre of land for each person! There is more good farm land in mountainous Kentucky than in all Japan.

Japanese publicists, anxious to make the best possible showing for the resources of their country, have often contended that though the soil of Japan is meager in extent, it is so fertile, comes under the influence of such a genial climate and is so skilfully cultivated that its agricultural wealth may be compared very favorably with countries possessing a more generous domain. This is only partially true.¹ In some parts of Japan several

¹The erroneous statement that several crops a year are produced in Japan is to be found in nearly every book written on the country. Mr. Chamberlain, in his authoritative work, *Things Japanese*, remarks on the prevalence of this idea. He says: "Many Europeans believe that two rice crops are produced in the year. This occurs as a solitary exception in the province of Toosa, where the warming effect of the Kuro-shio, or Japanese Gulf Stream, makes itself felt with special energy. Elsewhere such a thing is rendered impossible by the length and severity of the winter." According to the official statistics, which may always be depended on to take the most optimistic view of Japanese resources, less than one-third of the rice fields are classed as "two crop fields." See *Japan Year Book*, 1914 edition, page 341. In actual practice, most of these "two crop" fields really produce three crops in two years.

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crops a year are grown, but here the law of diminishing returns works as inexorably as elsewhere and the more frequent the crop the less is the yield. In these favored sections excellent systems of irrigation rob drouths of their terror and the climate is so genial that late spring frosts never come to kill the growing crops. But these favorable conditions are not universal. The Empire of Japan dots an area which is roughly 1800 miles from north to south and 2200 miles from east to west. If we were to place the southern point of Formosa a few miles south of the southern tip of Florida, a point which is on the same parallel of latitude, the country would extend over all the Atlantic seaboard and the northernmost island of Hokkaido would be in Maine. "Or if we were to put the southernmost point of Kyushu in the south of Sicily, it would make a long narrow country covering the whole of Italy, Switzerland, Alsace-Lorraine, Baden, Württemberg, Hesse, and the Rhenish provinces of Prussia. Or if you placed its southernmost point at Assouan, in Egypt, which is on the same parallel of latitude with the south of Japan, you would get a long narrow empire reaching from there to about Warsaw, in Poland." ²

² *Every-day Japan*, by Arthur Lloyd.

Within this great range of distances there are about the same differences of climate and of soil fertility one would find in the European or American territories to which it has been compared. Though some parts are very rich, in many others the soil is thin and climatic conditions make the crop uncertain. In the past five years, though the area planted to rice, the principal crop, has remained practically the same, the production has varied more than ten per cent. from year to year, while there has been a still greater variation in the non-irrigated crops.

The natural thinness of the soil is shown by the fact that Japan, considering its farm acreage, is the best market in the world for commercial fertilizers, and a constantly increasing amount is needed to maintain the fertility of the soil. The yearly consumption of fertilizers, domestic and imported, is estimated at above \$100,000,000 or say \$5 per acre for all cultivated lands.* Of this about one-half is imported.

This enormous amount of fertilizer is used with the greatest care and the tiny patches which are called farms in Japan are cultivated like American flower gardens. The plants are coddled and nursed to maturity with an attention to details of

* *Japan Year Book*, 1914 edition, page 343.

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which the American farmer has never dreamed. Wheat, corn, and rice are planted in forcing beds as lettuce or tomatoes are planted in America, and, when the young plants have attained sufficient growth, are very carefully transplanted to the field where every clod is broken up and every weed removed. Thereafter the cultivation of each plant is a daily task to which as much care is given as an American florist would bestow on his favorite rose bush. Every insect is picked off, every weed removed before it has an opportunity to sap the fertility of the soil. If the farmer fails in an attempt to nurse a weak plant back to vigor, it is immediately replaced by another from the forcing bed so that no square inch of the small fields remains unproductive. But for all of their labor and their careful use of fertilizers, the farmers of Japan do not raise remarkable crops, as shown by the following average yield for a five-year period: ⁴

Rice	bushels per acre,	32
Barley	bushels per acre,	30
Wheat	bushels per acre,	20
Indian millet	bushels per acre,	20
Sorghum	bushels per acre,	24
Barnyard millet	bushels per acre,	26
Soy beans	bushels per acre,	15

⁴ *Outlines of Agriculture in Japan*, published by the Agricultural Bureau, Department of Agriculture and Commerce, Tokyo.

Small beans	bushels per acre,	13
Buckwheat	bushels per acre,	15
Sweet potatoes	pounds per acre,	8384
Cotton (in seed).....	pounds per acre,	448
Hemp	pounds per acre,	648
Leaf tobacco	pounds per acre,	1216

The statistics do not make a very good showing either for the ability of the Japanese farmer or for the fertility of his land. The United States is not generally known as a rice producing country, though the acreage devoted to that useful crop is more than one million and is growing larger each year. Rice is grown in Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, and California. According to the most recent statistics of the Department of Agriculture at Washington the average yield per acre is 35 bushels, or 3 bushels greater than the average for Japan. The average barley yield for the Western States, the greatest barley producing section of the United States, is 33 bushels, the average yield for the entire United States being 30 bushels, exactly the same as for Japan. The average wheat yield of the United States is far less than the average for Japan, but if we eliminate the sections where wheat is grown as a catch crop, the average is greater. America's average yield of buckwheat is 20 bushels; Japan's 15. Japan, with truck garden methods and the liberal use of fertilizer, raises

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20 bushels of corn to the acre; the United States raises 28.

If we compare Japan's crop yields with those of any European country, where the intensive cultivation common in Japan is more general than in the United States, the contrast is even more striking. There is scarcely a country in Europe which does not raise crops far superior to those of Japan. Japan's cultivation, if we may judge it by the size of the farms, the amount of fertilizer used and the manual labor involved, is the most intensive in the world; the cultivation of the United States is the most careless. The number of farmers in the United States and in Japan is practically the same, for while 64 per cent. of Japan's population of 60 millions are set down as farmers, we make a similar classification of about 30 per cent. of our population of 100 millions. The farmers of Japan produce annually about 400 million bushels of grain (including rice, barley, wheat, corn, millet, beans, and peas), 3 million tons of potatoes and vegetables. The American farmer produces annually 5000 million bushels of grain, 14 million tons of potatoes, 64 million tons of hay, and 13 million bales of cotton. In brief, the annual products of the Japanese farms are worth 500 million dollars,

or less than \$9 per capita. The annual products of the American farms are worth 6000 million dollars, or \$60 per capita. Undoubtedly the expenditure of physical labor on the part of the Japanese is much greater than that of the American, though his products are worth only one-twelfth as much as the products of the American farmer.

In old Japan, in the days before the ambition to become a world power seized on the rulers of the country, the Japanese farmers, in spite of their slender resources, were quite able to supply foodstuffs for their own country. It was not until the weight of a huge standing army and a big navy had been added to the national burdens that the farmer began to fail. Japan has for many years been unable to supply her own foodstuffs and has been compelled to import them in constantly increasing quantities. From an annual average of about \$25,000,000 a few years ago, the annual average of imports of foodstuffs has risen to above \$50,000,000. The important items imported in 1913 were:

Rice	\$24,000,000
Beans	3,000,000
Flour	1,000,000
Sugar	18,000,000
Wheat	6,000,000

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The total of all foodstuffs imported that year was \$55,000,000. Against this must be credited the exportation of a certain amount of foodstuffs, of which rice, tea and sugar make up the principal items. Japan is both an importer and exporter of rice for she sells her best rice abroad and imports cheaper qualities for home consumption. In former years her exports of foodstuffs balanced her imports, but recently they have fallen far below and are now barely enough to cover the imports of oil cake brought in for use as fertilizer.

In the year for which the figures above are given, the exports of foodstuffs, amounting to \$21,000,000, included the following items:

Rice	\$2,000,000
Tea	5,000,000
Marine products	3,000,000
Sugar	8,000,000

The meagerness of the soil has made the struggle for existence always hard in Japan and has had a profound effect on the national life and character of the people. During the greater part of our history we Americans have had before us fertile plains which were to be had by driving out the savages. The Japanese who centuries ago drove out the aborigines and possessed themselves of the country gained a more beautiful but poorer prize

in their circumscribed plains and narrow valleys. These strikingly different conditions have naturally affected the national characteristics of the two peoples and, just as the lands occupied by them present greater physical differences than are to be found between the domains of any other two powers, so are the people separated by racial differences greater than those which separate any others. These are not the differences of race prejudice and color, but differences which find equal cause in the histories and the physical environments of Americans and Japanese. What some of these racial differences are will be considered in later chapters. For the present it is enough to point out that, while we in America have the most liberal allowance of land on which to raise our food and the food of others, Japan has the most meager allowance. Japan might exist in luxury on the uncultivated fence corners of America.

It is difficult for us who have always had land for the asking, or the homesteading, to visualize the conditions which confront a less fortunate people, but it may aid us to realize the situation in Japan if we imagine what the struggle for existence in America would mean if the entire population of the United States were crowded into the

State of Ohio. Considering only the area and productivity of the soil, the citizens of our Republic would have a better opportunity to prosper on the diminished area of Ohio than the subjects of Japan have in the country they now possess. But if Ohio were given to the Japanese as it was given to us, uncultivated, unimproved and infested by savages, it is doubtful if the Japanese would have made of it what we have, or that they would have made serious attempts to take possession of it.

It is frequently asserted that every square foot of arable land in Japan is under intensive cultivation. Doubtless this is the impression one gets on coming from America, where in some places at least, the owners still count their possessions by the section and the quarter section rather than the acre. But a closer study of the area of the country and its development reveals the fact that the present area under cultivation might be appreciably increased. Though theirs is a mountainous country, the Japanese are not mountaineers, but dwellers of the plains and valleys. There they live, contented with their narrow fields, and the sides of hills and mountains which would be terraced by Chinese or Igorots remain uncultivated and unproductive. The government authorities after a careful survey of the entire country have

reached the conclusion that simply by reclaiming and putting under cultivation the land which is inclined at an angle of less than 15 degrees, the area of arable land may be doubled.

Though living in a country where the cramp of land hunger was felt long before the fertile plains of America were discovered to Europe, the Japanese are not pioneers and know nothing of that passion for ownership and development of land which has made so much American history. They have not felt that lure of the distant plain which in less than a century has carried the Americans through deserts and the strongholds of hostile Indians from the Mississippi Valley to the Pacific Coast, a distance much greater than that which the Japanese people have traversed in the twenty-five centuries of national existence which they claim. In Hokkaido, the important northern island of the Japanese Archipelago, there is enough uncultivated land to take care of Japan's surplus population for many years to come. But the island remains sparsely inhabited and is not the objective of any steady stream of immigration to be compared with that which in America constantly moves from the crowded States to the less thickly settled portions of the country where land is cheap and plentiful.

The Japanese appear to lack that moral courage which has enabled other peoples to plunge into the wilderness and by their own individual efforts wrest a living from the soil. Their development of their own country was slow and tedious. They did not press on into the wilderness until compelled to do so by strong economic pressure in the portions already settled. Their development of Japan is not yet completed and they are demanding land in the most favored sections of other countries while fertile parts of their own country remain uncultivated and unproductive. Unlike the Chinese, the Japanese will not go where there is either extreme heat or extreme cold. The heat keeps them from Formosa and the cold from the northern parts of their ancient domain. The Japanese are not to be found in any numbers in either Formosa or the Federated Malay States, and these places have been developed by Chinese who had opportunities no better than those of the Japanese. Japanese claims to a broader opportunity must always be discounted by this reluctance on their part to earn the opportunity they demand. Other peoples, the Spaniards, British, French, Portuguese, Dutch, Chinese, Americans, who have sought and found greater opportunities for their energies, have gone into the waste places

of the world and made the wastes blossom and produce. In Formosa, Japan has had an opportunity to do this, but after twenty years of occupation of the country the Japanese settlers there are few and their achievements of little consequence. They have yet to learn that it is not the conquest of the soldier but the conquest of the farmer which gives a final title.

The Japanese cultivates with intense care the small plot of land which belongs to him, but centuries of life in a country where all individualism and all initiative in the lower classes were crushed out of existence have left him without a mentality to conceive the possibilities of an uncultivated hillside, or a piece of unimproved plain more than a day's journey from his native village. There is no more striking example of the lack of initiative with which he is so often charged.

Denied the possession of a wide expanse of fertile soil, the Japanese are also denied the safe possession of the small areas of land they occupy. Typhoons, floods, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions—all of the hysteria of nature which are most terrifying to mankind and most destructive to his property—are, in this beautiful country, not isolated incidents to be encountered once in a lifetime, but events to be expected during each year,

like the coming of frost or the heat of summer. The many rivers which in their gentler moods flow in graceful curves through the flower-decked valleys become raging torrents with each rainy season, devastating the valleys which they formerly adorned. In the most fortunate years the damage by flood always exceeds several million dollars, and an official record kept for more than thirty years shows an average loss of life from floods of 693 yearly. The average annual destruction of property because of floods, typhoons and tidal waves, as shown by records kept for a number of years, is nearly \$15,000,000. I doubt if in our own wide expanse of territory with its many uncurbed rivers our annual loss from floods is so great.

Many of the mountains which crown Japan with majestic beauty are of volcanic origin, and some of those which have long been considered extinct occasionally become dangerously active and compel the desertion of large areas of the country which for centuries have been occupied by farms and villages. The latest example of this was the eruption of Sakurajima, which after being quiescent for many years broke out in the early part of 1914 and devastated the beautiful island of the same name, covering a large area of farm land with

ashes and making many thousands homeless. About fifty volcanoes in Japan are still accounted as active, and there have been few decades in recent history without a destructive eruption of one or more of them.

Earthquakes come with great frequency to terrorize all. An earthquake is something to which no one ever becomes accustomed. After much travel one may toss through a severe storm at sea without apprehension, but when the solid earth beneath one begins to shake and quiver, the stoutest hearts grow faint. In Japan these natural apprehensions are strengthened by a study of local history which is full of records of earthquakes carrying death and destruction with them. Without going into a record of ancient disasters or of the minor ones which are of yearly occurrence, a list of recent severe earthquake shocks will give some idea of what Japan has always suffered from them:

<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Houses Destroyed</i>	<i>Persons Killed</i>	<i>Persons Injured</i>
Oct. 28, 1891	Mino, Owari	222,501	7,273	17,775
Oct. 22, 1894	Shonai	8,403	726	977
June 15, 1896	North Japan	13,073	27,122	9,247
Aug. 31, 1896	Ou	8,995	209	779
Aug. 14, 1909	Mino, Omi	9,544	37	441

These natural characteristics of the country in which they dwell have gone far toward forming the character of the Japanese. The absence of large areas of fertile land has necessarily made them industrious, though not energetic. They cannot exist like their Filipino neighbors on the labor of a few days each year. There has always been the necessity of unremitting toil, much like that enforced on the Igorots who were driven by other Filipinos to occupy a portion of the Philippines similar to Japan in its wealth of mountains and its poverty of productive soil. Through centuries of comparative privation the Japanese have learned to live by a maximum of labor and a minimum of clothing, food and shelter. Living in a country so beautiful they have very naturally become a nation of artists, who may or may not rival the artists of the Occident, but have at least added more to the art of the world than they have added to its wealth or its ethics.

The value of Japan's fields, forests and mines, as compared to the value of American fields, forests and mines, is insignificant, nor is the ratio ever likely to be materially changed. While Japan's national resources are under development and are constantly growing more important and more valuable, the same is true of America, with

the difference that there is much greater opportunity for development in America than in Japan. In natural wealth the two countries occupy extreme positions, one being the wealthiest and the other the poorest of the great powers. A few comparative statistics will give some idea of how great this difference is:*

Total area of land in square miles:

United States	3,571,492
Japan	158,960

In these figures colonies and overseas possessions are omitted.

Annual value of farm products:

United States	\$6,000,000,000
Japan	500,000,000

Value of farm lands:

United States	\$40,000,000,000
Japan	2,500,000,000

Value of annual mining products, including non-metallic minerals:

United States	\$3,110,000,000
Japan	73,000,000

Value of annual forestry products:

United States	\$1,156,000,000
Japan	50,000,000

* Figures relating to the United States are taken from the *Statesman's Year Book*, while those relating to Japan are taken chiefly from the *Japan Year Book*, both 1914 editions. Where figures from the *Japan Year Book* are not available, the latest and most authoritative estimates of Japanese authorities are given.

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Capital of banks, savings banks, loan and trust companies:

United States\$1,039,000,000

Japan 280,000,000

Individual bank deposits:

United States\$11,528,000,000

Japan 700,000,000

Value of annual product of fisheries:

United States\$54,000,000

Japan 50,000,000

Annual exports of raw materials and manufactures:

United States\$2,465,000,000

Japan 316,000,000

This list might be lengthened indefinitely, but enough items have been given to indicate the great differences between the two countries. So far as natural wealth goes, the Pacific Ocean divides those who have the most from those who have the least.

CHAPTER III

JAPAN'S GREAT ILLUSION

AFTER one has read through the tedious myths and unromantic romances which make up the early part of Japanese history, and the more authentic accounts of civil wars and court intrigues which make up the latter part, the one important fact which rewards his study is that there has never been a struggle of the Japanese people for liberty or for personal rights. The idea of a sovereign people has never intruded to retard the ambitions of kings and courtiers, and is but little understood even at this late day. The many bloody battles which have marked Japanese history have always been fought to decide who would rule, never to determine how those in power would rule. Great families have fallen and others have risen to power through the fortunes of battle, but no victory has ever been consecrated by a great principle of human rights established, a just cause vindicated. Rulers have changed places and subjects have changed masters, but the relationship between the two classes has never been

altered. The Japanese people, suffering oppressions which few other peoples have endured, have never availed themselves of that right which the most despotic ruler can never take away—the right to revolt.

This record is in striking contrast with that of our own history through which we are able to trace a slow but gradual development of personal liberties. The great pages are those which have meant a surrender of kingly rights to the people, the breaking down of tyrannical old ideas and the establishment of new principles in which there was hope of greater happiness. The big events of Japanese history record nothing more important than a change of masters, some more oppressive, some less, than their predecessors. The people have on many occasions taken up arms to aid their feudal lord in his petty warfare against a rival, or to further his ambition to gain supreme power, but they have never struck a blow to help themselves.

This remarkable record, as well as many other remarkable things about the Japanese people, is accounted for by the alleged divinity of their Emperor, who is the head of the state, the source alike of sovereignty and morality. For his authority he does not rely on divine right; he is him-

self a divinity separated from his subjects as the Japanese heaven is separated from the Japanese earth. Obedience to his rescripts and loyalty to him is the beginning and the end of Japanese morality. Having complied with these requirements the Japanese subject may search his conscience and find there nothing to give him any qualms. The Japanese constitution, written and interpreted more with a view to strengthening the power and prestige of the Emperor than to safeguarding the rights of the people, declares him to be sacred and inviolable, the head of the Empire, holding in himself all rights of sovereignty. The entire structure of the Japanese state and the entire system of Japanese morality are based on this foundation. Probably it is the strongest possible foundation for a people cut off from the rest of the world and kept in ignorance, but many believe it cannot withstand the skepticism of an enlightened era.

Quite as important, from a political point of view, as the belief in the divinity of the Emperor, is the Japanese conception of morality, as based on the idea of loyalty. It might be said that the Japanese word *disloyalty* is the nearest synonym for the Christian word *sin*. The moral plumb line in Japan has always been loyalty—loyalty

to Emperor, feudal lord, husband, parents, family or clan. No moral system or religion could have been invented which would have more securely fastened on the lower classes the rule of the upper.

The first tenet of the Shinto creed (the national ethical code of Japan which has been garnished with the trappings of religion), and, indeed the only tenet of that system which may be stated with any degree of certainty, is, "Obey the Emperor." No religion has ever been taught more systematically, or strengthened with more petty devices of ritual and superstition, and no religion has been used more successfully as a means of keeping the people silent under oppressive and unjust rule. Under the name of "moral instruction" a large part of the curriculum in the public schools is given over to the teachings of this creed of the divinity of the Emperor and of loyalty to superiors. The pupils are taught that they should be diligent in their studies and work, brave on the battlefield, and devoted to the interests of the country, because in that way they will show their loyalty to the Emperor. Every good act is commended as an act of loyalty to him, every bad one as an act of disloyalty. How successful this teaching is has been shown in many instances of

reckless bravery on the part of Japanese troops. Their Emperor is the master of their souls as well as the ruler of their bodies.

Japan has more moral teaching than any other country in the world. It is the first thing taught to school children. It is preached by every superior official to his inferiors. The Japanese policeman will exhort an unruly crowd with maxims from the Emperor's rescript. Heads of government bureaus vie with each other in drawing up rules for the regulation of the lives of their subordinates and in the promulgation of good advice which, if followed, would make moral paragons of the Japanese. This moral teaching always finds its authority in the divinity of the Emperor and loyalty to him. By making loyalty to the Emperor a religious as well as a civic duty the rulers of Japan have, as far as it is possible for any rulers to do so, robbed the people of the right to rebel. Believing in the divinity of their Emperor, it would be as vain and impious for a Japanese to demand greater rights of him, as it would be for a Christian to demand that the Ten Commandments be changed or the Sermon on the Mount revised.

This political stratagem of surrounding the nominal ruler with mystery and with the attributes

of divinity is not peculiar to Japan. It has been found in many countries of backward political development. But nowhere else has it survived so long or been made use of so successfully. Its long survival and its strength at the present day is proof alike of the high political abilities of those who have ruled Japan and of the retarded development of those who have been ruled. It is not an evidence either of the ability or the divinity of the Imperial family. Their long survival is a triumph of eugenics and nothing more. Except on a few occasions the emperors of Japan have never ruled, but have been the puppets of those who surrounded them, who if they did not create at least have kept alive the popular belief in that divinity and have traded on it to their own ends. It has only been by isolating the Emperor and depriving him of all real power that his theoretical power and divinity have survived. On the few occasions when the emperors have been allowed an unrestricted use of their powers, they have, like false divinities elsewhere, weakened their prestige by their base actions. In the early part of the Christian era Japan suffered from the unrestricted reign of several tyrannical rulers. The Emperor Yuraku (457-459), after exiling an officer to gain possession of his wife, killed his own brothers and

sisters and other members of the Imperial family.¹ Two of his successors were equally bloody and despotic. Since that time the emperors have been secluded and amused with concubines or religious meditation, while the real power has been exercised by others, who have kept alive the idea of divinity or allowed it to fall into neglect, according to the political exigencies of the times.

Throughout the history of Japan the title to power has been possession of the Imperial person. To accomplish this has been the first task of every ambitious clan or general. The authority of one who held that divine symbol of power was unquestioned and was opposed only for the purpose of wresting the symbol from him. Thus, while everything has been done in the name of the Emperor, the Emperor has done nothing. Japanese acceptance of this peculiar arrangement has been explained by Dr. Gulick as arising from a characteristic which he terms their "nominality." He explains: "It accepts and, apparently at least, is satisfied with a nominal state of affairs, which may be quite different from the real. The theoretical aspect of a question is accepted without reference to the real facts. The real power may be in the hands of a general or of the daimyo, but if author-

¹ See page 85, vol. 1, *Japan*, by Brinkley.

ity nominally proceed from the throne, the theoretical demands are satisfied.”²

This nominality of the Japanese, their inability or refusal to distinguish between theory and fact, between fancy and reality, is something which every one who studies Japan and the Japanese must always keep in mind, for it is the source of many misconceptions. It was some years after foreigners began to study Japan before they probed beneath the surface of pretense and theory and discovered the real political organization of the country. Many more years must probably pass before the common illusions about the country have been swept away and it comes to be known as it really exists.

With the theoretical absolute authority of the Emperor for guidance not only in affairs of state but in morality as well, the Japanese have always been the most thoroughly ruled people in the world. With this powerful backing the officials of the land have governed not only the actions of the people but their thoughts as well, arrogating to themselves the rights of an almighty god. So successful have they been that in spite of their educational advances the Japanese people find it difficult to make up their minds on any question

² *Evolution of the Japanese*, page 146.

where the decision has not been laid down by rule, or a precedent set by some superior. This is not wholly true of the English-speaking Japanese with whom the foreigner comes in contact, for many of them have broken away from the old ideas and developed a certain independence of thought and action. But 95 per cent. of the people remain in mental bondage, their minds "steeped in tradition and laid away for safe-keeping in official hands." The remarkable unanimity of opinion on national affairs, which has so often been the occasion of comment by foreigners, is not the result of the patriotism for which the Japanese are given credit, but the result of the fact that 95 per cent. of the people do not think about public affairs, but blindly follow their clan leaders. This tendency has been well exemplified in the three most recent wars in which Japan has engaged. Neither in the war against China, Russia, nor Germany was Japan's sovereignty assailed. In no one of them was there any question of national honor at stake. They were all wars of conquest, occasioned by the ambitions of the military clan of Japan. Yet in no case was there an anti-war party. The Japanese Peace Societies which had been active for years were strangely silent when the attack on Germany as Tsingtau was planned. They have

always been silent on the armaments of Japan which all peace advocates must disapprove. So it has always been. Japanese subjects were taxed in the Middle Ages to support civil warfare from which they could gain no benefits. They are taxed to-day to support an army and navy to which not one in a thousand gives intelligent approval.

Their lives and their thoughts are to-day regulated to a minute degree which would drive a less docile people to revolution. Threatened with a rule less despotic than that which the Japanese have patiently borne for centuries, the Virginia Assembly, in 1623, sent a message to the King saying: "Rather than be reduced to live under the like government, we desire His Majesty that commissioners be sent to hang us." At the time the Virginians were fighting for their rights, the Japanese were living under regulations which are still preserved in the law-books of the time. Lafcadio Hearn gives an account of some of these laws in his *Japan, an Interpretation*:

"Every class of Japanese society was under sumptuary regulation,—the degrees of regulation varying in different centuries; and this kind of legislation appears to have been established at an early period. It is recorded that in the year 681 A. D., the Emperor Temmu

regulated the costumes of all classes,—‘from the Princes of the Blood down to the common people,—and the wearing of headdresses and girdles, as well as of all kinds of colored stuffs,—according to a scale.’ The costumes and the colors to be worn by priests and nuns had been already fixed, by an edict issued in 679 A.D. Afterwards these regulations were greatly multiplied and detailed. But it was under the Tokugawa rulers, a thousand years later, that sumptuary laws obtained their most remarkable development; and the nature of them is best indicated by the regulations applying to the peasantry. Every detail of the farmer’s existence was prescribed for by law, and the cost of his dwelling, down even to such trifling matters as the number and the quality of the dishes to be served to him at meal-times. A farmer with an income of 100 koku of rice—(let us say £90 to £100 per annum)—might build a house 60 feet long, but no longer: he was forbidden to construct it with a room containing an alcove; and he was not allowed—except by special permission—to roof it with tiles. None of his family were permitted to wear silk; and in case of the marriage of his daughter to a person legally entitled to wear silk, the bridegroom was to be requested not to wear silk at the wedding. Three kinds of viands only were to be served at the wedding of such a farmer’s daughter or son; and the quality as well as the quantity of the soup, fish, or sweetmeats offered to the wedding-guests was legally fixed. So likewise the number of the wedding-gifts: even the cost of the presents of rice-wine and dried fish was prescribed, and the quality of the single fan which it was permissible to offer the bride. At no time was a farmer allowed to make any valuable presents to his friends. At a funeral he might serve the guests with certain kinds of

plain food; but if rice-wine were served it was not to be served in wine cups—only in soup cups! (The latter regulation probably referred to Shinto funerals in especial.) On the occasion of a child's birth, the grandparents were allowed to make only four presents (according to custom),—including 'one cotton baby dress'; and the values of the presents were fixed. On the occasion of the Boy's Festival, the presents to be given to the child by the whole family, including grandparents, were limited by law to 'one paper-flag,' and 'two toy spears.' . . . A farmer whose property was assessed at 50 koku was forbidden to build a house more than 45 feet long. At the wedding of his daughter the gift girdle was not to exceed 50 sen in value and it was forbidden to serve more than one kind of soup at the wedding feast. . . ."

The same negative qualities of the people which secured an obedience to these regulations ensured the payment of oppressive taxes which enabled the large ruling classes to live in idleness and luxury. At one period in addition to the taxes on the products of the land, and on all the principal staples of production, there was a forced *corvée* of thirty days of labor annually from every male between the ages of twenty-one and sixty-six years and of fifteen days from every minor. At the end of the Ninth Century each farmer was paying into the central government one-eleventh of the gross produce of his land, and also a forced *corvée* of thirty days of labor annually. His taxes

did not stop here for the provincial governors and local lords levied additional taxes equally heavy.

These tyrannical exactions and heavy tax levies have never driven the people to rebellion. On the other hand, the pretext on which authority has been changed has always been the "restoration" of the Emperor to those rights which he has always held in theory and has never held in practice. Each rebellious general has declared it to be his intention to rescue the Emperor from those who held him in their power and restore him to his real authority. Each restorer has followed the example of his predecessors by secluding the Emperor and by ruling in the Emperor's name.

The restoration of the Emperor to power in 1868 was not the remarkable achievement it is usually thought to have been by foreigners. Indeed, except for the pressure of foreign influence which compelled a change in the system of government, it was but a repetition of the many other restorations which did not restore. The Emperor to-day has little more power than was wielded by his grandfather who was secluded in Kyoto while the Shogun at Yedo ruled the country. The Satsuma and Choshu clansmen, the hereditary enemies of the Shogunate family, finally overthrew

the last Shogun, again "restored" the Emperor to power, and have since ruled Japan just as their predecessors in power ruled, in the name of the puppet Emperor.

The Shogun had allowed reverence for himself to replace the old reverence for the Emperor, and when forty years ago Prince Ito and his colleagues set about building up the new Japanese state, they laid the foundation by restoring to the Emperor the divinity of which he had been robbed by the Shogun. Much of the pomp and mystery surrounding the present ruler of Japan, which most foreigners believe to be the result of traditions handed down from a hoary old age, are no older than the present generation. They have all been invented since the telephone. According to Japanese history the present occupant of the throne is the 120th descendant of Jimmu Tenno (the descendant of the amorous sun-goddess Amaterasu), who in 660 B.C. ascended to the throne of Japan and became its first ruler. Each year February 11 is celebrated as the anniversary of the accession of Jimmu Tenno and Japanese dates are reckoned from 660 B.C. But it was not until a few years ago that the date of Jimmu Tenno's accession to the throne was decided on, and that decision was reached by a process of re-

search no foreigner understands. It would be quite as easy, with the historical materials at hand, to fix the exact day of the week, month, and year when Eve ate the apple. The custom of bowing to the picture of the Emperor, the idea that it is an act of sacrilege to look on him from above—these and many other devices are recent innovations unknown to the Japanese of half a century ago.

Every one who has lived in Japan for any length of time will recall the many petty expedients, amusing to outsiders but intensely serious to their inventors, to add to the cult of Emperor-divinity. In the school histories one reads that during the Russo-Japanese War the Emperor was at the front, encouraging his troops and aiding them by his divine influence. Yet it is well known that he was no nearer the front than Hiroshima, a comfortable resort on the Inland Sea, a day's journey from Tokyo. This Japanese perversion of facts in order to increase the prestige of the royal family was illustrated at the recent death of the Empress Dowager. On April 9, 1914, the Tokyo papers issued extras stating that the Empress Dowager, who had been at the summer palace at Numadzu for some time, had become critically ill and would be brought to Tokyo during the

day. The extras further stated that the Emperor and Empress had left that morning for the bedside of the Empress Dowager.

The uninitiated foreigner naturally accepted the news at its face value and wondered why an old lady so critically ill should be subjected to the dangers of a railway journey of several hours. But to the old resident the extras meant that the Empress Dowager was dead. Officials of the Foreign Office admitted, confidentially, to the newspaper correspondents that she was dead, but a strict censorship prevented the news from being sent abroad. For twenty-four hours all intelligent Japan knew that the Empress Dowager was dead, but no newspaper dared print the news. The reason for this was a recently manufactured tradition that no member of the Imperial family dies outside the Imperial city.

During the twenty-four hours that this news was kept bottled up by official authority, courtiers kept up the ghastly farce of pretending that the Empress Dowager was alive. Meals were served to her and when the body arrived in Tokyo it was met in the usual way and conveyed to the Tokyo residence in the red lacquered carriage of the palace. In the official histories of the future it will be set down that the Empress Dowager died in

Tokyo on April 10, 1914, while everyone knows that she died at Numadzu on April 9. There is consistency in one thing. The hour and minute of her death are set down with care, being the exact hour and minute at which life was pronounced extinct, but twenty-four hours later!

During the attack on Tsingtau in the autumn of 1914, hundreds of lives were sacrificed in an attempt to make the fall of the place coincide with the birthday of the Emperor, October 31, a patriotic project which the stubborn resistance of the Germans thwarted. Having failed in this, the army commanders did the next best thing. They announced that the general attack on the place had begun on October 31, and later ascribed the surrender to the auspicious date on which the attack was begun. Even the date of the birthday is wrong. The present Emperor was born on August 31, 1877, but for some reason which I have forgotten, the date was arbitrarily changed to October 31. The Emperor is officially two months younger than he really is.

The outward exhibitions of reverence for the Emperor are not left by the officials to the volitions of the people, but are subject to police regulation down to the minutest detail. When the funeral of the Empress Dowager was held the po-

lice were busy for many days before the event issuing a complicated set of regulations whose observance would ensure an outward show of respect. I was a spectator at the funeral and found the tedious ceremony relieved by the actions of the police who looked after the behavior of the crowd with maternal care. "Now is the time to stop talking," they would observe to the crowd. "Now you must remove your hats." "Now you must not move or talk," etc. The great outward show of respect, the draped flags, the funeral decorations on the humblest house, the band of crêpe universally worn—all the things which so impressed foreign visitors may be attributed to the efficiency of the Tokyo police. With a natural curiosity in the movements of a divinity, I have been present at a good many of the comings and goings of the Emperor and other members of the Imperial family, and on every occasion I have found that the impressive outward show of reverence has been strictly enforced by the police. I do not mean to say that there is not a great deal of real veneration for the Emperor on the part of the Japanese people. I merely wish to emphasize the interesting fact that the outward show of reverence which has so profoundly impressed foreign observers, is regulated by the police and would be

equally impressive if there were at heart no reverence at all.

While the bureaucrats who rule the country have done much toward strengthening the belief in the divinity of the Emperor, it has been upheld and strengthened by other things over which the rulers have had but indirect control. The continued progress of the country since the most recent restoration of the Emperor has probably been as valuable as the artificial devices in giving solidity to this fiction of divinity. In the two wars fought in his name, and in the more recent raid against German possessions in the Pacific, his adversaries have been defeated and his territories and property increased. Native commerce, manufacturing and shipping have grown at a remarkable rate and the Japanese have come to enjoy a place in the family of great powers. Credit for all of these accomplishments is given, not to the men who were responsible for them, but to the virtue of the Emperor and the guidance of the spirits of the divine ancestors.

It is interesting to speculate on how it would be affected by adversity. Every event of the past fifty years has helped to strengthen it, because the Empire of Japan has during that time constantly added to its glories. But suppose the Emperor's

standards should be defeated in war, his industrial enterprises fail, or prolonged business depression ruin the finances of the Empire! It is reasonable to believe that in either event faith in his divinity would be weakened and the foundation of the state shaken.

Official theory does not take into account a possibility of this sort, for the steady progress of Japan until the nation reaches its goal of a foremost position among the nations of the world is taken for granted. Every student in the primary schools is taught in the official textbooks that "the Emperors through one unbroken line have inherited the nature of divinity. No nation in the world can be compared with Japan in age or in holy nature. Our nation is the oldest in all the world and its future will be more prosperous with the years."

While the Satsuma and Choshu clans have exercised every ingenuity to increase the power of the Emperor, they have been equally diligent in piling on him a wealth the country can ill afford. In a catalog of his property we come first to the land, which amounts to about five million acres, more than 5 per cent. of the total area of the country. This is divided into dwelling land, forests and plains, ranging from the most valuable of

city property to forest and mountain land of little value. But in crowded Japan there is no land which can be called valueless and much ordinary farm land sells for \$1000 an acre. A price of \$100 an acre is a very conservative average and at this rate the value of the crown lands (this does not include state possessions) may be placed at 500 million dollars. It is very probably worth nearer one billion dollars. In addition to this very valuable property, the court is a heavy stockholder in many of the industrial enterprises of the country. These items include: 60,660 shares in the Bank of Japan, 60,400 shares in the Yokohama Specie Bank, 10,000 shares in the Industrial Bank, and 80,550 shares in the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, the well-known steamship company. According to the *Japan Year Book*, the total value of these industrial holdings is \$250,000,000. With the estimated value of the land the total climbs near the billion-dollar mark. Yet the Hohenzollerns were accounted wealthy with their \$125,000,000!

It is not to be supposed that the wealth which has been thrust on the court of Japan is the personal property of the Emperor except in name. Like the divinity with which they have invested him, it is nominal and is for the use of those who

rule him and, through him, rule Japan. It is administered and expended by the clansmen, invested in enterprises which they foster, paid out in pensions to the nobility and as grants to those who have earned the gratitude of the ruling faction. Much is said of the grants to charity made by the Emperor, but in comparison to his great wealth these grants are absurdly small. There are many American philanthropists who give more in a year than the Emperor of Japan gives in a decade.

The combination, the wealth of the court and the power acquired through the fiction of divinity, makes one of the most powerful political machines in the world. Let us see how it operates in everyday affairs.

The lower house of the Imperial Diet of Japan is in session. There are present nearly all of the three hundred members who represent the million and a half voters of the Empire, for matters of great importance are being discussed. The majority party at the command of the ministry is trying to force through a heavy naval appropriation which the minority parties disapprove, partly because it has been disclosed that many of the high officials of the navy have been receiving bribes from naval constructors and partly because they

wish to voice the demands of the people for lower taxes. A few days before the discussion of the question became so violent that several members came to blows. To-day the argument is bitter and personal.

A speaker is in the midst of an attack on the administration when a royal messenger walks out on the rostrum. The debate stops and the chamber is hushed. The speaker of the house advances to meet him and reverently receives an envelope bearing the royal seal. He opens it and announces that by the authority of the Emperor the sitting of the Diet has been suspended for three days. Instantly the warring members are on their feet. They bow low, touching their foreheads to their desks to signify their obedience to the Emperor's command, and a few minutes later the hall is empty and deserted.

If the message had been a command that the budget be passed, the assent would have been equally as prompt and unquestioned, in spite of the fact that the houses of the Diet were at that time surrounded by an angry mob determined that no more of their taxes be spent on naval expansion. The government of Japan is a government whose chief object is the glory of the Emperor, as expressed by Imperialistic achievements. Those

who gain high places in its councils are not those who serve the people but those who add to his victories in warfare, or by the building up of a large army and navy which will add to his prestige among the nations of the world. This has been the inspiration of Japanese ministries which have piled up taxation in an ever increasing burden and forced on the people a hateful conscription that the Emperor might glory in the strength of an army and navy justified neither by the resources of his country, the desires of his subjects, nor the necessities of defense. One by one these ministries have been forced out of office either by popular clamor or by a quarrel between the army and navy factions, and each has been succeeded by another ministry equally ambitious to carry out plans which would make prematurely a power of the first class out of Japan no matter what might be the cost to Japanese subjects.

One cannot but admire the wisdom of Japanese leaders in their invention of this illusion without which we would not now be called upon to admire the progress Japan has made during the past half century. As Professor Chamberlain says in his *Things Japanese*: "New Japan could never have risen and expanded as she has done without some ideal to beckon her onward; and this Imperial-

istic ideal was the only one within reach. It has been the lever that has raised her from Oriental impotence to her present rank among the great powers of the world." But while we are admiring the astuteness of the leaders we cannot forget the reverse of this fabric of state—that the illusion would not be possible with a people less docile than the Japanese, that they without protest allow themselves to be imposed upon by cramping political ideas which America threw off before she began to be a nation.

CHAPTER IV

JAPAN'S WONDERFUL PROGRESS

SO much has been written about the wonders of Japan's progress and the miracle of her modernization that one can hope to say little about it that has not already been said. The story of how this secluded nation of Asiatics was awakened by the appearance of Commodore Perry's fleet, set in to remake herself after the European pattern, and has succeeded so well that she is now able to compete successfully with her teachers is, as it is usually told, a narrative which lacks only the presence of an Aladdin and a wonderful lamp to make it plausible. Each new writer has found it more wonderful than the last. Each has added something to a tale already pleasing until we finally have a story so fascinating that it has convinced the Japanese themselves, and they have told it over and over again with embellishments of their own. To the average person, who has not studied the details of Japan's progress, compared it to the progress of other countries, and inquired into the means of accom-

plishment, the story is one of almost superhuman achievement which proves the Japanese to be a superior people and makes their competition a menace which may well fill the Westerner with terror.

Captain Brinkley has summed up Japan's achievements as follows: "When an American squadron arrived to break down her isolation, she did not possess even the beginnings of a national fleet or a national army; of an ocean-going mercantile marine; of a telegraph or postal system; of a newspaper press; of enlightened codes; of a trained judiciary, or of properly organized tribunals of justice; she knew nothing of Occidental sciences and philosophies; was a complete stranger to international law and the usages of diplomacy; had no conception of parliamentary institutions or popular representation; and was divided into a number of feudal principalities, each virtually independent of the other, and all alike untutored in the spirit of nationality or imperialism. In thirty years these conditions were absolutely metamorphosed. Feudalism had been abolished; the whole country united under one administration; the polity of the state placed on a constitutional basis; the people admitted to a share in the government under representative in-

stitutions; an absorbing sentiment of patriotism substituted for the narrow local loyalties of fiefs; the country intersected with telegraphs and railways, and its remotest region brought within the circuit of an excellent postal system; the flag of the nation carried to distant countries by a large mercantile marine; a powerful fleet organized, manned by expert seamen, and proved to be as capable of fighting scientifically as of navigating the high seas with marked immunity from mishap; the method of conscription applied to raising a large military force, provided with the best modern weapons and trained according to Western tactics; the laws recast on the most advanced principles of Occidental jurisprudence and embodied in exhaustive codes; provision made for the administration of justice by well-equipped tribunals and an educated judiciary; an extensive system of national education inaugurated, with universities turning out students capable of original research in the sciences and philosophies of the West; the state represented at foreign courts by competent diplomatists; the people supplied with an ample number of journals and periodicals; the foundations of a great manufacturing career laid, and the respect of foreign powers unreservedly won."

So rapid has been the modernization of the

country that new institutions have followed fast on each other's heels with confusing sequence. A chronology, which must necessarily be incomplete since the particulars of Japan's progress in the past fifty years would be as voluminous as the particulars of Europe's progress for the past five centuries, may give some idea of the rapidity of that progress:

1870. The feudal lords and barons, a few voluntarily, some under compulsion and some through ignorance of the consequences, gave up their possessions to the Emperor and relinquished all sovereignty to him. In return they received government bonds to the value of their property.¹

1871. A bureaucratic centralized government set up. A mint established, posts and telegraphs inaugurated, Buddhism nominally disestablished, all social disabilities removed.

1872. Building of railways begun. Imperial University founded.

1873. European dress for officials adopted, along with vaccination, meat eating and photography. Persecution of Christians stopped.

1875. Brand new orders of knighthood created.

¹ The samurai, or fighting men, who laid down their arms at the restoration of the Emperor, did so only after they had been promised pensions. In 1876, after repeated reductions these pensions amounted to \$18,000,000 yearly.

Torture abolished and steamship companies established.

1877. National exhibition held.

1878. Stock exchange and Chamber of Commerce established.

1880. All old laws abolished and replaced by a set of new laws drawn up by foreign authorities.

1883. Supreme court established.

1884. English introduced into the curriculum of the public schools. An aristocracy created by official order.

1888. Local self-government granted, with reservations which leave the central government in power.

1889. Constitution formally promulgated.

1890. Imperial Diet formally assembled.

1896. Subsidies granted for shipbuilding and navigation.

1897. Gold standard adopted.

This is truly a remarkable record. Stripped of all of the fanciful trimmings which have been added by superficial and imaginative foreigners and perpetuated through Japanese conceit, it is still remarkable—a record which, as we have often been told, has no parallel in the history of the world. But the story is only half told when this list of accomplishments is catalogued. It is im-

portant to know not only what was done but also why and how it was done. Whence came the desire for it and whence the means? How was it possible for this nation of little brown men to accomplish so much with the tools of the white man, of which they had been in entire ignorance a short time before? It is a very ungracious task to spoil a pretty story and prove that the fairy prince did not exist. It is a task for which one gets much abuse and little thanks, and I would not attempt it were it not for the fact that the myth of Japanese accomplishment has grown to such huge proportions that a large part of the world is deceived by it and because of this deception it is difficult to form correct opinions on current Japanese questions.

The motives for Japan's modernization should not be difficult to understand or to appraise. It is not necessary to credit her with any qualities that we do not ourselves possess. We need only note our own interest in the story of the world's progress, as told in the daily papers, to visualize the effect which the sudden opening up to Japan of the wonders of modern civilization must have had on that secluded people. A German physician makes a discovery in surgery; an Italian teacher perfects a new and successful method of

teaching children; a new novel by a Russian author is published; a new comic opera is presented in Vienna; a French aviator does with an aeroplane something that was never done before, and at once the cables are busy. We read of it with eager interest next morning and do not rest until these accomplishments are our own.

Japan had for centuries been cut off from contact with that progress which we follow from day to day with such intense interest. At once the new world was opened to her as dramatically as though a theater curtain had been lifted. The wonders of mechanical invention dazzled her just as we might be dazzled if we were cut off from the rest of the world for a decade and then suddenly acquainted with what had been accomplished in the meantime. Japan displayed no more eagerness to master the ideas of the West than we display in our daily efforts to keep up with the progress of the world.

This was illustrated in the attitude of foreigners toward Japan. Many appear to have overlooked the fact that while Japan has been industriously studying the West, the West has been with equal industry studying Japan. The zeal of the Japanese students who were trying to master Western learning was matched by the zeal with which for-

eigners sought to master Japanese learning. Of the two, the achievements of the foreigner have been the more remarkable. Without hope of lucrative employment and official honors, of which the Japanese student could be confident, the foreign student worked with equal energy. Thanks to him, the history of Japan, its literature, its art and its social and political systems were disclosed to the West quite as rapidly as the things of the West were disclosed to the Japanese. Japan's adoption of the tools of Western civilization was because of the same discrimination that led us to adopt Japanese decorative art. We have taken from Japan all she had that we believed to be superior to our own. Japan has done the same thing. Japan has taken more only because we had more to offer.

There was, of course, a strong reason for Japan's haste in the adoption of Western civilization. It came to her in the form of battleships and threatened her national existence. Foreign merchants and investors flocked to the country. There were demands for concessions, for extra-territorial rights, for treaties which left Japan with her sovereignty sadly impaired and with the way open for foreign aggression. She believed that she must adopt the tools of the foreigner or

lose her national existence and she wisely chose the former course. The motives for the modernization of Japan were those which would have been shared by any intelligent people placed in a similar situation. It is only when we come to a study of the means employed to secure her progress that we see revealed the great difference between her people and our own.

The program for the modernization of Japan was worked out by a small group of men. It would perhaps be better to say that the decision that she was to be modernized along European lines was made by a few men, while the program, down to the minutest details, was worked out by a group of foreign experts employed for that purpose. The Japanese people had little or nothing to do with it. It was their duty to obey in haste and approve at leisure. Before they knew what railways were, they were compelled to pay taxes for the building of them. New laws, patterned after the European fashion, and actually written by Europeans, were adopted faster than the judges could learn them. Everything was made over as rapidly as the foreign experts could do the work, and the docile Japanese accepted the new order of things because they had been told to do so by their superiors.

It may be descending from the sublime to the ridiculous to compare the modernization of Japan with the introduction of forks into Europe, but it happened that soon after reading an especially enthusiastic story of the rapidity of Japan's transformation, I read Disraeli's amusing account "Of domestic novelties at first condemned," and found that the introduction of forks into general use in Europe took a longer time than has been occasioned by the entire transformation of Japan. Forks, it appears, were known at the time of Queen Bess, but such was the opposition of the independent English to this Italian invention that they did not come into general use before the Restoration. "Here the use of forks was, however, long ridiculed; it was reprobated in Germany, where some uncleanly saints actually preached against the unnatural custom 'as an insult on providence, not to touch our meat with our fingers.' It is a curious fact that forks were long interdicted in the *Congrégation de St. Maur*, and were only used after a protracted struggle between the old members, zealous for their traditions, and the young reformers, for their fingers."

Thus it has always been with all progress in the West, whether it be the introduction of forks or philosophy. Nothing has won its way until it

has been proven and accepted from the highest to the lowest. In Japan no such tedious process has been necessary. Several centuries ago, when Jesuit missionaries came near bringing Japan into the boundaries of the Papal Empire, the Japanese became nominal Christians in this way. A feudal lord, having been converted to belief in this strange religion, would send out word that all of his retainers were to assemble on the following day at a certain hour and be baptized in the new faith. These new converts, baptized in lots of thousands, would burn down the Buddhist temples where yesterday they had worshiped. Trained from the beginning of their history to that slavish obedience to superiors against which American civilization is a protest, the Japanese people have adopted Western notions for no better reason than that they were told by the officials to do so.

The belief that the masses of the Japanese people were in favor of these innovations is a common error. Here ignorance and superstition were to be found as elsewhere; it was not an impediment to progress here because of the weakness of the individual. A Japanese writer, describing the construction of the first telegraph line, says: "This pioneer line suffered much

from the persecution and maltreatment of the ignorant masses, who betrayed their simplicity by regarding telegraphy as a sort of witchcraft, and taxed the patience of the government by frequently injuring the line. The task of guarding it alone was no easy matter." Viscount Inouye, writing of the early building of railways, says: "What was then the public opinion concerning railway construction? Naturally there was a universal cry of opposition, and it is not to be wondered at, for the people were not yet able to appreciate its benefits. Even after the work of construction began, opposition was still heard."

Had the Japanese nation been composed of subjects with the independence and spirit possessed, let us say, by the average Chinese, who will be bullied into no reform of which he does not approve, Japan's progress would have been a vastly different story. It would have been accomplished by that slow and tedious process with which reform is accomplished elsewhere. No matter from what angle Japan's progress is studied, one must come to the conclusion that it has been effected quite as much through the docility of the people as through the wisdom of the leaders.

If I appear to go out of my way to bring out

this point, it is not through a desire to discount the progress of Japan, or to underrate the capabilities of the Japanese. Sooner or later Japan will demand of us certain privileges in the way of immigration and citizenship which make it important that we know what the Japanese people are. Criticism here of the Japanese people is not intended to stir up animosity between the two peoples. I desire quite as much as any one to see good relations between the two countries, but I do not believe any good will come of a friendship based on a false idea of Japan's progress, and the false ideas of the Japanese people which have been spread in America by Japanese press agents and by Japan's misguided and deluded American friends. The contrasts between Japan and America are not set forth to prove American superiority, but merely to present some of the differences between the people which appear to be important. The methods of progress indicate one of these fundamental differences.

In our own republic, before any reform can be effected we must have public approval, not only approval of the educated public, but of the ignorant as well. Then there must be a careful consideration of all of the thousands of rights and prerogatives which would be infringed by the in-

novation. We are always reforming, always progressing, but the advance is tedious because it must overcome the weight of ignorant opposition. It is permanent because this opposition has been overcome. In Japan no such considerations have been necessary. Once a change is decided on by the little group in power, it is as good as effected. There is no need to wait for tardy public approval, nor to consider the private rights which such a change might injure. Banks have been opened, railways built, schools established—all without waiting for the approval of any but the little group of rulers. Thus it has come about that Japan is the contemporary of America in her equipment of the tools of civilization, railways, banks, schools, telegraphs, shipping lines, etc.—and socially and politically is far behind the Europe from which the American colonists fled.

We must always remember that in governmental affairs particularly, the people of Japan are the materialists, and we of America the idealists. We sacrifice a certain amount of efficiency to the ideal of democracy, personal rights and liberties. The progress of the Japanese in material things is hampered by no such sentiment. Her guiding rule is expediency, and the expedient imperialistic idea has formed the dominating policy in every-

thing that Japan has done. Our republic has been built up as a dwelling place for its citizens. Japan has been built up as a glory to the Emperor. Between these two motives for national progress will be found a great deal more than the color line and the race prejudice which separate the two peoples. In it is found the only phase of the yellow peril that deserves serious consideration. We can stand the introduction of yellow labor into America, and survive, but we cannot survive the introduction of yellow political, social, and moral ideas.

There remains one more point of view from which to consider Japan's progress, a comparison with the progress we and others have made during the time in which her modernization has been accomplished. Those who tell of Japan's progress during the past half century too often ignore the fact that it is not Japan alone that has progressed during this time. The world, as is its habit, has been moving rapidly, and a large part of that progress for which Japan has been given credit is but a part of that forward impetus which has been shared by all the world. In many phases of her progress, political, social and industrial, she has not equaled the progress made by the United States during the same length of time; in

actual and potential wealth and strength, she is relatively as far behind the United States to-day as she was at the time of the visit of Commodore Perry. When we wonder at Japan's reformation of her social system, we should not forget that during this time America has abolished slavery, a social reform far greater than any which has been accomplished by Japan. The Japanese have not yet succeeded in ameliorating the condition of the two million etas, who though of pure Japanese blood are to-day socially ostracized as relentlessly as Southerners ostracize the negro. The American women, who have in so many States gained the right to vote, have advanced socially and politically far more than the Japanese women have advanced during that period. It is still against the law for a Japanese woman to attend a political meeting. To go farther afield, the individual Filipinos through American aid enjoy far more personal freedom and a greater participation in governmental affairs than is enjoyed by the individual Japanese subject. Japan has abolished the old form of her feudal government, but in operation the feudal government remains. She has a constitution, but the real rulers of the country, the Genro or Elder Statesmen, have no constitutional status. She has an elective legislative

body which can in its own constitutional right do but one thing, vote money for the maintenance of the Imperial Household. Though a quarter of a century has passed since the opening of this body, it has not yet developed any political party founded on principles.

When we come to an appraisement of Japan's material progress—and it is to this that Japan has given the most careful attention—we find the brilliancy of her achievements lessened in comparison with the achievements of others. In this phase of the story of Japan's progress, as in that dealing with social and political reforms, the chroniclers have frequently overlooked the fact that a large part of it has been merely incidental to the progress of the rest of the world. The marvel that Japan to-day has telephones, battleships, automobiles, ceases to be a marvel when we remember that fifty years ago no one had any of these things and now no country is without them. Commodore Perry's fleet which startled the Japanese out of their seclusion was made up of boats of insignificant tonnage as compared with the battleships of to-day. America had not at that time a line of railway west of the Missouri River. The telephone, the electric light, the phonograph—all these things were yet unknown to the world and

their invention and development by America is a far more wonderful feat than their adoption by Japan. Who is it that has not adopted them?

Japan's progress, even in material things, has been more dramatic but no more important than the progress of America during the same period. During the time she has been making such wonderful strides, she has not contributed as much to the material progress of the world as has Thomas A. Edison; she has not built as many railways as James J. Hill; her expenditures for education have not equaled the educational endowments of Rockefeller and Carnegie. Japanese capitalists have organized many companies, some of which are now competing with American shipping lines, while others have driven American cotton goods from portions of the Far Eastern market where formerly America was dominant, but the total of their labors is small as compared to some individual enterprises in America. The total paid up capital of all agricultural, industrial, commercial and transportation companies in Japan, embracing practically every enterprise in the country, is \$878,000,000, being but slightly in excess of the capital of the New York street railways alone, and far less than the amount invested in public utilities in the island of Manhattan. Two of the lead-

ing life insurance companies in the United States could buy up every ordinary partnership, joint stock company, and limited partnership company in Japan, thereby taking over every industry in the country except farming and fishing, and still have millions left in their reserves.

CHAPTER V

THE COST OF PROGRESS

JAPAN'S development, from the point of view of an American, has been as contrary to established principles as the Japanese way of doing things is, to us, wrong and topsyturvy. Just as a Japanese book begins where our books end, so, it appears to Americans, has Japanese national policy begun where it should end, and what should be the effect of progress has been made the cause. Imperialism, the standing of America and Americans, the relative size of our fleet, the opinion of our country and ourselves held by other people—these are things in which Americans have a certain vain and idle interest, but they have seldom been considerations which would outweigh questions of domestic policy. The occasional sneers and jeers of foreigners have aroused the ire of the individual, but even at this late day have never driven Congress to appropriate enough money to put our diplomatic and consular service on a basis suitable to our size and importance. The pacifist who would scrap our

navy and keep the army infinitesimal has his most potent ally in the citizen who believes in a big navy, but believes even more strongly that the local river should be dredged and a federal building erected at the county seat. In his eyes it is more important that Hick Center outstrip the rival city of Maple Grove than it is for the United States to maintain an adequate fleet. If the rest of the world does not appreciate the greatness of the United States, as exemplified by a thousand resplendent and growing Hick Centers, then it is the fault of the rest of the world, which is wallowing in the mire of ignorance and prejudice.

Exactly the opposite is true in Japan, for from the very beginning of her modernization, her ambition, her guiding policy in all things has been national glory—the recognition of the greatness of Japan and the equality or superiority of the Japanese people in the eyes of the world. Japan is, among the nations of the world, the social climber, and she has worked to achieve her ambition just as the social climber works. The ambition has been the same in both cases, recognition of equality by those who hold themselves superior. I know of no comparison which will better explain and visualize Japan's efforts and policies during the past fifty years than to compare her to the

woman whose husband has an income of \$3000 a year, trying to break into a social set with an average income of three times that amount. In each case the effort means sacrifice of home comforts and pleasures for outward show. In one the climber must do without the luxuries of the table, must forgo all expensive private comforts in order that she can maintain a motor car and other outward indications of wealth and luxury. In the other the climber has sacrificed the comfort and health of her subjects, has piled on them an oppressive taxation and conscription, has denied them the protection of factory laws, in order that Japan's army and navy, her mercantile marine and her diplomatic and consular service may gain for her recognition in the eyes of the world.

The struggle is one which must arouse pity, derision, or sympathy, according to the point of view. Much as we, as Americans, must condemn Japan's policy as one which is diametrically opposed to our own ideals of democracy, no one who has studied her sincere efforts to make a place for herself among the nations of the first rank but must applaud the success she has so far achieved. We certainly cannot approve of all of her methods, for some of them have been unscrupulous and she has never hesitated to sacrifice personal rights

for imperial ambitions. But we must admire the pluck and determination which has made her progress possible, has gained for her the recognition of the great powers as one on whom it is necessary to count in all questions of world politics.

Foreign approval is still a very important consideration in all matters of state policy, and the administration pays a great deal more attention to the comments of foreigners and of foreign newspapers than is generally known. Doubtless many editorial writers in America would be both surprised and flattered to know that their comments on Japan are cabled in full to the Foreign Office in Tokyo and there given out for publication in all the Japanese newspapers. During the past year I have seen comments from practically all the New York, Chicago and San Francisco newspapers and from several papers in cities of less than 100,000 cabled to Japan for publication. Very often the cabled comments, even if they could be known to represent American public opinion, could be of no conceivable value in deciding governmental policy. Their sole value was to answer that question which Japan is so insistently putting to the world: "What do you think of us? Have we advanced far enough to be recognized by you on terms of equality?" We

have a glimpse of the sensitiveness of the people when we think of the great and powerful Japanese government putting its consular and diplomatic machinery to work to collect these expressions of opinion which can do little more than flatter national vanity. The simile is inevitable: The social climber listening to the gossip of servants to learn what her rich neighbors think of her.

In every phase of her progress toward the goal which she hopes soon to reach, Japan has paid a price which Americans would refuse to pay, even if they shared the Japanese motives for progress. They would like to see American factories the largest and most prosperous in the world, but, more than that, they want the small independent manufacturer to be protected and they want the factory laborers to be well paid and to be protected by wise factory laws. A big national army and a big navy would please the vanity of some and quiet the fear of others, but most Americans have preferred low taxes and a policy which would make for peace. A system of conscription in America such as that of Japan would possibly result in a rebel army before it would form a national one. Most Americans believe that an American mercantile marine which would carry the American flag into the principal ports of the

world would be a fitting advertisement of our national greatness and a valuable commercial asset as well. But a desire to protect the sailor has outweighed the desire for ships, and until the European war forcibly brought home to Americans the great need for a mercantile marine, public opinion was overwhelmingly against any plan which would tax the people for the encouragement of shipping.

Japan's policy is in striking contrast. One of the most noteworthy achievements of the country, perhaps the one achievement outside of her wars that has brought on her the most favorable comment of the world, has been her progress in shipping. When travelers were able to go to Japan from the principal ports of the world in Japanese steamers, owned by Japanese companies and manned and managed largely by Japanese, the skeptics were willing to admit the abilities of the little brown people. As the steamship lines under Japanese ownership have grown in size the belief in Japanese capabilities has grown. Yet this success does not mean all that it appears to mean for if it were not for the lavish subsidies of the government there would not be a Japanese steamer farther away from home ports than the Chinese coast.

There are two of these Japanese steamship lines, the Toyo Kisen Kaisha and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, which compete seriously with American lines across the Pacific. The Toyo Kisen Kaisha's steamers sail from San Francisco for the Orient and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha's steamers from Seattle. The first has been for years the most serious competitor of the Pacific Mail and the second is the most serious competitor of the Great Northern Steamship Company. The American lines not only receive no subsidies or grants, but are compelled to compete with the Japanese lines for the United States mail contracts.¹

It is illuminating to see how these Japanese lines continue an apparent success. In 1913 the Toyo Kisen Kaisha, which has a paid up capital of \$6,500,000, enjoyed a gross revenue of \$2,855,000 while its gross expenditure was \$4,107,000, leaving an apparent deficit of \$1,252,000—a deficit amounting to almost 20 per cent. of the capital stock. However, the state subsidy of \$1,650,000

¹ Since the above was written the Pacific Mail Line, a pioneer in Pacific shipping, has sold its ships and retired. This action was followed by the retirement of the Great Northern Company, thus leaving no American mail boats in the transpacific trade. Though American legislation is blamed for this, Japanese shipping subsidies have been an equally important cause.

for the year enabled the company to wipe out the deficit and pay a dividend of 7.7 per cent. The Nippon Yusen Kaisha for the same year made a better showing. Its gross revenue was \$14,588,000 and gross expenditure \$14,079,000, leaving net earnings of \$519,000. The government subsidy of \$2,417,000 for the year enabled it to pass \$1,696,000 to the reserves and pay a dividend of 10 per cent. on the capital stock of \$11,000,000.

There are ten Japanese shipping companies which receive subsidies, these comprising all the companies which do a foreign carrying business. These ten companies have a combined capital stock, paid up, of \$29,945,000, and they receive an annual subsidy and bounty amounting to \$5,760,000. In other words, they can operate with a loss of almost \$3,000,000 a year and still pay a dividend of 10 per cent. on the capital stock. In the ten years ending with 1913, these shipping companies were granted subsidies amounting to more than \$43,000,000, the average annual subsidy being more than 15 per cent. of the paid up capital.

It is largely because of these companies and the subsidy which they receive that the American flag is of so little importance on the Pacific and if American legislation continues in the course it

has recently taken it will be of still less importance in the future. The principal American steamship lines are debarred from the use of the Panama Canal, while it will be open to these Japanese lines which through the support of their own government subsidy will be able to carry goods and passengers at a loss and still pay large dividends.

Unless something is done in America to relieve the situation Japan will dominate the traffic from the Atlantic coast to the Orient through the Panama Canal. At the time the American Congress was enacting laws denying steamship lines owned by American railways the right to use the canal, the Japanese authorities were drawing up a system of subsidies which would enable the Japanese lines to run at a loss and compete for Panama traffic. The scheme provides for the payment of the following state bounties to Japanese lines which maintain a service through the Panama Canal: for 1915-16, \$718,000; for 1916-17, \$841,000; for each of the three following years, \$875,000.

Let us quit complaining at American shipping when it must meet such competition as this. If the United States, following the example of Japan, would spend for shipping subsidies an

amount in proportion to the value of her farm, mine and fisheries products, she would offer her shipowners an annual subsidy of about \$75,000,000. If the expenditure were in proportion to the volume of American foreign trade, the annual shipping subsidies would be about \$40,000,000. The expenditure of either amount would certainly carry the American flag into every port in the world. This is not an argument either for or against shipping subsidies and the subject is mentioned here only to illustrate the difference between the American and the Japanese views.

The products of Japanese factories are finding a constantly increasing market. Japan has driven American cotton goods from the fine market they formerly held in Manchuria; she sells matches and toilet articles in all parts of the Far East. The chances are that the toothbrush you used this morning was made in Japan for we buy seven million Japanese toothbrushes every year. In a recent year we bought from Japan eight hundred thousand tablecloths, two hundred and thirty-three million cigarette mouthpieces, sixty-seven million paper napkins, two million imitation panama hats and twenty million bundles of braid. In addition we bought more than \$50,000,000 worth of silk in various forms. Chinese pur-

chases of manufactured products are even larger, for the Chinese take a large part of the cotton goods which Japan's million factory girls produce.

It is in the barbarous treatment of these factory girls that Japan is paying a price for her increasing foreign trade which would probably not be paid by any other country. These girls are overworked, underfed and underpaid to an extent that the average American would find unbelievable. In almost all of the factories in Japan, the dormitory system prevails, the girls being kept in barracks on the factory grounds, under the direct control of the superintendent. Usually the regulations are so strict that even the visits of parents are regulated to a certain number a month and the girls are allowed to leave the compound of the factory only with the permission of the superintendent. The visits of foreigners to these factories have been followed in the past with such harrowing stories of conditions under which the girls worked that at present it is impossible for a foreigner to visit any of the large factories.²

² "Publicists and economists have thus far concentrated their efforts on finding ways of increasing the per capita productivity of the nation, and bringing down the adverse balance of trade, but they have been strangely near-sighted. They have apparently failed to realize at what fearful cost to the present and future

It is a remarkable and interesting fact that the conditions prevailing in these factories are fairly well known to the Japanese, but there is no public sentiment against them. It is only another of the hundreds of facts which might be brought to prove that the impulse we feel to work for the welfare of man is not to be found among the Japanese. However, this spirit is awakening and occasionally one can find in the Japanese papers a reference to bad factory conditions. One of these appeared in the *Tokyo Asahi* in the early part of April, 1914. A physician who had looked after the health of a number of factory girls in Nagano prefecture wrote an article in which he said:

“The number of girls employed by all the filatures in this prefecture is 80,000, of whom 58,000 have their homes here and the others come from adjoining prefectures. Most of these girls work from 6 A. M. to 7 P. M. They are often compelled

generations has the wealth derived from the factories been won. Even though philanthropists and publicists have failed to see the menace of the factory system to the health and fertility of the nation, one would expect that the general staff of the army, at least, would have seen that sooner or later the impaired physique of hundreds of thousands of women in factories would weaken the physique of future conscripts, and would also bring down the birth-rate.”—Galen M. Fisher in “The Christian Movement in the Japanese Empire” 1915 edition.

to work for fifteen hours a day. As regards their health, the illness most prevalent among them is the illness of exhaustion—a species of illness peculiar to them which may be called ‘factory girl sickness.’ The great majority of the girls are more or less affected by this distemper. But this is not so formidable an illness, for two or three days of quiet rest will generally set the patient to rights. What is really dreadful is consumption and its rapid dissemination among them, the constitutions of factory girls growing weaker and weaker. Excess of labor combined with absence of nutritive food causes disorders of the stomach and intestines. The poor quality of the food, which is furnished by the factory management, and the extraordinary length of the working hours keep their vitality down. In two or three filatures which I have personally inspected I saw the girls despatch their meals while standing in from five to seven minutes and then resume their work without any rest.

“Yet another cause for the general decay in their health is to be found in the fact that they are paid for work done, not for the duration of their working hours. Keen competition is natural; for many, fearing to be outstripped by their competitors, volunteer to work as long as they can possi-

bly endure. While on the one hand they are thus destroying their own health, on the other the unsanitary condition of their dormitories is contributing to their destruction. They dwell promiscuously in small chambers which scarcely know the sunlight. At night they sleep together face to face, two girls on each mat. (The Japanese mat is six feet by three.) It is no wonder then that consumption should be spreading amongst them with alarming rapidity. If submitted to strict examination at least 40 per cent. of the factory girls would be found to be victims of consumption. In extreme cases girls affected with fever of over 39° (centigrade) are sometimes found actually engaged in work, and such cases are often discovered quite accidentally by physicians. Under these circumstances it is natural that the development of consumption from one stage to another is effected very rapidly. When the patients, finding it absolutely impossible to continue their work, go home, it is generally to expire in less than a month.

“What is still more terrible is the fact that young girls of twelve or thirteen, who work in the filatures in growing numbers, are infected by this disease. The owners of filatures, however, are too much engrossed with their own profits to

think of introducing remedies for the improvement of these terrific conditions. Year after year this dreadful tendency of increased disease is growing more accentuated."

The picture given here of conditions under which Japanese factory girls work is not overdrawn. Indeed the physician might have gone much farther without in any way exaggerating the horrors of Japanese factory life. There is no legal restraint whatever on the owner or superintendent of a factory, and if he see fit to work his operatives day and night he can do so. In most places the employees are on a long time contract which places them entirely at the mercy of the employer who, by holding out back pay and the imposition of fines, makes individual or collective opposition to his exactions impossible. The fact that Japanese factories are so free from strikes has often been suggested as proof of the remarkably cordial relations existing between employer and employee. It proves nothing more happy than the perfection of a system which makes strikes well-nigh impossible, and keeps the workers under a system of peonage.

Several years ago, goaded into action by foreign criticism of the inhuman factory conditions, the Japanese Diet passed a factory law. Its en-

actment by the Diet was against the violent protest of the manufacturers, who quite truthfully asserted that if they were compelled to forgo the employment of children, submit to restrictions regarding the hours of labor, obey sanitary regulations and abandon night work, they would not be able to compete with foreign mills. Before the factory law got through the Diet some member had slipped a joker into it. This is a provision that during rush seasons the legal limitations in regard to hours of labor are to be ignored and that the provincial governors may at their discretion suspend the operation of the factory law in their own provinces. Even in the law itself the hours of labor allowed were so long that in any other country the law would be a ghastly joke, for its requirements were so lax and the interpretation of the rights of employers so broad as to have only the effect of legalizing the inhuman methods now prevailing. However, the entire bit of legislation has now only a melancholy academic interest, for after the bill was passed by the Diet it was stored away in the archives and has never been given the Imperial sanction that legislation in Japan must receive before it becomes a law. The fact that the Japanese Diet had passed a factory law was heralded abroad. Newspapers com-

mented on this convincing proof of the advance of Japan—and the overworked, underfed factory girls went on committing suicide at the same rate as before.

The Japanese manufacturers were quite right when they protested against any kind of factory legislation, for it is only their prodigal expenditure of human life that enables them to compete successfully with British and American factories for the trade of Asia. So great is the wastage that factory owners are compelled to recruit about 200,000 new employees every year in order to keep up the supply. These girls come from the farms, but after their factory experience, the police records show, less than half of them return to their homes. The others drift from one unskilled employment to another, many of them becoming maids in the disreputable tea houses or inmates in houses of prostitution. The price which Japan will pay for this present commercial success will be measured in the decreased birth rate of the future, if a more violent reckoning is not exacted by social and political upheavals.

Japan's great success in manufacturing has been usually credited to her very low wage scale which is made possible by her very low cost of living. The other factor, of equal or greater impor-

tance, is the inhuman condition under which her goods are produced. The Japanese worker is not efficient, and even with the low wage scale, the Japanese factories would not be able to compete with other factories, if they were compelled to observe the regulations enforced here or in England.

The wage scale of Japan, as given by the official reports, is very low. According to the fourteenth Financial and Economic Annual of Japan, average daily wages of laborers in various lines of work were, in 1913:

	<i>Cents</i>
Female silk spinners	15
Weavers, male,	21
Weavers, female,	13
Dyers	25
Tailors	28
Shoemakers	30
Confectioners	22
Carpenters	43
Plasterers	45
Stonecutters	50
Jewelers	34
Printers	26

The wage rate in many lines is even lower than indicated by these figures. This is especially true of factory girls, most of whom are compelled to live in the dormitories of the factory and take meals furnished by the management. The cost of

these accommodations is taken from their wages and a system of fines still further reduces the amount they actually receive. There have been instances of girls working for months and actually being in debt to the factory owner at the end of the time.

In all lines given above, the wages apply, not to the eight-hour day of America, but to the ten-, twelve- or sixteen-hour day of Japan. For instance, Japanese printers, if paid the wage given above for the 48-hour week which is now observed in so many American printing shops, would earn from \$1 to \$1.25 weekly. Stonecutters, plasterers and carpenters in Japan as elsewhere are likely to have long periods of idleness, which greatly reduce their average daily income. Some of the wage scales are based, not on hours worked but on the amount of work done, so that the wages given above apply only when the wage earner has performed tasks designated as a theoretical day's work.

There is a common belief that the low cost of living in Japan tends to equalize the low scale of wages, and make it possible for the Japanese workman to enjoy about the same comforts and opportunities as are enjoyed by his fellow workman in other lands. This is one of the many illu-

sions about Japan. The problem of making income meet expenditure is, for nine-tenths of the Japanese, a problem which must be solved not only by careful thrift but by much self-denial as well. Japanese periodicals devoted to the interests of women are full of discussions of the problem and in a recent symposium on the subject, a number of model family budgets were published. Among them a very interesting one was submitted by a primary school-teacher with a monthly salary of \$17.50. He was married and had two children, his family being smaller than the usual Japanese family, just as his income was larger than that enjoyed by any Japanese workman. He divided his expenses as follows:

Rice	\$2.60
Sugar, salt, tea, wood	1.95
Meat, pickles, etc.	3.00
House rent	3.75
Furniture50
Clothing	1.25
Social expense (entertaining)75
Books and newspapers75
Car fare75
Barber and bath35
Extraordinary expense50
Pocket money and tobacco85
Savings50

The amount expended would buy no more rice in Japan than in America, for the price of this food staple is practically the same in both countries. It would purchase about 50 pounds of the best quality rice, or 70 pounds of the poorest quality. The amount of sugar and salt purchased would be practically the same as in America, while tea would, of course, be cheaper, and wood dearer in Japan. The amount expended for meat would purchase less in Japan than in America unless all of it were spent for fish. Nearness to the source of supply makes fish a very cheap article of diet. The minimum prices for meat, at the time this budget was published, were: beef, 23 cents a pound; horse meat, 13 cents; pork, 15 cents. These prices, it should be noted, are for the cheapest cuts. It has been my experience that the good cuts of meat are more expensive in Japan than in America. Butter, cheese, milk and cream sell at about the same price in both countries. Eggs in Japan are cheaper, the best grade selling the year round at 18 cents a dozen. But this is hardly a fair comparison, for the eggs of Japan are much smaller and are of an inferior quality. Vegetables, as a rule, are cheaper in Japan, though the difference is not great. If the teacher whose budget is pub-

lished bought the cheapest quality of horse meat and the cheapest quality of rice, he would have a daily allowance of food for each member of the family of 3 ounces of horse meat and 10 ounces of rice. Any variation of the diet would mean lessened quantities of these two staples.

The house for which a rental of \$3.75 a month is paid could probably not be duplicated in America. It is small, of very light construction which gives no protection from the cold of winter. Its nearest counterpart would be found in the single room of a frame tenement. Considering the fact that the renter in Japan does not have the benefit of sewers, improved streets and sidewalks, rents in Japan are no cheaper than in America.

It is difficult to make a comparison between the cost of clothing in the two countries, owing to the great differences in requirements. Cotton and silk textiles cost much less in Japan than in America, while the smaller cost of the cotton fabric is largely offset by its inferior quality. From personal experience I would say that clothing of the European style costs about the same in Japan as in England. Japanese clothing, contrary to the usual idea, is more expensive than European and many Japanese adopt the foreign style of dress out of motives of economy. The Japanese spend

much less for clothing than we do, but that is largely because their requirements are less. Nowhere else in the world does a collar do such yeoman service before it is sent to the wash. In few other countries do the people do with such a small amount of clothing. During a great part of the year the climate is such that little clothing is needed and the lower classes do not add much to the loin cloth which a wise statute requires all residents of Japan to wear. But in the winters, which are more severe than those of England, there is intense suffering from the cold. A very large proportion of the population—certainly one-fifth—wear nothing but thin cotton garments from year end to year end in spite of the fact that snow and sleet remain on the ground for days at a time.

Electric lights, gas, coal and wood are as expensive in Japan as elsewhere. The family whose budget has been given would have no more than one electric light of 8-candle power and would have no heat other than a tiny charcoal fire. Street car fares are cheaper, as they are cheaper everywhere. It is only in America and the Philippines that a five-cent street car fare is charged. However, the monthly allowance of 75 cents for street car fare would provide for only thirty trips

during the month. The Japanese live on their pitifully small incomes only because they do without many things we believe to be necessities.

When Japan started on her imperial progress, she had no money and little resources. In order to carry out her plans, she has been a prodigal borrower and has piled up an enormous debt. The present national debt, exclusive of the millions owed abroad for provincial and municipal loans and industrial debentures, amounts to 1250 million dollars. How greatly this debt overbalances the resources of the country may be realized by the statement that Japan's creditors might take over every agricultural, industrial, commercial and transportation concern in the country at the capital stock valuation without satisfying more than one-fourth of the obligation. The entire exports of the country for four years would not be enough to retire the outstanding national bonds. The strain on Japan's credit is shown by the fact that Japanese bonds are less favored and sell at a cheaper price than bonds of Mexico, China or Cuba.

In addition to the huge sums required to pay the interest on this big debt and establish a sinking fund, the Japanese statesmen have been prodigal in their expenditure for the army and navy, and,

as has been shown in detail, in their encouragement of the mercantile marine. To meet these great outlays every possible resource of taxation has been exhausted. There is a high protective tariff on imports and taxes on every kind of business. Government monopolies on salt, tobacco and camphor add to the prices of these staples and turn additional revenue into the exchequer. The income tax affects all with an income of more than \$150 a year. When one rides on a street car, one-fifth of the fare is paid to the government as a transit tax. Railways, telegraphs and telephones have been nationalized to add to the national revenue. There are special taxes on sugar, kerosene and textiles. The taxes have been piled up so rapidly that they have doubled in the past ten years and one of the most pressing problems of the administration at present is the discovery of some new method of taxation which will increase the national revenue. While the taxation burdens have increased, the increases in the national army have taken from productive employment hundreds of thousands of young men. One of the immediate results of this great national debt and the expenditures on imperial projects has been to greatly increase the cost of living. There has been an increase also in the scale of wages, but this

has not been in proportion to the advance in prices.

The peasants and laborers have paid a heavy price for the progress of the country and have had little or nothing to say about the policies which determined that progress. Through property qualifications the franchise is limited to a million and a half of the fifteen million men who would be allowed to vote if American laws were applied. These voters under the bureaucratic system of government, have little influence or authority. The millions of lesser people who cast no vote are but rarely considered in legislation. They are poorer to-day than they were a decade ago. The laborer has a larger income, but he must pay out more of it for taxes and must pay enhanced prices for rent, food and clothing. The farmer is finding it impossible to stand up under the economic strain and every year a growing number of the small independent farmers are compelled to sell their ancestral holdings and take up the drudgery and semi-slavery of tenant farming.

Let us look at the other and even less pleasing side of the picture. While the lower classes are growing poorer, the capitalists and landlords, rulers and friends of rulers, are growing richer. They have sacrificed nothing, but have ridden to

wealth on the wings of national ambition. The connection between the capitalists and the powerful official circle is close, and in a country where the government controls so many enterprises and is so lavish in its expenditures on national undertakings, there are many rich plums. Shipping subsidies are paid to steamship lines whose stock is held by the Imperial family, by the officials and their friends. Government contracts are given to firms in which officials are interested; government funds are used to aid banks in which officials and their families are stockholders. The Russo-Japanese War, which piled such heavy debts on the country and added so much to the burdens of the poor, made fortunes for the capitalists. The practices by which those close to powerful officials gain fortunes are more or less open, and there is no public opinion which condemns them. It is a notorious fact that though the salaries of high officials are very small, many of them retire from a short term of office with comfortable fortunes.

The progress of Japan has been accomplished at great cost and enormous sacrifices. But the cost has not fallen on the people responsible for the rule of the country. Just as the old daimyos surrendered their possessions to the Emperor only in return for government bonds, so have the suc-

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cessors of the daimyos profited at every step in the progress of the country. The cost has been borne by that oppressed mass which has not yet found power to voice its wrongs.

CHAPTER VI

DANGEROUS THOUGHTS

SEVERAL years ago a Japanese statesman coined a phrase, "dangerous thoughts," which has come into usage as common as President Roosevelt's "undesirable citizen" or President Wilson's "watchful waiting." Indeed, while the presidential phrases have had their vogue and have gone into the ash heap with last year's slang, the Japanese phrase is growing in popularity and will probably continue to be used for many years to come. Everyone in Japan knows what "dangerous thoughts" are and a great many people are thinking dangerously. In a broad way "dangerous thoughts" may be said to include all those ideas of Western civilization which cannot be accepted without doing violence to Japan's political and social institutions. There are many kinds of these thoughts. Socialism is one, believed by the Japanese authorities to be the most insidious and most dangerous. Personal rights is another, for when the people of Japan

begin to think of personal rights and liberties, the sand under the foundation of Japanese things political will begin to wash away. The new feminism is another, for Japan is so far behind the rest of the world in social and political evolution that we find the problems that the West solved in the Middle Ages and the problems the West is striving now to solve demanding an equal amount of attention.

There are so many of these dangerous thoughts in present-day Japan that it would be most difficult to place them in the order of their importance. But since the government towers above everything else in Japan, is the fountain of all morality as well as all power, it may be well to consider first the dangerous thoughts which do most violence to the theory of government itself. The theory of the government of Japan is exactly the reverse of that of the United States. No Japanese statesman ever thought of "the consent of the governed," for that would have been a most dangerous thought, dangerous alike for Japanese institutions and for the man who proposed such an heretical idea. The Emperor is supreme, his powers being set forth in the first part of the constitution of Japan as follows:

"The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over

and governed by a line of emperors unbroken for ages eternal. The Emperor is sacred and inviolable. The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercising them, according to the provisions of this constitution."

Thus the entire structure of the Japanese state is reared on the belief that the Emperor is the descendant of the gods, sacred and divine. There is no other authority for Japanese law and it is solely through appointment by the Emperor or sanction of his acts that a Japanese official exercises his powers. The many elective officers do not take office until their election has been sanctioned by the Emperor, and the election itself is nothing more, in theory, than a recommendation to the Emperor that a certain candidate be appointed to that particular office. So thoroughly is this theory carried out that more than one candidate for the mayoralty of a city is voted for, those receiving the smaller number of votes being recommended to the Emperor as alternates, to receive the appointment in the event that the leading candidate does not meet with Imperial favor.

Since the accession to the throne of the present ruler the popular belief in the divinity of the Emperor has been weakened. The present Em-

peror, son of the late Emperor Meiji by a concubine, does not command the veneration of his subjects as did his father, a circumstance which is explained alike by the growing skepticism of the people and by the differences in the men. The late Emperor was a man who justly earned the regard of all Japanese and those who were skeptical enough to reject the idea of his divinity, respected him as a man. The prestige of the present Emperor must, unfortunately, rest solely on the theory of his divine ancestry. He lacks the strong character of his father, is a weakling in body, and according to Tokyo gossip, is a weakling in mind as well. Gossip like this may be expected about those who lead mysterious lives like that of the Emperor of Japan. In this case it is of no importance whether or not it be true. The important thing is that Japanese make this charge against their Emperor, for it shows that some of them have pierced the shallow ruse and found the man beneath the trappings of divinity.

Nothing in Japan has been guarded more carefully than this idea of the divinity of the Emperor and nothing, the Japanese statesmen would have us believe, has a firmer hold on the people. In the past it has not been necessary to definitely attack the idea to bring about a storm of protest; any-

thing that could in any way be construed as a suggestion that the Emperor was not divine, that the Japanese state could be anything other than it is, was interpreted as treason. In 1891, Mr. Ozaki, who was then Minister of Education, made a speech in which he criticized the tendency of the Japanese to give undue honors to men with money. In order to illustrate his point he said: "You Japanese worship money even more reverently than the Americans do. If you had a republic as they have, you would nominate an Iwazaki or a Mitsui to be president, whereas they don't think of electing a Vanderbilt or a Gould." This faint suggestion that a republican form of government might be possible in Japan was seized upon by Mr. Ozaki's political opponents to such good advantage that in a short time they had forced him to resign his office and retire from political life for several years. His speech so weakened the prestige of the cabinet of which he was a member that it was compelled to retire soon after.

It would be vain to attempt to determine how widespread is the disbelief in the divinity of the Emperor. It is naturally not a subject of general conversation, for the police are everywhere, and punishment for such blasphemy is severe. Yet many Japanese have, in private conversation, told

me this idea of divinity was only a bit of political nonsense with which the officials sought to fool the people. This skepticism may be confined to the group of socialists who flourish clandestinely in Tokyo. Criticism of the theory of state is beyond the capabilities of the average Japanese subject, nor would it be consistent with Japanese character to quarrel with a theory. The great bulk of the Japanese accept the theory in its entirety, and falter in their loyalty to the Emperor only when that loyalty calls for something more than respectful bows. Payment of taxes and service in the army comprise the two concrete duties of the Japanese to their emperor, and it is in the fulfilment of these duties that the flaw in their devotion appears. Some would have us believe that Japanese patriotism is of such a superior quality that they look on the payment of taxes and service in the army as joyful privileges rather than painful duties. Yet the Japanese system has not made the collection of taxes or the enforcement of conscription any easier there than elsewhere, except insofar as it is made easier by the greater docility of the Japanese.

While in Japan I took advantage of every opportunity to inquire of Japanese friends about the payment of taxes and was surprised at the number

of them who had managed to escape the attentions of the tax collector. The practice of giving false returns for the income tax is widespread and is connived at by some of the biggest concerns in Japan. The same attitude prevails toward conscription which is universally dreaded and universally avoided. The number of young Japanese who pretend defective eyesight in order to avoid being drafted into the army has given opportunity for a collection of native jests on the prosperity of the spectacle makers as affected by the size of the standing army. Any visitor to Tokyo must be struck by the fact that spectacle wearers are confined almost exclusively to young men of conscription age. I do not pretend to say that the Japanese are any more adept at dodging taxes than are my own countrymen, or that their attitude toward conscription is not more obedient than our attitude would be. In theory Japanese patriotism is of a peculiar quality, combining in itself the highest motives of civic and religious duty; in practice it differs from other patriotism only in a narrow chauvinism and in the blindness of its devotion to the opinion of leaders. In fact Japanese statesmen have taken advantage of the very natural disinclination to serve in the army by making certain exemptions of students in the higher schools, with

the result that students make many sacrifices in the hope of being able to remain in school and postpone or avoid service in the army.

Partly as a result of this system of encouragement of higher education, Japan is suffering now and has suffered for several years from a surplus of young men with a college education. By their training they have unfitted themselves for mechanical labor, and there is no place for them in the government or in the overcrowded professions. In the early part of her modernization the Japanese government was able to give employment to all who mastered even the rudiments of a foreign education. So great was the demand for talent of this sort that illiterate American and British sailors have in the past found lucrative employment as teachers of English. The government then took over the entire educational product of the country, and it still takes over the pick of the graduates. The government has a virtual monopoly on the brains of Japan, for both high and low prefer employment by the government to any other career. The permanency of employment even at a low wage is attractive, and there is the further advantage that one's social position in Japan is determined solely by his official rank. But that

tendency to combine into clans and groups which is so characteristic of the Japanese soon asserted itself in the government service and now entry into the charmed circle of official employment is guarded by every known device of nepotism. The average departmental payroll looks like a family tree, and even a roster of high officials of the country betrays on close examination striking family connections, and even more striking and dangerous connections with great financial interests. Ten years ago Lafcadio Hearn commented on this condition, which exists to-day in a more aggravated degree than at his time. He said: "In theory any man of great talent and energy may rise, from rank to rank, up to the highest positions. But as private life is still controlled to no small degree by the old communism, so public life is yet controlled by survivals of class or clan despotism. The chances for ability to rise without assistance, to win its way to rank and power, are extraordinarily small; since to contend alone against an opposition that thinks by groups, and acts by masses, must be almost hopeless. Only commercial or industrial life now offers really fair opportunities to capable men. The few talented persons of humble origin who do succeed in

official directions owe their success chiefly to party help or clan patronage; in order to force any recognition of personal ability, group must be opposed to group."

Since that was written the same clannishness which had closed the ranks of official employment operated to limit the opportunities for employment in industry and commerce. Just as the Choshu and Satsuma clans have gained and held complete control of the army and the navy so have certain powerful families gained control of certain industries and businesses. The most notable example of this is the great Mitsui family, which handles more than one-third of the exports and imports of Japan. This great concern, with branches in all parts of the world, is relatively of greater importance in Japan than would be a great American combination consisting of the Standard Oil Company, the steel trust, the harvester trust, and all the great life insurance and banking companies. In this as well as all other enterprises in Japan, kinship to one in power is the only certain method of securing employment.

It is from the ranks of these unemployed young men that the political malcontents are recruited. There is a Young Japan party just as truly as there is, or was, a Young Turk party and a Young

China party. The stringency and efficiency of police regulations keep the Young Japan party silent and clandestine. It would perhaps be too much to say that they have any definite aims or policies, that they are united by any stronger bond than a vigorous if repressed discontent with things as they are.

They are the "Outs" in political affairs and against them the "Ins" are effectively barricaded by a limitation of the ballot, for these briefless young lawyers, idle physicians, and unemployed graduates are by their poverty denied the right to vote. The use of the ballot might afford this large and growing class of malcontents an opportunity to work off their unrest in political activity, but any extension of the ballot liberal enough to include them would be revolutionary, and would mean even greater turbulence than is now the rule in Japanese politics. This reform, like an extension of greater powers to the Diet, would be plunging into immediate difficulties in order to avoid a danger which is, as yet, remote. The Japanese people, as a mass, have not yet shown any great political abilities or any large capacity for self-government. A quarter of a century of parliamentary experience has not yet resulted in the formation of a single political party with fixed

and definite principles. Many parties have been formed in the past on what appeared to be a bed-rock of political belief, but all of them soon abandoned their principles for personal allegiance to one or another leader, and none have hesitated to adjust and reverse their platforms to meet political exigencies of the day. There are not half a dozen political leaders in Japan who have not shamelessly abandoned their principles and violated their election pledges, not once, but many times. The political parties of the present time bear more resemblance to our fraternal organizations than to our political parties. They are composed of men who are bound together by common interests, not by common principles. Party membership plays but a minor part in elections to the Diet, personal allegiance being a far more important factor. Members of the Diet frequently change parties after election, with no complaints from their constituents and no explanations for the change.

In spite of the fact that the ballot is restricted to the prosperous one-tenth of the population, bribery and selling of votes is a shockingly common practice. Every election is followed by investigations which show widespread political corruption. Enormous sums are spent by candidates

for the seats in the Diet and investigations show that this money is often expended directly in the purchase of votes. Membership in the Diet carries with it little power, and a very small salary. But it does often give the holder an opportunity to share in government patronage. It is quite a common practice for members of the Diet to accept positions on the directorate of concerns which hope to profit through government contracts, and it is from such connections as this that the members are able to recoup themselves for their heavy election expenses.

Recent events have shown that even among the higher officers of the country bribery and commission hunting are common. Within the past year conditions in the Household Department, which has charge of the administration of the Emperor's estate, have been found to be so bad that there was a wholesale dismissal of all the higher employees. During the same time an admiral has been convicted of the collection of a commission on the cost of one of Japan's biggest battleships, and there was a cabinet crisis due to the implication of one of the members of the Cabinet in a piece of bribery. These are but the most prominent incidents of a year which has been filled with hundreds of exposures of bribery and political corruption.

There is no reason to believe that an extension of the ballot would remedy any of these conditions. On the other hand it is quite reasonable to suppose that it would make conditions worse. If the most prosperous subjects show such a small appreciation of the duties of citizenship, is it reasonable to suppose that the conduct of the poorer and less responsible portion of the population would be any better?

Some of the malcontents turn their thoughts to socialism, though necessarily in secret, for only a few years ago several Japanese subjects were executed for no greater crime than a public avowal of belief in socialist doctrines. Since then the socialists have flourished in a secrecy so well guarded that one cannot make an intelligent guess at their number. Socialist books are clandestinely published and circulated. Some daring souls even manage to make socialist street speeches, carefully sugar coating their socialist teaching with patriotic sentiments. It is this element that is responsible for the many riots in Tokyo in the past few years. They are but following the precedent set by many others in other lands, for when the ballot is denied it is human nature to turn to the use of cobble stones. In the past these disturbances have never been very serious; in fact the

Tokyo rioters have seldom done as much damage to property as would be done by a bunch of American schoolboys celebrating a football victory. They have seldom had any definite object except a display of defiance for constituted power. It may be many years before these disturbances take on a serious aspect, but the discontent, the loss of faith in the impeccability of the Japanese state and the tendency toward independent modern thought on political things have yearly grown more pronounced.

The dangerous thoughts of Japanese women have little to do with politics. It is against the law in Japan for women to attend political meetings, so that a Japanese suffragist becomes a felon as soon as she attempts to gain converts to her cause. The possibility of Japanese women voting is so remote that so far as I know it has never been discussed in Japan. The franchise as granted to men is so limited by property qualifications that I doubt if more than 5000 women of Japan could qualify to vote even if the sex qualification were removed. Nine-tenths of these would be the proprietresses of questionable tea houses, for that class comprises practically all of the women who have independent business enterprises and independent incomes. This results in the peculiar

situation that the Japanese women's efforts for the franchise would result only in increased power for the few women whom the others hold to be the enemies of the sex.

The dangerous thoughts of the Japanese women are much more primitive and fundamental. They are hoping, not for political rights, but for decent womanhood. They want a marriage system which will guarantee the faith of the husband, a reform in society which will not allow the husband to openly flout the wife for any painted prostitute who may strike his fancy. They want also, though the want has hardly yet become articulate, a reform in the laws and social system which will give some stability to the marriage relation, for divorces are more frequent in Japan than in any other country of the world. Not long since, the Japanese author of a book on the Japanese-American immigration question sought to prove his contention for Japanese immigration by proving that America was no better morally than Japan. Among the many other charges he brought against his adopted home was the very large number of divorces in America. He had evidently forgotten to look up the facts as regards his own country. The comparative statistics for a recent year are as follows:

	<i>Marriages for year</i>	<i>Divorces for year</i>	<i>Percentage divorces to marriages</i>
Japan	461,000	60,000	13
United States ...	853,000	72,000	8½

The percentage of divorces in America is nothing to be proud of but at least it can be reasonably explained. With a few minor exceptions which do not affect the general rule, it will be seen on an examination of the statistics that the percentage of divorces to marriages in the United States is large in the Western States where the community is new; and small in the older States where society is more settled. Thus in New England, the only part of the United States which can be in any way compared to Japan for established social systems, the percentage of divorces is negligible. There the permanency of the social system makes marriages permanent, just as in the West the looseness of the social system tends to make marriages easily dissolved. If the Japanese were like Americans we might reasonably expect them to have the lowest instead of the highest percentage of divorces, for if a few centuries of life in New England can result in a low divorce rate, it might be reasonable to expect twenty centuries of life in Japan would have a similar happy result.

That this has not been the result is only another

proof, if any additional proof be needed, that there is a very wide gulf separating the Japanese from the Americans. It is difficult for Westerners, and especially for Americans, to understand the Japanese attitude toward women, for their attitude ignores in this relation all that we take for granted. Some of the most beautiful bits of our literature, some of the most charming stories of our history are based on love between husband and wife. It is not too much to say that the Japanese leave out of consideration any such sentiment as this. To put it bluntly, they do not distinguish between love and lust, and see in the relationship of the sexes nothing more noble than the workings of animal passion. Any public reference to domestic affection they consider as shameful as a public reference to those passions which they believe to be the sole relationship between the sexes. Dr. Gulick in his *Evolution of the Japanese* has given a characteristic example of this. Some years ago, when the late Dr. Neesima, the founder of the Doshisha, a leading Japanese school, was on the eve of his departure for the United States he made an address to the students. "In the course of his remarks he stated that there were three principal considerations that made him regret the necessity for his departure at that time. The first was that

the Doshisha was in a most critical position; it was but starting on its larger work, and he felt that all its friends should be on hand to help the great undertaking. The second was that he was compelled to leave his aged parents, whom he might not find living on his return to Japan. The third was his sorrow at leaving his beloved wife. This public reference to his wife, and especially his love for her, was so extraordinary that it created no little comment, not to say scandal; especially obnoxious was it to many, because he mentioned her after having mentioned his parents. In the reports of this speech given by his friends to the public press no reference was made to this expression of love for his wife. And a few months after his death, when Dr. Davis prepared a short biography of Dr. Neesima, he was severely criticized by some of the Japanese for reproducing the speech as Dr. Neesima gave it."

We have the highest authority in Japan that domestic affection, as we understand it, is not considered a necessary part of the marriage relation. It is no less an authority than the rescript of the late Emperor Meiji¹ which is declared to be the embodiment of Japanese morals, the Ten Commandments of the Japanese. The rescript, in

¹ *Japan Year Book*, 1912 edition, page 174.

part, reads: "Ye, our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brother and sister; as husbands and wives be harmonious; as friends, true." More, it will be seen, is demanded in the relations between friends, children and parents and brother and sister than is demanded in the relation between husband and wife. If they can live in harmony the commands of the rescript will have been fulfilled! It would hardly have been consistent for the Emperor to have taken a different attitude toward marriage since he had one wife and seven concubines, and some facetious ones have suggested that the rescript reflected an ideal of connubial relations which must have been uppermost in the mind of a husband of eight.

CHAPTER VII

THE TWO JAPANS

IT is probably the experience of every one who tries to gain an understanding of Japan by reading the books and articles written about the country, that he finds so many contradictory statements that the longer he studies the more difficult it is for him to come to any decision about the country or the people. Every generalization whether it be in favor of Japan or against it can be disproved by an overwhelming mass of contradictory evidence. For every piece of evidence one can find that the Japanese are or are not industrious, progressive, efficient, kindly, moral, cruel, good, bad, peaceful, warlike; it is possible to produce equally good evidence to prove the contrary.

This contradictory state of affairs may be partly accounted for by the great differences between different classes of Japanese, differences in development which have produced rather sharply contrasted results. There is, for instance, official Japan and unofficial Japan. Official Japan, made

up of the ruling oligarchy, having the first demand on the brains of the country, is, comparatively, efficient, progressive and, to outward show at least, governed by the same code of morals that governs similar classes in other countries. Unofficial Japan, the Japan of the people, is still living with the feudal point of view. It is inefficient and unprogressive except as efficiency and progress are forced on it by the officials. We find the Japanese army and navy, the foremost products of the official classes, to be equal if not superior to other organizations. The operations at Port Arthur and later at Tsingtau proved the high capabilities of these two organizations. Troops were moved, provisions and ammunitions carried over long distances, railways built, and extensive military operations carried on without a hitch and with a minimum of labor and maximum of effect. Many observers believe the abilities of the Japanese army and navy to be vastly overrated, and this belief may be the correct one, but it is certain that in comparison with other Japanese enterprises, the degree of efficiency developed in these two organizations is remarkable.

One may turn from the army and navy to any of the industries of Japan and see a remarkable contrast. Everywhere there is inefficiency, confusion,

great manual skill in the use of primitive tools, but great waste of effort through lack of organization and inability to use labor-saving devices. The millions of wooden clogs which are produced each year are still made just as they were made centuries ago, in small shops, almost the entire process being by hand. Yet there are few articles of every-day use in any land which could be more easily produced by machinery, or whose cost would be more certainly reduced by the adoption of labor-saving methods.

In the industries where imported machinery is used, there is the same inefficiency. An authority on Japan who is noted for his sympathetic criticism of the people says: "A visit to Japanese factories often shows machinery treated carelessly, employees so numerous that they impede rather than expedite business, and a general lack of the precision, regularity and earnestness that characterize successful industrial enterprise in Europe and America."¹

Everywhere in Japan, in big factory or small shop, in office or bank, there is what appears to a Westerner to be a great surplus of employees and a maddening tediousness about transacting the most trivial business. One need only carry an ac-

¹ *Japan*, by Captain Brinkley.

count at a Japanese bank to get a forcible illustration of this. On many occasions I have watched the process through which the bank machinery went in order to cash a check. It has on some occasions been thirty minutes after check and bankbook were presented at the teller's window before the cash was actually received. The record time, so far as my experience goes, was ten minutes. On that occasion I made a special request to the bank manager to hurry as I was trying to catch a departing steamer.

In America the cashing of a check need not take thirty seconds. Not so in Japan. Here the teller stamps the check with his seal and passes it to the bookkeeper who checks up the pass book with the bank's books to see that the entries tally. A second bookkeeper enters the new check on both books and passes both to the chief cashier who examines all the entries to see that they are correct and then endorses an order for the payment of the money. A fifth clerk records the endorsement and makes a final check. The documents then go to a sixth man who, if there has been no hitch in the proceedings and you are still waiting, pays you the money. The six men who take care of the cashing of a check in the Japanese bank would not be able to attend to one-tenth the number of customers who

are taken care of by the average teller of an American bank.

In the printing and publishing business in Japan there is inefficiency and waste which would drive any American concern into bankruptcy. On the best managed newspapers in the country forty reporters do the work ten would do in America and do it twice as well. In the mechanical processes connected with printing, such as stereotyping, electrotyping, and engraving, the work done is usually very poor and the minimum time in which it is possible to complete a process is four or five times the ordinary period required in America. But in the government printing office there is great improvement over these conditions. There the machinery is modern and the employees the most skilled to be found in the country. Japanese manufacturers have as yet done very little in the way of supplying the demands of their country for machinery. A cheap bicycle is the most ambitious product of the private factories, but in the government factories large caliber guns and other munitions of war of the best quality are turned out.

This official and unofficial Japan is only one of the many contrasted aspects of the country. There is the surface Japan, the country which the

tourist sees, and the country which slowly and reluctantly reveals itself to the disillusioned foreign resident. There is the Japan of the wistaria and smiling faces and beautiful scenery which enchants the tourist who does not stay long enough to learn that it is but the outer shell of a nation which, according to a well-known authority, "reeks with every species of moral filth, abomination, crime and corruption." So are there two Japanese people, the polite obliging fellow traveler or casual acquaintance who will walk blocks out of his way to show a tourist some point of interest, and the officious and sometimes insolent official understrapper with whom the foreign resident often comes in touch. While Japan is the paradise of the tourist, it proves a very nerve-racking place for many foreign residents.

In so far as these different aspects of the country are natural, we can have no quarrel with them. Rarely does the tourist view of a place coincide with the view held by the foreign resident. In China the old resident is the one who expresses the highest regard for the Chinese, while the tourist who does not remain long enough to learn the solid worth of the people often goes away with the impression that all are dirty and nearly all dishonest.

But divergent views of Japan cannot be entirely accounted for by the superficiality of the tourist and the more or less profound observation of the old resident, for in both cases the truth is obscured by the Japanese people themselves. More than a half century ago Sir Rutherford Alcock observed "the incorrigible tendency of the Japanese to withhold from foreigners or disguise the truth on all matters great and small." This tendency could have been accounted for at that time as being a spontaneous effort on the part of the Japanese, who were quite naturally suspicious of the foreigner and believed that he would use to his own advantage all the information he had about the country. More recently this has been developed into an organized campaign with many ramifications whose purpose it is to cover up all that is bad about Japan, and to exploit all that is good, whether real or imaginary.

There are many small towns in the West where the stranger may live for months without being able to learn anything to the detriment of the place. It may be subject to drouths, it may be in debt up to the eyebrows, perhaps sand storms make the springtime hideous, but all of these things are concealed by the local patriots, who point with pride to everything in the vicinity and

view nothing with alarm. Among themselves they may discuss the disadvantages of climate and soil and the shortcomings of the city administration, but none of this reaches the ears of the visitor. A psychologist might attribute this to the self-consciousness and sensitiveness of a new and loosely organized community. A cynic might find that most of the boosters have real estate to sell. Whatever the cause, the result is often deceptive to the visitor unless he knows the viewpoint of the residents of young and hopeful cities.

Similar motives have developed in Japan a code in which every Japanese heartily concurs, binding himself to present to strangers only the best side of Japanese affairs. Whether it be a ricksha coolie or a government official one talks to, it is always exceedingly difficult to get him to give any information which he feels would lower Japan in the estimation of the foreigner. I have been told that Americans have the same characteristic and perhaps this is true. In several corners of the world I have heard fellow Americans paint word pictures of an America I do not know. But the work of the boasting American is crude compared to that of the Japanese. No people in the world are more adept at making virtue out of necessity, or of painting vice in presentable colors.

A foreigner of long residence in Japan, who had spent many years in a study of the history of the country, was once asked to describe in one word the dominant characteristic of the Japanese people. He answered that the one word to describe them was "nice." They are a nice people. Perhaps no other has ever paid so much attention to the little relationships of life, to the formalities of intercourse. No matter what situation may arise in Japan, its rough and unpleasant features are glossed over. Truth is never the supreme consideration. Far more important than truth is the necessity to avoid any unpleasantness, any word or action which may be deemed impolite.

It naturally follows from this that it is a Japanese characteristic to give some ethical or sentimental reason for the existence of customs which might readily be explained from natural causes. For example, if you ask a Japanese why his countrymen abstain from eating large quantities of meat, the chances are he will reply that it is because they are Buddhists and Buddhism forbids the eating of meat. One might accept this fine proof of piety did he not know that Buddhism also enjoins respect for the lives of fishes which have always formed (except for one brief period) a staple of Japanese food. The skeptic can easily

explain the vegetarian tendencies of the Japanese by the fact that they have never had any food animals, the native grasses being too coarse for pasturage. Their abstinence has been of the same measure as their necessity.

Many foreign writers reflect this view. No less an authority than Lafcadio Hearn was impressed by the kindness of the people to dumb animals as proven by the sight of "farmers coming to town, trudging patiently beside their horses or oxen, aiding their dumb companions to bear the burden." The picture is pretty, as all Japanese pictures are, and especially those painted by Hearn's magic pen, but what are the facts? In a land where one can hire a carter at ten dollars a month to drive a horse which costs twelve dollars a month to feed, it would be foolish for the carter to ride the horse. The value of the labor of the horse is greater than that of man's labor and always has been in Japan, so very naturally the carter leads and aids the horse. No other arrangement would be sensible.

On the other hand, there is a great deal of downright cruelty to animals in Japan. It is but natural that a people so blind to human suffering should be equally callous to the sufferings of animals. Inhuman factory hours and a tender re-

gard for work horses would not be consistent. The Yokohama Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals has been in existence for a number of years, but its membership is almost entirely foreign and Japanese interest in the organization is difficult to arouse.

There are a large number of Americans who believe it to be broad-minded and an indication of culture to assert the superiority of foreign over American institutions. From this class are recruited a large number of the expatriates whom the European war disturbed, and from it are also recruited a large number of those who have been carried away by Japanese superficiality. It is their senseless adulation of Japan, their intemperate praise for everything Japanese that has resulted in creating in the minds of many people a conception of a Japan which does not exist, and in giving the Japanese themselves a belief in their own superiority.

In general it may be said, and there are few exceptions to the rule, that all of the excellent or superior qualities or habits with which the Japanese people are popularly credited are subject to discount on closer investigation. Instances of this might be multiplied until they filled this entire volume. We hear a great deal about Japanese

personal cleanliness, for like their allies, the English, they make a fetish of the daily bath. But the Japanese are not so cleanly as the Filipinos who wash not only their bodies but also their shirts. Dr. Gulick remarks that "the Japanese habit of wearing heavy cotton wadded clothing, with little or no underwear, produces the inevitable result in the atmosphere of any closed room. In cold weather I always find it necessary to throw open all the doors and windows of my study or parlor, after Bible classes of students or even after the visits of cultured and well-to-do guests. That the Japanese bathe so frequently is certainly an interesting fact and a valuable feature of their civilization; it indicates no little degree of cleanliness; but for that, their clothing would become even more disagreeable than it is, and the evil effect upon themselves of wearing soiled garments would be much greater. . . . To a Japanese the size of the weekly wash of a foreigner seems an extravagance."

Even the frequency of the baths does not imply the regard for cleanliness which would be presumed by one who is unacquainted with the nature of a Japanese bath. The hot water in the tub is not changed more than once a day. The privilege of taking the first bath is accorded to the

master of the house and after him come in the order of their precedence the other members of the household, ending with the servants. The bath, instead of being a means to cleanliness, as in other countries, is but little more than a luxurious soaking in warm water.

Japanese politeness, like Japanese cleanliness, is greatly overestimated. In their complicated rules of etiquette, the Japanese are probably ahead of any other people except the Chinese. In the feudal period these rules were so strict that a Samurai might cut off the head of a commoner who laughed with such impolite abandon as to show the back teeth. For centuries politeness toward their superiors was impressed on the Japanese at the point of the sword, and with such severe penalties for a violation of the rules, they learned their lesson well. The tourist, meeting servants, hotel keepers and curio dealers, comes to the conclusion that all Japanese are obsequiously polite, and that they are the most courteous of people. But as in all other things connected with this charming and aggravating country, a longer experience brings a change of opinion, and even the politeness is subject to a discount of disillusionment. There is no country where the inferiors pay so gracefully their tribute of courtesy toward superiors,

none where there is less graciousness of superiors toward inferiors. The Japanese clerk, who greets his employer with low bows and that audible sucking of the breath through the teeth which is a sign of Japanese respect, will be brutally rude to the native salesman or collector, to everyone, in fact, whom he can browbeat and insult with impunity. This system is followed so consistently that it is comparatively easy to tell the relative social standing of two people merely by the way they address each other on the street.

In real courtesy and consideration for inferiors the Japanese are not the equals of Europeans or Americans though in the outward show of politeness they are far their superiors. I have often been told by Japanese of the petty clerk or servant classes that they prefer employment by foreigners to employment by their own countrymen because the foreigners are more polite and considerate. Observation of the different establishments in Japan shows that this is true. Throughout Japan foreigners always call a male servant "Boy San," or "Cook San"; that is "Mr. Boy," or "Mr. Cook." Most foreigners erroneously believe that in doing this they are complying with a native custom. Yet I have never been able to learn of a single Japanese employer who used these hon-

orifics in addressing his servants. Foreign employers in Japan almost invariably treat their employees with greater consideration, work them shorter hours, and demand from them none of the groveling obeisance which the Japanese employer assumes to be his right.

Because of this tendency of the Japanese to make out the best possible case for their country, and the tendency of foreigners to accept the most fanciful and ridiculous explanations for things, it has been easy for the Japanese government to carry out a program which has still further created false impressions about the country. Though at first this program probably had no object other than that of cultivating the friendship of foreigners, it has been equally successful in giving erroneous ideas about the country and the people. This program has included governmental rules and regulations laid down for the special treatment of foreigners by Japanese. Since the earliest days of intercourse with foreigners these rules have been issued, taught in the public schools, and enforced by the police. A number of the rules now taught in the public schools have been translated as follows:

- (1) Never call after foreigners passing along the streets or roads.

(2) When foreigners make inquiries, answer them politely. If unable to make them understand, inform the police of the fact.

(3) Never accept a present from a foreigner when there is no reason for his giving it, and never charge him anything above what is proper.

(4) Do not crowd around a shop when a foreigner is making purchases, thereby causing him much annoyance. The continuance of this practice disgraces us as a nation.

(5) Since all human beings are brothers and sisters, there is no reason for fearing foreigners. Treat them as equals and act uprightly in all your dealings with them. Be neither servile nor arrogant.

(6) Beware of combining against the foreigner and disliking him because he is a foreigner; men are to be judged by their conduct and not by their nationality.

(7) As intercourse with foreigners becomes closer and extends over a series of years, there is danger that many Japanese may become enamored of their ways and customs and forsake the good old customs of their forefathers. Against this danger you must be on your guard.

(8) Taking off your hat is the proper way to

salute a foreigner. The bending of the body low is not to be commended.

(9) When you see a foreigner be sure to cover up naked parts of the body.

(10) Hold in high regard the worship of ancestors and treat your relations with warm cordiality, but do not regard a person as your enemy because he or she is a Christian.

(11) In going through the world you will often find a knowledge of a foreign tongue absolutely essential.

(12) Beware of selling your souls to foreigners and becoming their slaves. Sell them no houses or lands.

(13) Aim at not being beaten in your competition with foreigners. Remember that loyalty and filial piety are our most precious national treasures and do nothing to violate them.

Some of these interesting rules of conduct explain the wrong impressions travelers get of Japan. Not long since a tourist writing in a magazine of his impressions of a trip to Japan told of offering some coppers to a group of Japanese schoolboys who refused them. The tourist attributed this to scorn of money, as taught by Buddhism! It was merely a part of school discipline.

The student who wants to get at the truth of things in Japan should never forget that the country has been made over to meet foreign approval and that the appearance of reform does not always mean reform itself. It is well known that when foreigners first came to Japan, nakedness was much more prevalent than it is now, but when it was found that foreigners looked on nakedness with some disapproval, the edict went forth that clothing should be worn—when foreigners were about! The poor citizens of Tokyo are required to wear some clothing even in summer because there are a few foreigners in the city, but those who live in the country are subject to no such sumptuary legislation. Tourists traveling the usual routes seldom see anything more than half nakedness, but anyone who goes into the less frequented sections of the country will find the people with the same lack of clothing that prevailed before the coming of the Western barbarians. In Tokyo, Kyoto and other places visited by tourists, the famous mixed baths have disappeared, but in the smaller places uncontaminated by prudish foreign ideas, men and women bathe together in the public bathhouses.

For a similar reason—the disapproval of foreigners—the police forbid the sale of the many

lewd pictures which every great artist of Japan has produced. Yet these articles, of whose existence not many foreigners are aware, are freely sold between Japanese. Several curio dealers have explained to me that they were in no danger of trouble through selling these pictures to their fellow countrymen, but that the police prosecution would be very vigorous and effective if they sold any to a foreigner.

One more instance of this conscious effort to create a good impression among foreigners. A recent Japanese writer who discussed a number of reforms which should be made by his countrymen remarked on the tendency of the Japanese to discuss indecent and vulgar subjects. He went to some length to prove that the average conversation between Japanese men is foul and vulgar, and then, with the anticlimax which is peculiarly Japanese, advanced as his sole reason why this was a bad practice the all convincing one that as foreigners mastered the Japanese language, they often overheard these conversations and it lowered Japanese in their estimation.

Throughout almost every official act we can find this tendency to cater to the appreciation of the foreigner. The English editions of the annual reports of the various government bureaus and de-

partments are written and printed like advertising literature. The English edition of the annual report of the Governor-General of Korea is probably the most attractive government report issued in any country. It is clearly and interestingly written, well printed and handsomely illustrated. The financial report of the Japanese government is handsomely printed and bound, and contains a wealth of maps and colored charts. The Japanese versions of these reports are contained in the unillustrated and unattractive pages of the government gazettes.

Soon after the outbreak of war in Europe, several Japanese Red Cross corps were hurried to the battlefields of the allied countries. The members of these corps were carefully selected and the expeditions were elaborately equipped. No expense was spared either in the equipment of the corps or in the publicity about the mission. They proceeded to their posts through that white light of publicity with which Japan always illuminates her acts of virtue. One instinctively thinks of the social climber who organizes charity balls. The simile is just, for if the Japanese felt a call to do humanitarian work they could find plenty of it to do at home, where there are many fields of endeavor entirely untouched. The hospital equip-

ment of Japan is so poor that Americans are now being asked to contribute funds for the building of a modern hospital in Tokyo. The principal hospital located there now is a missionary enterprise. For years the principal work of caring for the lepers of Japan has been done, not by the government, or by Japanese organizations, but by missionaries and foreigners. The care of lepers has been so neglected that to-day less than five thousand of the 24,000 lepers of the country are properly provided for. The remainder are allowed to wander about the country as they please and are frequently seen even in Tokyo. There is in all Japan absolutely no provision for the care of the insane. The statement so frequently made that provision for the care of insane is not necessary because of the fact that relatives take this duty on themselves is no more true in Japan than it is true elsewhere. Japanese pay no attention to the needs of their own lepers and insane. They thoroughly appreciate the fact that charity should not begin at home if its object is to create a good impression among the neighbors.

If by chance some distinguished journalist or statesman of the rank of Congressman be reading this book I would suggest for him a trip to Japan the next time he finds time hanging heavy

on his hands. He should go with the proper advance notices and if his stay is not too long, say for not more than two months, I can guarantee that he will be most royally entertained. In fact he will be overwhelmed with honors and if he be extraordinarily distinguished, or show himself tractable, he may receive a decoration. The visitor will find that every minute of his time is filled up, that he is always accompanied by charming Japanese companions. He will meet some of the country's most distinguished men and will be photographed with them. He will be shown what the Japanese want him to see, and told what they want him to believe and will be given no opportunity to see anything else or to learn anything else. In nine cases out of ten he will allow himself to be placed under so many obligations to the Japanese that he cannot speak frankly of disagreeable things which he may disapprove, and he will join the ranks of Japan's band of volunteer press agents.

Life for the foreign resident of Tokyo is unusually dull, but one of the comic reliefs is afforded by the frequent visits of these distinguished Americans. The system of entertaining them has been made so perfect that every participant knows what is to be done and the foreign resident always

knows what the next move will be. The visitor is almost always swept off his feet by the attentions and the honors—the rare experience of lunching with a baron, dining with a premier and being photographed in the center of a group composed of the Cabinet. As was said by a missionary of many years' residence in the country: "There are perhaps no people under heaven who know better the happy art of entertaining their guests, and none perhaps who succeed better in preoccupying them with their views. Indeed, the universal experience of those who remain long enough in this country to see beneath the surface is that first impressions are very deceitful." The passenger list of every vessel coming to Japan is carefully examined by Japanese agents who, if they find thereon the names of any persons of prominence, at once notify the Tokyo authorities, who set in motion the machinery necessary to properly impress the visitor. Quite a number of the professional guides in Japan are officers in the Japanese army who are detailed to this service for the benefit of distinguished visitors. They are very capable men who see to it that the visit is made as pleasant as possible and that the visitor sees only the pleasant side of the country. When these efforts are supplemented by the rounds of

entertainments and functions, the effect is almost always that of converting the visitor completely to the point of view of the Japanese. It is a remarkable fact, probably nothing more than a curious coincidence, that among the many prominent Americans who have been entertained in this way and converted to Japanese propaganda within the past few years are to be found some of those who are most prominent in their agitation to keep down the armaments of the United States, and have been most outspoken in their assurances of Japan's good will.

This subject cannot be dismissed without some reference to the very stringent censorship which prevails at all times in Japan. The press censor is as much an institution of peace as of war in Japan. Police supervision over the newspapers is maintained at all times, and during the eighteen months that I was connected with a Tokyo newspaper there was scarcely a week in which we were not prohibited from publishing news which would have been detrimental to the reputation of the country. Cases of official bribery, corruption in one of the biggest of the Buddhist temples, a mysterious bomb explosion in a school attended by the Crown Prince—these are only a few of the instances I recall. Once placed under the police

ban, it is usually impossible to learn any further details of these incidents. They might never have happened so far as the outside world is concerned. Of Japan's many scandals, public and private, the world hears but little, owing to this strict censorship. It is exercised not only in governmental affairs but in all things that may affect the prestige of the country. At the beginning of the fighting in the Carpathians, a Japanese concern made delivery, on contract, of one million yards of cloth which was to be used in the manufacture of uniforms in Russia. The entire consignment was refused on the ground that it was of inferior quality—the old complaint that Japanese manufacturers do not deliver goods up to the sample. The first rumor of this event had just been received in Tokyo when a message arrived at the newspaper offices from the police forbidding the publication of anything concerning it. The publication of the news would have lessened the reputation of Japanese manufacturers in some quarters and that reason was enough, in the eyes of Japanese officials, to justify the government prohibition.

This censorship is even more stringent on cable news sent out of the country, for many things which are published in the Japanese papers cannot be cabled abroad. The censorship is pecu-

liarily effective for the correspondent is never able to tell whether or not the message he has filed has been sent, unless he takes the time to unwind a tremendous amount of red tape. Or if the message be sent, he cannot be sure until months afterwards, when newspapers from home arrive, that the message was not changed by the Japanese officials. It follows quite naturally that the Tokyo correspondent who wishes to retain his position is forced to "play safe" with the Japanese government. If he does not do so, if he attempts to send out of the country any news that is likely to meet with official disfavor, the Japanese officials have at hand a certain and easy revenge. By strictly censoring the messages of the unruly correspondent they soon make him valueless to his news organization and compel his replacement by another man.

Japan's isolated position makes it possible for her to carry on this censorship more successfully than would be possible in other countries. The length of time it takes for mail from Japan to reach the United States makes it difficult to check up the operations of the censorship and most mail stories reaching America from Japan are so old at the time of their receipt that they are valueless to most newspapers.

Not content with restricting the news sent out of Japan, the Japanese government has established press bureaus which are supposed to spread what they call the "true truth" about Japan. There are quite a number of active and very able press agents in America, several of whom are Japanese and one, at least, an American—probably the highest salaried press agent in the world. The publicity organization is a formidable one and is operating very successfully. It has deluded a great many astute editors and has had its influence on American public opinion. It is not so noisy as the recent German campaign; indeed, a great many people do not know it exists, but it is much more successful. So successful is this press campaign that many who know of its inner workings in the Far East feel that they are quite justified in discounting any news which appears under a Tokyo date line.

Japanese explain these activities by saying we do not understand Japan and that these agencies will help to that understanding. What they want is that we should understand, not the true Japan but the fanciful Japan which does not exist, except in the minds of sentimental travelers, and Japanese press agents.

CHAPTER VIII

POINTS OF CONTACT

COMMODORE PERRY'S success in inducing the Japanese government to open ports for foreign commerce and residence came only after a number of unsuccessful earlier attempts had been made by other Americans to accomplish the same result. The Dutch had for many years carried on an exclusive trade with Japan, being allowed to send one ship a year to Nagasaki and to reside and maintain their factories on the small island of Deshima in Nagasaki harbor. In 1797, Holland being then at war with Great Britain, no Dutch vessels were available for the trip to Japan, and the annual visit was made by the *Eliza*, an American ship commanded by Captain Stewart, the first American vessel to visit Japan. Owing to the strangeness of the flag, the Japanese made objections to the visit of the American ship and it was only after lengthy explanations that the *Eliza* was allowed to enter the harbor and discharge cargo. Throughout the war between Holland and Great Britain other Ameri-

can vessels visited Nagasaki but always under charter by the Dutch East India Company. After the close of the war Captain Stewart, who had gained some idea of the profits to be made in the trade with Japan, attempted an independent visit to Nagasaki, but his request to be allowed to carry on trade was refused and he was sent away.

Adventurous American skippers continued their attempts to land cargoes and carry on trade in Japanese ports, but none with more success than had attended the efforts of Captain Stewart. It was not until forty years after the visit of the first American ship to Japan that a really serious effort was made to open the doors which the Japanese had so resolutely closed to foreign intercourse. At that time there was a rather important American colony in the Portuguese settlement of Macao. The old American firm of Olyphant and Company had long been in the Chinese trade and had one of its principal houses in Macao. A number of pioneer American missionaries were also living there, studying the Chinese language and making attempts to gain an entrance to Chinese territory. Missionaries and merchants had looked forward with equal eagerness to the opening of Japan and at length a curious circumstance gave them what they believed to be an opportunity

to establish friendly intercourse with the Japanese.

A party of Japanese fishermen in a small boat had been driven from the shores of Japan by a storm and eventually the craft drifted to the coast of British Columbia with seven survivors. These were picked up by the agents of the Hudson Bay Company, sent across Canada and the Atlantic to London and thence to Macao by the boats of the British East India Company. There they remained awaiting an opportunity to return to their homes. To the American merchants and missionaries this seemed a providential opportunity to gain the friendship and confidence of the Japanese by returning the fishermen to their homes. Accordingly a small boat was fitted out and in 1837 started on the great adventure. The party was composed of Dr. Peter Parker, the pioneer American medical missionary to China; Dr. S. Wells Williams, an American missionary whose books on China later brought him great fame; Dr. Gutzlaff, a German missionary and Chinese scholar; and Mr. King, a member of the firm of Olyphant and Company. Quite a number of presents were taken on board, including a picture of Washington, many books, etc. In order to show that the mission was a peaceful one they removed the can-

non with which merchant vessels of those piratical days were equipped. Several memorials were prepared in the Chinese language, explaining that the object of the mission was friendly and asking for permission to remain long enough to explain the books which had been brought as presents. As a final preparation a small stock of goods was placed on board so that the mercantile member of the party might turn an honest penny in case an opportunity presented itself.

Arriving at the Bay of Yedo the hopeful expedition was surrounded by boats and fired on by the forts so vigorously that a hasty and undignified departure was necessary. Several attempts to land at different places on the coast met with a similar reception and at length the party returned to Macao without having been able to deliver the gifts, present the memorials, return the Japanese to their homes or sell the goods.

At that time American vessels were more numerous on the Pacific than they are at the present time and many vessels engaged in whaling came in sight of Japanese shores or actually caught whales in Japanese waters. In 1845, Captain Cooper, commanding the *Manhattan*, of Sag Harbor, was in Japanese seas when he rescued from a small island eleven shipwrecked Japanese. Soon

afterward he rescued eleven more from a wrecked junk. Like the missionaries and merchants at Macao he thought this a providential opportunity "to impress the government with the civilization of the United States and its friendly disposition toward the Emperor and the Japanese people." Having previously sent messengers from another part of the coast telling the object of his visit, Captain Cooper proceeded to the Bay of Yedo, where he was received in friendly spirit though not allowed to land. In reply to the thanks of the officials for bringing the shipwrecked sailors home, the captain diplomatically suggested that he might find other shipwrecked Japanese and would bring them back. "Don't do that," said the Japanese. "Leave them at some Dutch port, but never come to Japan again. The Emperor would prefer to have them abandoned rather than that strangers should visit his dominions."

About the time of Captain Cooper's unsuccessful visit a New York Congressman introduced a resolution providing that immediate steps be taken to make commercial arrangements with Japan and Korea. Thirteen years before this when Mr. Roberts was sent to make treaties with Siam and Muscat he carried with him letters and credentials authorizing him to negotiate a treaty with Japan,

if prospects seemed favorable. He was successful in his missions to Siam and Muscat and was about to undertake the mission to Japan under promising circumstances when his death in Macao brought the work of his mission to an end.

Following the passage of the resolution in Congress renewed efforts were made to effect a treaty with Japan. Letters of credence were sent to Mr. Everett, the American diplomatic representative in China, and at the same time Commodore Biddle, commander of the American naval squadron on the East India station, was instructed to place his squadron at the disposition of Mr. Everett if the latter decided to attempt a visit to Japan. He was also told that he might himself undertake the mission if Mr. Everett were disinclined to do so. The result was that the sailor took over the letters of credence sent to the diplomatic representative and went from Macao to Japan in two vessels, anchoring in the Bay of Yedo, July 20, 1846.

To an officer who called on him the Commodore presented a memorial asking if Japan were ready to make a treaty with the United States. A week after the arrival of the American vessels a reply was given stating that foreigners could be received only at Nagasaki; that no treaty could be made

and that the ships were to go away at once and not return to Japan. The document containing this reply was prepared with a studied attempt at discourtesy and rudeness and during its delivery to Commodore Biddle he was pushed or struck by a Japanese soldier. The mission left as all others had done without setting foot on Japanese soil.

In the face of these discouragements it became increasingly necessary for some understanding to be reached with Japan. The whaling industry was at the height of its prosperity and dozens of vessels were engaged in the industry in or near Japanese waters. Such was the hatred of Japanese for all foreigners that American sailors wrecked on Japanese shores were subjected to the most cruel indignities. Many of them were imprisoned, were carried around the country in cages and exhibited as wild animals and compelled to spit and trample on the cross—symbol of the hated Christian religion. In 1848 news was received in Canton of the plight of the crew of the American whaler *Lawrence*, which had been wrecked on the Japanese coast, and soon thereafter it was learned that the whaler *Lagoda* had also been wrecked. To rescue the crews of these vessels Commander Glynn went to Nagasaki with the *Preble* and after some delay the sailors were delivered to him.

Commander Glynn, who had heard from the sailors their stories of the harsh treatment they had received in Japan, returned to Washington and sought to convince the authorities of the necessity of providing some protection for others who might be wrecked on Japan's inhospitable shores. The matter was taken up at once and provision made for a naval mission to Japan, for which the most elaborate preparations were made. Command of the expedition was finally given to Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, who had gained great distinction in the navy. The preparations which he completed were very elaborate. At a cost of thousands of dollars he collected from Europe a fine library on Japan. For charts alone, which came from Holland, he paid \$30,000. Scientists, interpreters and all members of the party which accompanied him were selected with great care and discretion.

Following a farewell visit to the squadron by the President, cabinet members, and many distinguished citizens, Commodore Perry sailed from Annapolis, November 24, 1852. At Canton and Macao he took on Dr. S. Wells Williams to act as chief interpreter and his squadron was augmented by several additions from the American East Indian squadron. On the morning of July 8, 1853,

the Japanese coast was sighted and later in the day the entire squadron, heedless of the signals to stop and of the Japanese junks which swarmed about, sailed majestically up the bay and came to anchor. One of the vessels of the squadron was the *Susquehanna*, a new steam frigate, the first steam vessel to be seen in Japanese waters. The sight of this strange craft belching smoke and moving rapidly forward in the face of a strong head wind without a vestige of sails aroused the superstitious fears of the Japanese. The whole city of Yedo was soon in an uproar. A native writer of the time told of the effects of the news that the barbarians had arrived: "In all directions were seen mothers flying with their children in their arms, and men with mothers on their backs. Rumors of an immediate action, exaggerated each time they were told, added to the horror of the horror-stricken. The tramp of war horses, the clatter of armed warriors, the noise of carts, the parade of firemen, the incessant tolling of bells, the shrieks of women, the cries of children, dinning all the streets of a city of more than a million souls, made confusion worse confounded."

From the beginning of the tedious negotiations which followed, Commodore Perry showed a re-

markable knowledge of Oriental methods and played his part with firmness and finesse. A Vice-Governor called to see him but he declined to negotiate with any but officials of the highest rank and remained in his cabin while his subordinates communicated this message to the visitor. The latter was told that the squadron had called on a friendly mission, that Commodore Perry carried a letter from the President of the United States to the Emperor, that he desired a conference with officials of the highest rank, that the squadron would not go to Nagasaki and that if the guard boats which were then collecting in great number did not leave they would be fired upon. The boats disappeared at once.

The following day the Governor of Uruga called, but the Commodore declined to see him owing to the inferior rank of the visitor. He was told that unless the Japanese government appointed a suitable person to receive the documents, Commodore Perry would be compelled to go ashore with a sufficient force to insure their delivery. The governor returned to shore with the promise that an answer would be returned in four days.

In the meantime surveys of the harbor were made and when the governor objected he was told that unless the letter of the President were an-

swered on this visit, it would be necessary to come the following spring with a larger fleet and the surveys were being made to locate the best anchorage available. There was further delay and attempts to transfer the negotiations to Nagasaki, but the American skipper finally gained all of his contentions. A pavilion was erected on shore for the reception of the messages which were delivered with a ceremony made as elaborate as possible in order to impress the Japanese. Commodore Perry arranged his forces so as to make the best showing and, after being preceded to the shore by sailors and marines, marched to the pavilion between two large and gaudily costumed negroes. The documents were delivered to two princes and Commodore Perry explained that he would leave in a few days but would return the following spring for an answer. "Will you return with all your ships?" asked an official. "All of them," replied the American, "and probably more, as these are only a portion of the squadron."

The expedition then returned to the Chinese coast to make preparations and await the time for the return to Japan. The return was hastened by the fact that Russian and French squadrons were then in the Far East and it was feared they might precede the Americans to Japan and reap the

fruits of the former visit. Accordingly Perry waited only a few months and started for Yedo early in the following year, arriving at his former anchorage on February 12, 1854. Passing this he steamed further up the bay and anchored nearer the city. At once the Japanese officials tried to change the scene of the negotiations to another point and so much time was spent in discussing this trivial matter that it was not until March 8 that the first conference was held. Three days later the presents brought by the commodore were delivered. They were many in number, something being provided for every one, from the Emperor down to the minor commissioners connected with the negotiations.

In these days of prohibition and wineless state banquets, it is interesting to note that all of the presents included large quantities of spirits. Among the many things given to the Emperor were: Quarter cask of Madeira, barrel of whiskey, case of champagne, case of cherry cordial, case of Maraschino. The commissioners were given five gallons of whiskey each, in addition to other presents of revolvers, clocks, lithographs, perfumery, etc. The presents for the Emperor included a miniature railway with engine, cars, etc., all complete, and a set of telegraph instru-

ments and several miles of wire. These toys were set up and operated to the great astonishment and amusement of the Japanese. The severe formality which had attended the previous meeting was abandoned and, with cordial relations stimulated by champagne and American whiskey, negotiations for a treaty proceeded with satisfactory swiftness.

The document as finally signed provided for the protection of shipwrecked sailors, the opening of two ports in addition to Nagasaki where ship supplies might be secured, goods be purchased and supplies of coals stored. Japan soon thereafter signed similar treaties with other powers.

The first agreement or treaty did not provide for the residence of Americans in treaty ports nor did it allow unrestricted trade in these ports. The task of securing these rights by the negotiation of a new treaty was entrusted to Townsend Harris, America's first consul-general to Japan. He reached Japan two years after the first treaty was signed, being the first accredited agent of a foreign power to take up his residence in that country outside the restricted port of Nagasaki. In fact, for more than a year after his arrival he and his secretary were the only white people in the country and they were without communication from home. Their stock of provisions ran out and they

were compelled to live for months on Japanese fare. Spied upon at every turn, his movements hampered and obstructed, himself the object of suspicion and distrust, the life of the consul-general was by no means a happy one. Yet by perseverance and tact and a display of abilities certainly not second to those of Commodore Perry, he managed to negotiate a new treaty which gave Americans the right to reside in the treaty ports, be subject to trial only by their own consuls, and fixed the value of American currency. Tariff and trade regulations were agreed upon and, in fact, almost every detail of the relations which were to exist between Japan and the foreign powers for nearly half a century were fixed in this treaty which was negotiated by Harris before the diplomatic representative of any other power had arrived in Japan and at a time when he and his secretary were the only foreign residents of the country.

In the disturbed years which followed, the tolerant attitude of the United States toward Japan stood out in sharp contrast to that of other powers. This attitude has been persisted in to this day and though inspired by friendliness has often been interpreted by the warlike sons of Nippon as a sign of weakness. The record of diplomatic

relations between the two countries is full of examples of this. One of the earliest occurred a short time after foreigners took up their residence in Yokohama. An Englishman was riding on a highway near there when he was attacked and killed by a retainer of the Prince of Satsuma. The Japanese have always contended that the Englishman deliberately tried to ride through the state procession of this proud nobleman, an act which in that time of feudalism was an unpardonable affront to one of the most powerful princes of the empire. At any rate the death of the Englishman was immediately followed by a demand by the British minister for an indemnity of \$500,000 from the central government and of \$125,000 from the Prince of Satsuma. After prolonged negotiations the first sum was paid, but the Prince of Satsuma refused to comply with the demands and finally paid the indemnity only after a British squadron had bombarded and burned his capital, Kagoshima.

Negotiations for the settlement of this incident were still being carried on when in one of the numerous anti-foreign outbreaks which rent the country, the American legation at Yedo was burned and at about the same time the Secretary of the Legation was killed. For this gross affront to its dig-

nity the United States demanded only \$20,000, half of that sum to be paid to the mother of the murdered secretary and half to cover the actual loss occasioned by the burning of the legation. It is interesting to note that the Japanese government was little more prompt in the settlement of this claim for actual damages than it was in the settlement of the punitive claim made by the British government.

A short time after the burning of the American Legation the powerful Prince of Choshu who, with his neighbor, the Prince of Satsuma, led the anti-foreign movement, made an attempt to close the Straits of Shimonoseki, through which vessels from the Inland Sea enter the Yellow Sea en route to China. An American merchant vessel was the first to be fired upon by forts which the prince had erected and later vessels of other nationalities received the same treatment. After an ineffectual attempt by an American war vessel to reduce the Shimonoseki forts, combined action was taken by nine British, three French, four Dutch, and one American war vessel. After a three days' attack by the combined fleet the Straits were opened and negotiations for an indemnity begun. This was finally fixed at \$3,000,000, an amount which was paid and equally divided between the four nations.

Soon after the downfall of the Shogunate government and the restoration of the Emperor to his ancient theoretical powers, the Japanese began efforts for the revision of the treaties they had signed. With their increasing knowledge of international usage they discovered that in these treaties they had surrendered a degree of their sovereignty and independence, for foreign residents could be tried on criminal charges and sued in civil cases only in their own consular courts and were not amenable to Japanese laws except in so far as the foreign consuls or judges saw fit to recognize and enforce the laws. Also the treaties bound Japan to a certain fixed import and export tariff which could not be changed without the consent of the powers. In 1871 an embassy set out from Japan to accomplish this great task, proceeding first to America where it was received with extraordinary honors and courtesies. Japan was still a strange country and the natural interest in the queer customs of the people was heightened by a sentimental regard for the country which had been introduced to the world through the efforts of America. A certain sense of responsibility for Japan, and a regard for the country as for a foster child were shown in the attitude of America at that time as it has been shown many

times since then. Japanese statesmen very early in their intercourse with us learned to appreciate this fact and to take advantage of it. Every move which Japan has ever made to secure complete recognition of her equality has been initiated by approaches to the United States as the nation most likely to be swayed by quixotic ideas and most amenable to sentimental appeals. This was true in that early day; we see an example of it in the present day in the California question.

The mission which visited the United States was interested not only in making efforts for the revision of the treaties but also in studying phases of Western institutions, knowledge of which would be useful in the reformation of Japan which was then contemplated, and with these two objects in view the embassy visited the principal countries of Europe before returning to Japan. Only in the United States did the members of the party receive any encouragement regarding treaty revision. They were assured by President Grant and by Secretary of State Fish that the United States was prepared to take up the subject in the most liberal spirit toward Japan. In Europe they were very sensibly told that jurisdiction over foreign subjects and citizens would not be surrendered until the Japanese courts had abolished tor-

ture, adopted a civilized code of laws and reformed the system of jurisprudence.

Though in this, the main object of their mission, they had completely failed in every country but the United States, in the other object of the mission, the discovery of institutions which could be advantageously adopted by Japan, they were more successful in Europe. Prince Iwakura, who was at the head of the embassy, looked with disapproval on the democratic institutions of America, and Prince Ito, a member of the party, found in Prussia that system of imperialism and autocracy which he later engrafted on Japan. The police system, posts, army, navy, etc., were all later remodeled on the European systems. Our schools alone met with the approval of the Japanese because their cheapness and their democratic atmosphere offered to Japanese students an ideal opportunity to learn the ways of the foreigner. Prince Iwakura later sent his three sons to school in America and they have been followed by a steady stream of Japanese students since that time.

The failure of the first attempt to revise the treaties was followed by feverish activities to adopt all of the Western ideas necessary to bring Japan up to the standards of the West. With the

progress of the country and the increased expenditures necessary, the old tariff proved a great impediment. It had been negotiated by Mr. Harris, who had placed on the free list or at a duty of five per cent. all raw products, food supplies and building materials; manufactures at a duty of 20 per cent. and liquors at 35 per cent. It was his idea that the tariff would be revised at the end of ten years, but an arbitrary construction placed on the treaties by European powers made this impossible. Lord Elgin, who had negotiated the British treaty, succeeded in having placed in the five per cent. class all manufactures of woolen or cotton, the articles which Great Britain exported to the Far East in the largest quantities. Under the "most favored nation" clause of the treaties, all nations shared in this reduction, which had the effect of ruining Japan's native cotton industry and throwing thousands out of employment.

The extra-territorial provisions of the treaties put the construction of the tariff in the hands of the foreign consuls, who were not always fair and were inclined to give decisions in the interest of their own nations. A British merchant was once discovered in an attempt to smuggle opium into the country, was tried by the British consul and

acquitted in a decision which placed opium in the same class as medicines which might be imported into the country on payment of a duty of 5 per cent. This is an extreme example of the difficulties under which Japan labored because of the terms of the treaties. With her advancement in the knowledge of medicine, Japan on several occasions attempted to enforce quarantine regulations, but the attempts were frustrated by the British and German authorities, who refused to admit the right of the Japanese officials to issue regulations affecting ships flying the British or German flags. A cholera epidemic of 1879 in which 100,000 Japanese lives were lost has been charged with some justice to the refusal of the representatives of European governments to co-operate with the Japanese authorities in quarantine measures.

In this quarantine question as with other matters affecting the sovereignty of Japan the policy of America remained consistent with its earlier acts. American vessels, by order of the American consul, were compelled to obey Japanese quarantine restrictions; and in trials which involved the interpretation of the treaties, the decisions of the American courts were invariably liberal toward Japan. Indeed, this attitude often aroused the

criticism of American merchants and skippers who saw themselves denied the privileges which courts of other nations upheld for their nationals; and also caused the resentment of the European powers which saw America in many cases back up Japan instead of making pressure on the country unanimous.

The Japanese continued their attempts to secure revision of the tariffs but met with such little encouragement on the part of the European powers that they soon centered their efforts on the United States. Disregarding the interests of American commerce in Japan and acting on the higher plane of justice, the American Minister in 1878 negotiated a treaty with Japan in which the United States agreed to the annulment of the existing tariffs and conceded to Japan the full right to establish whatever tariffs were deemed necessary. Encouraged by this recognition of her rights, Japan persisted in her attempts to bring the European nations to the same action but without success, and it was not until twenty years later that the country was finally freed and able to take independent action in regard to tariffs. The friendly action of the United States in this as in the small amount of indemnity demanded for the burning of the legation served chiefly to arouse the sus-

picion and enmity of the other treaty powers which viewed with natural concern America's independent actions.

In the early eighties a movement was begun for the return of America's share of the \$3,000,000 indemnity which had been paid by the Japanese government for the attack on merchant vessels in the Straits of Shimonoseki. This money, amounting to \$785,000, had lain in the treasury all that time and had not been appropriated to any use. It was finally returned to the Japanese government in 1883. This act is generally represented as having been a voluntary act on the part of Congress, inspired purely by motives of friendship. The real facts of the case are interesting and also important in that they show the keen perception of the Japanese for American weaknesses. Learning that the money was unexpended, the Japanese government employed a shrewd American lawyer to lobby through Congress a bill for the return of the indemnity, paying him a fee generally reported to have been \$40,000. At that early date Japan had learned the effectiveness of a press campaign in America and the readiness with which Americans respond to sentimental appeals. None know so well as the Japanese the uses of sentiment and publicity.

With every advance made in the Europeanization of the country Japan renewed efforts to regain her sovereignty by the negotiation of new treaties. As in all previous efforts of this kind, the greatest encouragement came from the United States, which in 1887 negotiated a treaty abolishing extra-territoriality and placing American residents under the jurisdiction of Japanese courts and Japanese laws. This treaty remained inoperative for a number of years because of the refusal of other powers to negotiate similar agreements.

It was not until Japan had proven her prowess in arms in the war with China that Great Britain recognized the claims Japan had been pressing for a quarter of a century and negotiated a new treaty in 1894. In this treaty it was agreed that extra-territoriality should be abolished, the entire country opened to the residence of foreigners, and Japan be allowed to regulate her own tariffs. The signature of other nations to similar treaties followed immediately. In order to give time for all concerned to adjust themselves to the new conditions, these treaties were to come into force five years later, and in 1899 Japan came into full possession of those rights which the United States had agreed to grant to her many years before.

CHAPTER IX

THE AMERICAN QUESTION IN JAPAN

IT was only natural that the relations between Japan and the United States should undergo a certain modification during the closing years of last century. Japan had come into her estate and was no longer the minor nation on which we could look with fondly paternal albeit pleasantly superior regard. Through the victory over China she had established herself as the leading Oriental power and by the full recognition of her sovereignty had removed from herself the stigma of Asiatic inferiority. The century was closing in a blaze of glory for the Emperor, his prestige established in the Far East, his right to a voice in world politics acknowledged. His ministers were already looking forward to a wider stage for Japanese activities and dreaming of the time when Japan would dominate the Pacific and rule China just as England dominated the Atlantic and ruled India. The day when we could patronize Japan was passing. The country had come of age and no

longer asked for the paternal aid which for half a century the United States had so liberally bestowed.

No blame need attach, to the Japanese that they then began and have since continued to demand a place in the world to which they are entitled neither by their achievements nor their needs. There are always a great many people to whom the exotic, the dramatic, the artistic, the unusual appeal with such fascination as to cloud their judgment. To these the advancement of Japan was the most wonderful thing in the history of human achievements, the Japanese, the most wonderful people; they were the modern Greeks; they possessed the subtlety of the Orient, the utility of the Occident. Into the not unwilling ears of the Japanese they poured such an enthusiastic measure of praise that even a less conceited people might have had their heads turned. The Japanese were easily convinced of their own superiority and looked forward with confidence to an aggressive imperialistic program which would be as brilliantly successful as had been the accomplishment of their domestic reforms. Japanese ambitions suddenly expanded in the warm sunshine of this praise and the pride of the victory over China. Having so easily attained first place in the Far East it was

quite logical to begin to look forward to a dominant position in the Pacific as well.

The wounded veterans of the war with China were scarcely convalescent before Japan began making plans to drive out Russia, her most threatening rival. As one of the rewards of victory over China, Japan had secured the lease of Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula. Russia, backed up by France and Germany, sent a note in which Japan was advised not to demand this cession from China, and Japan, in the face of this protest, was reluctantly compelled to give up the lease. Russia immediately took over the lease of Port Arthur herself and Russian statesmen were then bending their energies toward advancing Russian power in Manchuria. They were planning an extension of the Muscovite Empire to the south by the annexation of Korea, an ambition on which the Japanese looked with distrust and alarm.

Relations between Japan and Russia were developing toward that crisis which was to precipitate war a few years later when America, through the annexation of Hawaii in 1898, appeared on the Pacific as a potential rival for Japan, at once changing the attitude of Japan toward her old friend. The various dangers through which the unhappy Hawaiian Empire had passed illustrate

in an interesting way the changing currents of political influence on the Pacific, the appearance and disappearance of powers from this great ocean which is destined to be the scene of conflicts of the future. France, Great Britain and Russia had at various times considered the acquisition of the islands. As early as 1794 Captain Vancouver visited the islands and at a council of chiefs induced them to acknowledge themselves as subjects of Great Britain and cede the island of Hawaii to his Britannic Majesty. British statesmen being occupied with weightier matters, no steps were taken by the British government to confirm this cession. In 1815 a Russian commander built a stone fort on the islands, hoisted the Russian flag and entered into an agreement whereby the Hawaiians placed themselves under the protection of Russia, but his act, like that of the British commander, did not receive the sanction of the home government. In 1839 similar attempts were made by a French commander to bring the islands under the sovereignty of France. In 1843 the British flag was again hoisted over the islands by the commander of a British war vessel, and remained there four months until the admiral of the British Pacific fleet arrived and after an investigation repudiated the act of his subordinate.

With the acquisition of California by the United States and the growth of American commerce in Hawaii the European powers abandoned any ambitions they may have had in regard to this beautiful group of islands. When a commission of Hawaiians visited London in 1850 they were advised by Lord Palmerston, the premier, to look forward to becoming a part of the United States. Annexation to the United States had been so long foreshadowed by reciprocity treaties and by the openly expressed desire of the Hawaiians themselves that its final consummation in 1898 came as a surprise to no one. Yet when discussion of the terms of annexation was begun in 1897 Japan protested vigorously, declaring the independence of the country was necessary to maintain the good relations of the powers on the Pacific; that annexation might injure the rights of Japanese subjects living in Hawaii. This protest against annexation by the United States bore some resemblance to the protest against the Japanese lease of the Liaotung Peninsula which had been made by Russia, Germany and France only a few years before.

In reply to the Japanese protests it was pointed out that annexation had been foreshadowed by the treaty of annexation negotiated in 1893 but repudiated later by President Cleveland and that

Japan had not protested at that time. The answer was given that Japan's expanding activities in the Pacific since that date had changed the situation, an acknowledgment of ambitions with which the extension of American interests clashed. On being given assurances by the United States that Japan's rights would be fully protected the protest, although never withdrawn, was not pressed. At that time the Japanese population of Hawaii amounted to 61,000, more than twice the native population and almost 40 per cent. of the total population of the islands. It is reasonable to believe that if the United States had definitely abandoned ideas of annexation the ultimate domination of the islands by Japan would have been inevitable.

The American occupation of the Philippines coming soon after the annexation of Hawaii was another blow to Japanese ambitions. Actual possession of the Philippines may not have been contemplated as a part of Japan's scheme for expansion. Japan was already in possession of the island of Formosa and if her statesmen did not then know, they soon learned that there are many difficulties in tropical colonization. Japan has now been in possession of Formosa for twenty years and though the island has been developed to

a certain extent for the benefit of Japanese capitalists, the soothing effects of Japanese civilization as applied to the Formosan aborigines have been so slight that Japanese troops are still engaged in "subduing the natives." But Japan looked with a jealous eye on the advancement of any power in that sphere which she had marked out for her future domination and concealed her resentment at the encroachments of the United States only because Russia was a more threatening rival in the north.

Another event of about this period was Secretary Hay's proposal to guarantee the Open Door and the integrity of China. The immediate effects of the policy proposed by Mr. Hay and carried by him to a brilliant conclusion fitted well with Japan's aims and ambitions, as they were affected by conditions of the time, and Japan was one of the first to assent to the proposal. Unfortunately for the peace of the Pacific and the faith which some trusting people still place in solemn international agreements, Japan's assent was not dictated by regard for China's rights and the spirit of the policy was contrary to aims at the domination of China which Japan had long cherished. In other words, Japan gave assent to a policy which was temporarily expedient, but which she planned to

repudiate later when an opportune moment arrived.

In order to understand Japan's policy toward China, how her attitude toward the United States is affected by that policy, and what were her reasons for assenting to the Open Door agreement, it is necessary to review a little history which seems to have been forgotten. Japan has for centuries aspired to the suzerainty of China and Korea. The great Japanese warrior Hideyoshi several centuries ago proposed to the King of Korea an alliance for the purpose of invading China and bringing it under the rule of Japan, but this ambitious scheme was frustrated by the Korean monarch who replied that for Japan to attack China would be like a bee trying to sting a turtle. Korea had once been a tribute paying nation to Japan and the latter country had barely emerged from her seclusion when the old relationship was renewed. There was then begun a Japanese intrigue for the domination of Korea which eventually led to the war between China and Japan.

In this, the first of her modern wars, Japan's attitude toward China was clearly revealed. The war had been in progress but a few months when the Chinese, their land forces thoroughly whipped, sent commissioners to Japan to arrange for terms

of peace. Japan was not yet ready, however, though China was willing to concede the independence of Korea, the only issue over which the war had been fought. Accordingly the Japanese made technical objections to the credentials of the peace commissioners and refused to enter into negotiations, although the commissioners offered to have their credentials corrected by telegraph. The commissioners were sent home and Japan continued the war against a foe already whipped until China's navy was destroyed. She then exacted onerous terms. The treaty of peace gave her the Liaotung Peninsula, Formosa, the Pescadores and an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels (about \$150,000,000). China also withdrew all her claims to the sovereignty of Korea. It was Japan's purpose then as it has been since to prevent in every way possible the growth of China.

If Japan had been allowed to keep the Liaotung Peninsula her program for the absorption of China would have been progressing very satisfactorily. But the European conspiracy robbed her of this and at the time Secretary Hay made his proposal for the Open Door China was threatened with dismemberment by the European powers. The partition of the country which was threatened at that time would have given Japan but a small share of

the spoils and would have shut off the final avenue for expansion on the western side of the Pacific. Only the small and comparatively unimportant province of Fukien had been marked out for Japan's share, while Great Britain was to take the Yangtze Valley, Germany take Shantung, and Russia secure Manchuria and Mongolia. It was expedient for Japan that China be saved for a time from the rapacity of the European powers and the dismemberment postponed until Japan was in position to secure a larger share, or preserve the integrity of China by taking over the entire country. Hence her ready assent to the proposal of the Open Door policy.

Japan soon gained this more favorable position by success in the war against Russia—a success which made possible the consummation of two of her ambitious projects: the annexation of Korea and the domination of South Manchuria. She had adopted the same policy toward Korea as toward China, that is, to sign pledges guaranteeing the independence of Korea as a means of preventing the aggression of others, but with no intention of keeping them herself. Thus in the first Anglo-Japanese alliance, signed in 1902, the preamble states: “The high contracting parties, having mutually recognized the independence of China

and Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country." This declaration, as well as other pledges Japan made then and later to safeguard and respect the independence of Korea, was made solely for the purpose of warning Russia off. A few years later when Russia had been defeated, the threatening Muscovite wave driven back across the plains of Manchuria, and the independence of Korea no longer threatened, Japan showed almost indecent haste in making Korea a part of the Japanese Empire. The same policy governed Japan in assenting to the proposal to guarantee the Open Door in China.

The part played by America in securing peace between Russia and Japan is well known. The proposal by President Roosevelt for peace negotiations came at a time when Japan was in a highly advantageous position, and it is generally admitted now that the timeliness of his proposal had a great deal to do with Japan's success in the negotiations which followed. Though Japan had been successful her strength had been exhausted in the struggle. It was then not known outside official circles in Tokyo that a number of naval vessels of importance had been blown up by mines, and that the losses to the land forces had been much

greater than was known to the Russians, who then had on its way to Manchuria an army not only stronger than any Japan had in the field but stronger than any Japan could raise or equip. If the war had continued for a short time it is highly probable that it might have turned into a Russian victory.¹

The United States was keenly interested in the conclusion of peace not only because of the sentimental interest it has always taken in the welfare of China, but also because the war was being fought on one of America's richest trade fields. Though the products of the British cotton mills had always led in the southern Chinese markets, American goods predominated in colder Manchuria and our trade there at one time amounted to \$20,000,000 a year. Most of this trade had been handled through the port of Newchwang, but just before the beginning of hostilities between Russia and Japan, the United States succeeded in having Moukden opened as a treaty port. This was but one of a number of moves the United States was undertaking for the development of

¹ The author makes no pretense to knowledge of military affairs. The conclusions given here have been reached by competent military critics. Many Japanese who are in a position to know have told the author: "Colonel Roosevelt won the war with Russia for us."

Manchuria—plans which now have only a historical interest since the victory of Japan caused them all to come to naught.

On its face, the treaty of peace which was signed at Portsmouth, September 5, 1905, was quite satisfactory to American interests. Japan secured from Russia the leases of Port Arthur and Dalny and the South Manchuria Railway. What was of more importance to the United States was the fact that both Russia and Japan agreed to the principle of equal opportunity in the development of Manchuria and they also agreed "to exploit their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes and in no wise for strategic purposes." Russia had been attempting by every means of intrigue to create a sphere of influence in Manchuria. Japan had fallen heir to Russian prestige, but, apparently, in this treaty was content to give all others a free hand in the trade and development of the rich province.

It was some time before the many Americans who had rejoiced in the victories of Japan came to realize that their sympathies had been misplaced. Under the Russian domination of Manchuria our goods had found a ready sale there with no discrimination by Russian authorities. But America

waited in vain, and is still waiting, for a resumption of this trade after Japan took over the railways and ports. After the conclusion of peace American and other traders were kept out of the province because of the presence of troops and the alleged necessity of guarding military secrets. On this pretext they were not allowed to enter for more than a year. When they did finally gain access to the province it was only to find that American brands and trade marks had been artfully copied by Japanese manufacturers and that native dealers had been stocked with these counterfeit goods. Free access had been given to Japanese traders in the months when all others had been kept out, and the province had been so thoroughly deluged with Japanese goods as to give reason for the belief that the Japanese government had been active in the promotion of trade. Since then there has been a continued and successful discrimination in favor of Japanese goods on the Japanese railways and in the Japanese controlled ports, with the result that traders of other nations have thrown up their hands in despair and have abandoned to Japan a market which she gained and has held at the point of the bayonet. After a lingering decline, the final death of American trade in Manchuria was marked in the early part

of 1915 by instructions from the State Department at Washington to the American consul at Newchwang to close up his office.

American capitalists shared with American merchants the mistaken belief that treaties are signed with the idea that they are to be observed, for soon after the conclusion of peace they prepared to take advantage of the opportunities apparently offered for the development of Manchuria. The signatory powers, Japan and Russia, had bound themselves "not to obstruct any general measures, common to all countries, which China may take for the development of commerce and industry in Manchuria." British and American capitalists had had in mind for some years plans for the construction of additional railways in the province and they proceeded with their negotiations only to find that the ink was scarcely dry on the Portsmouth treaty before Japan had negotiated a secret agreement with China by virtue of which she was able to bar all other enterprises from Manchuria. One by one the American proposals for the building of new lines or the purchase of old ones were thwarted through Japanese opposition and American capitalists in 1910 finally withdrew from the Manchurian field. In the meantime Secretary Knox had made his famous proposal for the neu-

tralization of the South Manchuria Railway, a proposal which, like the efforts of Americans to secure railway concessions in Manchuria, was doomed not only to failure but to arouse the suspicions of the Japanese and add to their hostility for us.

With Russia out of the way, it was necessary for the war clans of Japan to pick out another probable enemy. With no possible foe in sight their prestige and power would be weakened and rival parties in Japan might be able to replace them. This unenviable selection fell on the United States, a selection dictated by many reasons which from the Japanese point of view were perfectly sound. The Anglo-Japanese alliance bound Japan to the other great power in the Far East and made improbable any conflict with another European power. In fact with Russia out of the way there were no conceivable causes of difference between Japan and any country of Europe. China, never a menace, was now known to be helpless. On the other hand, no matter in what direction Japanese statesmen looked for avenues of further expansion, the giant form of the United States stood in the way. We possessed Hawaii, the Philippines and Alaska, all logical avenues for Japanese growth and places which would doubtless have been the objective of

Japanese activity if the country had emerged from seclusion a little earlier. From the Japanese point of view it appeared that they had been deprived of their natural destiny in the Pacific merely because the United States had preceded by a few years their entrance into the affairs of that ocean.

The Monroe Doctrine cut off any opportunity for a Japanese foothold in South or Central America, while the policy of the Open Door in China served a similar purpose there. To be sure, the United States was not the only power to guarantee the open door, but the other signatory powers would always be amenable to reason in the shape of a division of the spoils. The well-defined policy of the United States made a bargain with that power impossible, and the fact that the United States had initiated and carried to a successful conclusion the policy of the Open Door made that country its chief guarantor. It was a strange trick of fate which in a few short years had changed the position of the United States from Japan's greatest aid in her domestic development to Japan's greatest obstacle in the accomplishment of her imperialistic plans. After the annexation of Korea there remained, outside New Zealand and Australia, not one desirable foot of territory in the waters

washed by the Pacific which Japan could appropriate without running foul of the United States.

Japan at once attacked this problem with characteristic oblique methods. One of her first moves was to attempt to divert the attention of the United States from the Far East by a cautious attack on the Monroe Doctrine. By pursuing this policy with sufficient caution, and with the usual anchors to windward, Japan had little to lose and a great deal to gain. It might result in a great many things which would be advantageous to Japan. If found necessary Japan could always step out from under with the usual explanation that Japanese enterprises on the American continent were purely private and without governmental sanction. On the other hand an attack on the Monroe Doctrine might elicit European sympathy or aid which would greatly strengthen Japan's position. In that event the United States might be forced into a bargain in which Japan would agree to keep hands off on the continent of America while the United States would give Japan a free hand in China. Or, if the worst came of this project and it became necessary to fight the United States, Japan would certainly enter the conflict with great advantage to herself if she could make the Monroe Doctrine a part of the issue and thus ensure

the sympathies of Europe. Japan's first objective was the west coast of Mexico as a point nearest to her own shores, and the Russian war was scarcely over before she began negotiations to secure a foothold there. These negotiations were not successful and Japan has since then, while not giving up hope of securing a colony in Mexico, turned her attention to Chile and Peru.

Only for a short time was the military party of Japan compelled to create anti-American sentiment, for the immigration question reached a crisis about the time the Russian war closed. As early as 1900, when the renewal of the Chinese exclusion act was under discussion in San Francisco, demands were made that the act be renewed as an Asiatic exclusion act so that it would exclude Japanese as well as Chinese. For a number of years this immigration had been unrestricted and Japanese had been coming at the rate of one to three thousand yearly. In 1900 the number suddenly increased to 12,000. Though the number was not so great in the following years, the constant additions to the Asiatic residents of the Pacific Coast States was enough to arouse the fears of the white population and create a demand for some kind of restriction. The immigration to the United States from Japan has never been so large

that it need become a serious problem were it widely distributed. But the same causes which have prevented Japanese settlement of the northern parts of their own islands have prevented the settling of Japanese in large numbers in any but the Pacific Coast States where the mild climate more nearly approximates that of their own country. They favor California above all other parts of the country and their extensive settlement there encysted on that State a large alien population and forced Californians to take actions which any other State would have taken if faced by the same conditions.

Agitation on the west coast continued and brought the question to a crisis in 1907 when parties and interests which were opposed to Japanese immigration were in control of the municipal government of San Francisco. They established a separate school in that city for Asiatics, planning to compel Japanese to leave the regular public schools and attend the new institution. Japanese residents, following their usual custom, protested to the Japanese government and there arose a threatening crisis. As a result of the agitation, the famous "gentleman's agreement" was entered into between Japan and the United States. This agreement provides "that the Japanese govern-

ment shall issue passports to the continental United States only to such of its subjects as are non-laborers or are laborers who, in coming to the continent, seek to resume a formerly acquired domicile, to join a parent, wife, or children residing here, or to assume active control of an already possessed farming enterprise in this country." This agreement has served to stop the flood of immigration, for the Japanese government has acted in good faith in carrying out its provisions. As a matter of fact, since the agreement went into effect more Japanese have left than have entered this country.

Effective as the arrangement has been in solving the question of Japanese immigration, it is important to remember that the Japanese have always looked on it as a temporary measure to be endured as patiently as possible until an opportune moment arrives for a solution of the question which will remove all discrimination against them. Arguments against any restriction of Japanese immigration have been constantly advanced in Japanese newspapers and in the publicity campaign which Japan has carried on in the United States. The constant aim of the Japanese government and of the Japanese people since the modern era of their history began has been to secure from the

world complete recognition of the Japanese as the equals of any other people. So long as restrictions on the immigration of the Japanese to the United States exist, no matter how cleverly the agreements may be arranged so as to save face for Japan, the issue will remain and the Japanese may be expected to retain their resentment. They will not endure discrimination of this sort any longer than they have to.

Unfortunately for the good relations of the two countries, the immigration of the Japanese had scarcely been stopped when agitation arose over the question of Japanese landownership. Legislation designed to prevent or restrict the acquisition of land by Japanese and other Asiatics had been enacted in Idaho, Washington, and Arizona without precipitating any diplomatic dispute. Several California legislatures had proposed legislation of this sort which would affect large numbers of Japanese, but its passage was always prevented by pressure from Washington. But with the growing acreage in the control of Japanese, pressure for such legislation became so strong that the California legislature in 1913 disregarded the protests of the Washington government and passed the Webb bill. This law inhibits the purchase or lease for a period of longer than three

years, of agricultural land by any alien not eligible to citizenship. The law also provides that such aliens ineligible to citizenship may hold land which they now own or on which they hold liens, but it cannot be sold to or descend to aliens of similar status. The same limitations apply to corporations in which a majority of the stock is held by ineligible aliens.

Even with the restrictions placed upon Japanese through this law, they still enjoy in California greater privileges than are enjoyed by Americans and other foreigners in Japan. No alien in Japan is allowed to own any kind of real estate. Although Japanese in California are allowed to own land and houses for residential and commercial purposes, and in most of the other States are allowed to own agricultural land as well, no one of the many Americans in Japan is allowed to purchase his own home, or to own one scrap of land which he can call his own. Of course these restrictions in Japan apply to all foreigners and are not discriminatory. However, the spirit which prompted the enactment of the California legislation is exactly the same as that which prompted the similar legislation in Japan. There is another similarity between the San Francisco school regulation providing a separate school for Asi-

atics, and the Japanese school system of Korea, where separate schools are provided for Japanese children so that they may not be compelled to associate on terms of equality with the "inferior" Koreans. Indeed, the attitude of Japanese toward aliens of competing classes and particularly toward other Asiatics on whom they look as inferiors is in every respect the same as the attitude of the people of California toward the Japanese. This fact has no particular bearing on the diplomatic dispute between the United States and Japan, but it is interesting in showing the hypocrisy of Japanese aspersions on Californians as "narrow-minded and blinded by race prejudice."

The California land law has been the subject of prolonged diplomatic correspondence and of constant recrimination in Japan. There the issue has been greatly exaggerated in the native press and, coupled with the immigration agreement and the other points of conflict with the United States, it has grown into a grave international issue. The army and the navy parties which dominate Japan and divide the wealth and the power of the country between them have made the most of the opportunity for it fitted well with their program, and greatly strengthened their prestige in Japan. The idea of a possible conflict with the United

States has become so firmly fixed that for several years it has been quite frankly stated in the *Diet* and in the semi-official publications of the country that Japan's naval program was prepared with the idea of a possible conflict with the United States.

So far Japanese have not attempted to settle the controversy over the California land law, or the other question over the right of Japanese to naturalization, in the courts of the United States. If any treaty right has been violated in the California land legislation, or if Japanese are possessed of the right of naturalization, a very simple manner of establishing these rights would be through a trial before a federal court. If the land law is in violation of treaty rights, the decision of the federal court would nullify the act. Some months after the law went into effect a Japanese resident of California made preparations for a legal test of this sort. A number of prominent citizens who wished to see the issue settled peacefully and without further diplomatic wrangles came to the assistance of the Japanese so that he was enabled to carry on the litigation at a minimum of expense and was assured of means to carry it to the Supreme Court of the United States if necessary to obtain a final decision. It appeared that the suit

would be pressed to a conclusion, but it was suddenly dropped. It developed later that the Japanese plaintiff had dropped the suit at the bidding of the Japanese consul-general in San Francisco, who for some reason did not want to see the question settled in this way.

The truth of the matter is that the Japanese statesmen are by no means anxious to have the California land question settled. By keeping the issue constantly alive it enables them the more easily to carry on programs of military and naval expansion at home, and it weakens any protests we might make against the Japanese domination of China. Indeed, China is the important issue, as was recently admitted by a semi-official representative of the Japanese government. Dr. T. Iyenaga, at the Japanese-American banquet held in New York on May 19, 1915, expressed the views of official Japan when he said: "Unless America stops trying to interfere with the policy of Japan in China and comes to a clearer understanding of what Japan is trying to do in China, I indulge in the prediction that there will be more serious disturbances in the relations between Japan and America than was caused by the California affair. We are going to remain the firm and best friend of China, but the United States must leave to us

the procedure." The present California issue serves the same purpose the Japanese earlier sought to attain by attacks on the Monroe Doctrine. It serves to divert attention from aggression in China and to make a popular pretext for war.

With a foreign policy which is dictated solely by expediency, in which there are no restraints of morality and principle, in which details are tortuously changed to take advantage of every fleeting opportunity, it is difficult and hazardous to make any predictions about Japan's future course. However, one phase of the complicated American issue in Japan seems to stand out rather clearly. Japanese statesmen have made the most of the California land law and other discriminatory legislation in America to work up an anti-American feeling in Japan and to create a sentiment which would be favorable to war with America. Taking advantage of the threatening situation they are able to proceed with more assurance in their plans for aggression in China, feeling certain that the United States will not, by effectively protesting on behalf of that unhappy country, add another to the long list of causes of grievance. However, if it should become necessary to go to war with the United States to remove obstacles to Japan's im-

perialistic progress, the California land law and the immigration restrictions will form a pretext for war which would doubtless be popular both at home and abroad and, *mirabile dictu*, would even gain the support of the Chinese who are subject to the same restrictions. If in the meantime Japan be able to involve the Monroe Doctrine in the controversy, so much the better for Japan.

CHAPTER X

WHAT JAPAN THINKS OF US

JUST as there are two Japans which disclose themselves to the view of the student when he investigates the country, so are there two opinions of America and Americans held in Japan. There is as much difference between these two views as there is between official and unofficial Japan, or, to go farther afield for a simile, as much difference as there is between what we think the Filipinos ought to think of us and what they really think. One is the view for home consumption, the other the view held for export to our fair Republic where we charge no customs duty on imported flattery. It is of the latter view we know the most, for it has been very persistently brought to our attention. It has become conventionalized, like other things Japanese, so that, though it is often expressed by many different people and under many different circumstances, it never varies far from the original which I fancy must be filed away in the archives of the Japanese Foreign Office and taught to all of Japan's diplomatists. One of

the most recent expressions of this conventional Japanese view of the United States was made by the Japanese consul-general at New York. It is worth quoting in full as it appeared in the *Japan Review*, a New York periodical supported indirectly by the Japanese government in the aid of Japan's foreign relations:

“Neither are there any two nations on the face of the earth with such romantic relations and affections as those of Japan and the United States. The United States, on the shore of Kurihama, where now in imperishable marble stands the statue of Commodore M. C. Perry, importuned Japan to yield and open her door to trade and commerce. The United States smilingly and gallantly brought up Japan in the practice of modern commerce, to which the bashful Eastern maiden, who for centuries kept herself free, sweet and pure from anything in the shape of bargaining, trafficking and trickery of trade relations with the world, submitted in fraternal vows. Now that Japan has reached full age, her natural geographical advantage makes it inevitable that she should have the mastery in vast Asian affairs and hold China in her sphere of commercial interest and political influence.¹ The United States, proud

¹ The statement of Japanese determination to gain the mastery

and trusted, Japan's spouse, unsullied and devoted, shares the progress and prosperity of the foster child. Alike in open door policy, in international relations to China; alike in the policy of sustaining Chinese national integrity intact; alike desirous of opening up the vast resources and utilizing and commercializing them,—Japan and the United States hold fast to their exclusively advantageous positions, unrivaled by any in the world.

“In co-operation with each other the American and Japanese men of business and industry, each helping the other—if not in supplying capital, then in supplying labor—in turn they supply the vast and fast-growing needs of humanity. Even in her own national demand for raw materials for her factories and manufactories, Japan is largely supplied by foreign countries. For herself and for her industrial outlets in China, Japan, in the nature of things, reciprocates vast trade with the American States, whose people share in the Japanese trade and industries, in capital investment

in Asiatic affairs and dominate China has been made so often by Japanese publicists that it is remarkable that it was not, until very recently, recognized generally as a part of Japan's foreign policy. This speech was made some months before the outbreak of the European war which made Japan's recent raid on China possible.

and in mutual gain. Thus the commerce on the Pacific has awakened. It has revealed its wonders. The mightiest of the oceans, instead of becoming like unto the old Mediterranean, where the East and the West—Carthage and Rome—met in the one hundred years' war for decisive battle for supremacy, Japan and the United States have made it man's theater of supreme achievement of peace and prosperity for mankind."

This is the sentiment we hear expressed day after day, year after year. It has formed the text of a hundred, of thousands of after dinner speeches by Japanese on those occasions when Americans and Japanese meet on some common project. There is not a Japanese diplomatist who does not know it by heart in a dozen different forms. True, the same things are said to England, because of the Anglo-Japanese alliance; the same things are said to China, because of the supposed common interest on the ground that both are Asiatics; similar expressions of affection are voiced for Russia, because Russia and Japan have the same common plan to rob China; I have even heard similar expressions of friendship for Mexico, though the only common interest between Mexico and Japan was at that time a common dislike for the United States. But it is for us that the most ardent ex-

pressions of affection are made—and most often made. The sentiment is rather pretty, despite its mawkishness. But how much truth is there in it?

The traveler who goes to Japan in a private capacity and expects to find there any reflection of this regard for America is certain to be disappointed. That is, he will be disappointed if he expects to find it expressed in Japanese newspapers or by the Japanese people. Instead of these flattering comments on America, there is always, or at least has been during the past few years, a steady outpouring of vilification and abuse of the United States throughout nearly all of Japan's numerous publications—abuse scarcely less violent than that which has recently been exchanged between the German and British press. Even during the time that Japan was actively engaged in war with Germany, the Japanese press was more bitter in its comments on the United States than in its comments on the country against which its soldiers were fighting. No event has been too trivial to call forth abuse of America, no falsehood too glaring for use if by its utterance the United States could be made to appear in an ignoble light. No diplomatic action has been taken by the United States without the basest of motives being attributed to it by the Japanese press, and by the

most audacious misstatements and most specious reasoning, every action is given a sinister and unworthy aspect.

Every European criticism of America has been echoed in Japan, but with a maliciousness of phrase one rarely sees in Europe. During the entire period of the Panama Canal controversy, the bitterest criticism of the action of the United States was not found in England but in Japan. "Hypocritical, cowardly, arrogant, designing, double-faced," these are only a few of the adjectives which appear almost daily in the Japanese press, as descriptive of Uncle Sam. In the Tokyo comic papers Uncle Sam always appears in the villain's part, and there are few issues when he is not pictured in the rôle of a bully, a hypocrite, or a thief.

During the entire trouble with Mexico there has never been a time when the Japanese did not throw all of their sympathies with the Mexicans, express doubts as to the sincerity of President Wilson's actions, and exult over every insult offered to the United States by irresponsible Mexican chieftains. The *Kokumin* (a popular Tokyo paper) expressed its regret that Mexico had given the United States an opportunity to attain her object, that is, the annexation of Mexico. The *Niroku* in a number of

leading articles urged action by Japan, saying, "it is not merely imaginary or improbable that in co-operation with the Mexicans, we can destroy the arrogance of the Yankees." The *Osaka Asahi* observed that the arrest of American marines at Tampico was a "pretext for the Americans to seize the chance for the realization of some far-reaching object." The *Tokyo Asahi* found that the reason the United States did not prosecute war against Mexico was only because of her inadequate military strength which would make the issue of the contest doubtful. The less violent papers found that the United States was planning to annex Mexico and came to the conclusion that if the United States would not interfere with Japan's ambitions in China, Japan might not interfere in Mexico!

When at the beginning of the European War, President Wilson made his offer of mediation, Japan had not yet begun to take part in the conflict, but the only expressions of opinion in the Tokyo papers on President Wilson's attitude were decidedly uncomplimentary to him and to America. A large part of the press, after searching carefully for possible motives, decided that the offer was made out of sympathy for Germany, for, they said, President Wilson saw that Germany was sure to

be beaten and out of regard for German-American votes desired to bring the war to an end and save Germany from defeat. The papers which did not express that view ridiculed the offer as only another of America's hypocritical efforts to appear humanitarian and peace loving. It was taken for granted that there was some sinister motive behind the act, just as it is taken for granted that there is some sinister motive behind every official act of the United States. About the time of this offer, of mediation the Sino-American arbitration treaty was negotiated and this was greeted in Japan as a base design to undermine Japanese influence in China.

At the time this is written the European War has been in progress for about one year and during all of that time the Japanese papers have been full of innuendos, insinuations and false charges against the United States. It has been assumed that American neutrality is hypocritical and that she is secretly aiding the Germans. The papers have been full of false statements; charging the United States government with allowing German warships to find refuge and take on food and coal in Philippine waters and at Honolulu, that Americans with the knowledge of the Washington government were surreptitiously supplying German

warships with coal and provisions, that America was planning an alliance with Germany in order to attack Japan, etc. Facts well-known in Japan which would prove these assertions to be false are ignored.

All these false and unfair statements and expressions of malicious opinion pass unchallenged in the Japanese press. To be sure there are a few of the more conservative and solid journals which do not indulge in the constant abuse of America, nor do they take the trouble to controvert the false statements of their less responsible journalistic brethren. Even the conservative journals sometimes forget their caution and join the anti-American chorus. The *Japan Times*, which is owned by a Japanese company consisting of some of the most influential men in Japan, on last Independence Day remarked: "It would seem that there are Americans who, no longer dreaming of conquering territory through missionary enterprises, would think nothing of plunging a neighboring state into internecine struggles for purposes of commercial conquest. This is an ominous state of things. We should be on guard lest war may be sprung on us when they get through with Mexico and begin to look round for more commercial conquests or at least for more international money-

making opportunities, regarding war as a business proposition."

Japanese opinion of America, everywhere expressed outside of official circles, exhibits this conception of American aims and American character. It never gives credit to America for honest intentions or humanitarian motives no matter what may be the subject under discussion. This constant stream of abuse against America continues in spite of the censorship which places all newspapers under police control.

Peace advocates who are always anxious to minimize any international differences readily explain away these attacks on the United States by saying that it is only the driveling of the yellow press and that it should be held of no more importance than similar utterances of the yellow jingo press of America. The explanation is plausible but not convincing. Anti-Japanese articles seldom appear as editorial utterances in American papers. On the other hand, American editors show a great amount of friendliness for Japan. Several of our most prominent weeklies can always be counted on to defend and approve everything Japan does. Anyone who will take the trouble to sift through the comment on Japan which appears in American publications will find that three-fourths of it is all

that official Japan could wish. It is a reflection of the press campaign with which Japan manages so successfully to impress on us her views. No American publication maintains its circulation by constant attacks on Japan, for there is not enough interest in this country either for or against Japan to make that possible. But anti-American articles constitute the chief stock in trade of at least a few of the Japanese papers. No American paper maintains a constant campaign of abuse and ridicule against Japan, yet that is what several Japanese papers continually do and there are few Japanese publications which do not occasionally join in the chorus. American comment, even of the most violent and bitter kind, is usually in defense of what are believed to be American institutions. Japanese comment appears to be inspired by nothing more than blind hatred.

It is the wide distinction between the two opinions of America that is so striking. For no other country do the Japanese statesmen profess so much friendship; for no other country do the Japanese press and a large part of the Japanese people express so much hatred and contempt. Many of them appear to share the sentiment of the powerful Osaka *Mainichi* which recently said: "It is high time that we ended forever the arrogance

of these ten thousand times ten thousand half-beast Yankees!"

During recent years several peace societies have been established with the idea of promoting friendly relations between Japan and the United States, and as a result of the efforts of these organizations a number of visits have been exchanged between the two countries. Distinguished American publicists have visited Japan and returned to the United States to explain to their fellow citizens the attitude of the Japanese people, and visits by Japanese have been paid to the United States with, ostensibly, a similar end in view. The American visitors have done their work conscientiously. Nearly all of them have become enthusiastic admirers of Japan and on every occasion when it has seemed necessary have come to the defense of Japanese policies and people. It might be said that they have fulfilled their mission entirely too well, for their devotion to the cause of peace has led them into an approval of Japan's imperialistic program. For America to approve this program might secure peace between America and Japan, but the carrying out of the program will as certainly mean future conflicts in the Far East, either between Japan and China or between Japan and some other power. During

Japan's recent diplomatic raid on China, the apprehensions of Americans were allayed by the assurances of these peace advocates. Even after the coup had been accomplished and China had been forced into signing a treaty which gives away valuable concessions and threatens the open door policy, the peace advocates in their enthusiasm for peace justified Japan's ruthless diplomacy and minimized the results of the raid.

With the laudable aim of preventing a possible war the peace advocates have done much to promote American friendship for Japan. They have advertised the virtues of the Japanese and have sought to discredit those who write frankly about the Japanese people or Japanese policies. In their efforts to allay the suspicions of their fellow countrymen they have constantly talked of Japanese friendship and striven to create the impression that the Japanese hold for us an affection as unreasonable as it would be unprecedented.

One may search in vain for a similar group of Japanese whose enthusiasm for peace leads them into a defense of the acts of the United States. Those who have come to this country on missions of peace have always been active in the United States, but on their return home have made a few colorless addresses and then relapsed

into silence. From their superior knowledge of America they would be able to refute the many obviously false statements made in the Japanese press. They should be able to assure their countrymen that we are not a nation of monsters such as we are often pictured, that we do not aspire to subjugate Japan, control China or set up a trade monopoly on the Pacific. There are a large number of Japanese publicists who are prominent at meetings of an international character and are prodigal in their assurances of friendship when there is an American audience. Among their own people, where much good work could be done in quieting suspicions and removing false ideas, they remain strangely silent. While many Japanese writers and lecturers have gone to great trouble to set forth Japan's views to the United States, there are none who have shown equal energy and enterprise in the more important task of explaining the aims and ideals of the United States to their own countrymen.

One might be justified in doubting the sincerity of most of the Japanese peace advocates. Perhaps they are sincere but certainly they do not conceive of peace programs as we conceive of them. Count Okuma has for many years been the president of the Japan Peace Society and has been the

most outspoken Japanese advocate of peace. Yet he is also the strongest advocate of an increase in Japan's already large standing army, although there is no hint from any quarter that Japan is threatened by aggression. In Japan there is no pretense that the army increase is for any purpose other than to carry out the program of Japan's aggression in China. An insight into what I believe to be a common Japanese conception of peace propaganda was furnished a few months ago in the official organ of the Japan Peace Society. The Mexican situation was then at an acute stage and the Mexican chieftains were more than usually defiant. A writer, in an article which appeared in the official organ of the Japan Peace Society, discussed this situation with a keen appreciation for the difficulties of the United States and with rather undisguised joy at Uncle Sam's embarrassments. He said this was the opportune time for Japan to settle all outstanding questions with the United States. Without saying so in so many words, his inference plainly was that an alliance between Japan and Mexico would force the United States into a recognition of the rights of both countries. Suggestions such as this have been common, but it is rather remarkable that the official organ of a peace society should give publicity to such a war-

like plan. The Japanese have taken advantage of the peace propaganda to quiet our fears and in the meantime they go on with their own imperialistic schemes and continue their cultivation of a warlike spirit in the youth of the land.

The frequent references made by Japanese publicists to Japanese gratitude toward the United States are usually convincing. The fact that Commodore Perry opened up the country to foreigners and the frequent references to the aid which the United States gave Japan in achieving her modernization have led many Americans into the error of believing that the United States, more than any other country, has been the model which Japan has always had before her. Nothing could be further from the truth, for in the employment of those foreign experts who have played such an important part in the making of new Japan, the authorities have turned more frequently to England, Germany, and France than to the United States. In only one department, education, have Americans played an important part, the department on which there has been the least money spent, to which there is the least attention paid. The organization of the Japanese navy was the work of a group of Englishmen. The French began the organization of the army and the work

was later completed by Germans. The same is true of the codification of the laws, which was begun by the French and completed by Germans. The first telegraph instruments ever brought to Japan were among the presents Commodore Perry gave to the Shogun. But when Japan decided to build telegraph lines of her own, the work was done under the superintendence of an English engineer. The railways were built by the British. The constitution is on the Prussian model. The police system is German. The method of legal procedure is French. Germans were employed for many years to teach foreign medical practice to the Japanese. The originator of the Japanese newspaper press was an Englishman. The first dockyards were built by the French. It is only in education that Americans have been employed and even there the highest positions were denied them. When the Imperial University was established, the foreign staff of eighteen was composed of two Americans, eight British and eight Germans.

The part played by Americans, at the invitation of the Japanese, has been a very small one. On the other hand, no nation has thrown itself so energetically or so liberally into the work of aiding the Japanese. American missionaries were

the first to go to Japan and to-day they outnumber those of all other nationalities. For many years the schools, hospitals, orphanages, etc., maintained from funds contributed by Americans were far more important than similar native enterprises. It was from American missionaries that the Japanese youth first learned to speak English. In thousands of cases it was the American missionary who educated the Japanese youth to a point where he could secure a lucrative position and in most cases when he reached that point the Japanese kicked away the ladder by which he had climbed. It is America to-day which comes most readily to the relief of Japanese distress when flood or famines threaten. It is America which is doing more than any other country, through the efforts of her missionaries and teachers, to aid Japan. It is America which has always sympathized with Japan's struggles for progress, and which has paid her the most generous amount of praise for her success.

But it is only our national vanity which would lead us to believe that Japan looks to us for leadership. There is nothing about Japan's modern life that is American. It is all European. Her leaders look to Europe, not to us. European rationalism has a far greater hold on the Japanese

than has any idea taught by the American missionary.

Why should there be any close friendship between the two peoples? What is there in common between Japanese and Americans that makes friendship possible? Friendship between America and England is reasonable. We have the same history, read the same books, worship the same heroes. Many of us can go to England and find the parish churches where our great-grandparents were married, pick out on street signs and on old gravestones our own family names, and feel a sense of kinship even though it be removed through several centuries. In spite of the supercilious attitude which our British cousins are still inclined to take toward us, there is a lot of genuine affection between the two countries, affection not of the maudlin sort based on a few isolated incidents of history, but strong enough to withstand the occasional jars which incidents of history have given it. Between America and France there are real reasons for friendship, for the two great republics have much in common, and their citizens some traits of mental alertness and vivacity which seem to be peculiar to them alone. There is scarcely a spot in Europe to which Americans cannot go and find there an ancestral birth-

place. There is scarcely a spot in America to which Europeans cannot go and find there something which has been brought over from Europe and taken root in American soil. There is a bond between America and all Christendom—the bond of common ancestry, common religion, common civilization.

There is no such bond between Japan and America, in spite of recent efforts to create one. Our history has nothing in common with that of Japan, nor does a knowledge of each other's history bring us any closer together. Japanese history has a strange sound to American ears. We search it in vain for her Patrick Henry, Washington, Jefferson or Lincoln. Our own history is equally incomprehensible to the Japanese. It is to him a record of much bloodshed for ideals and principles without producing a Hideyoshi, or any one man strong enough to rule the country, an achievement which has always been the objective of Japanese ambitions. We see in Japanese loyalty to their rulers a docility which is inconceivable to most of us. They see in our refusal to be ruled by any one man an entire lack of that loyalty which is the supreme virtue in Japan.

Search as we may, we can find nothing in common between the two peoples. American political

ideas would be most dangerous to the Japanese state as it is at present organized. A Japanese who would publicly express the political ideas which are aired in any political campaign in America would be denounced as a socialist and thrown in jail. An American who tried to apply to America the political ideas of Japan would doubtless retire from public life besmeared with the refuse with which a disgusted public would pelt him.

There is a wide gulf which separates the individual Japanese from the individual American. It is doubtless the experience of all Americans who have lived a great deal abroad that they have made friends from among many nationalities, and that in some cases these attachments become strong enough to obliterate all differences as to nationality and language. Such friendships exist, in isolated cases, between Americans and Japanese, but an insuperable bar of social usage usually prevents these friendships from becoming intimate. If there were no other reason for this, the difference in our regard for women would be enough to prevent the growth of intimacy between families. The American's liberal treatment of his wife, his deference to her and his manifestations of affection for her strike a Japanese as not only incomprehensible but as actually indecent. The

American tourist who has ever walked down the street of a Japanese city with his wife on his arm must remember the surprised stares of the Japanese. Indeed, to the average Japanese conception of the relations between the sexes, this picture could mean but one thing—a drunken man with a prostitute.

After all, what does international friendship amount to in governing the policies of countries? We have only to look at the record of Japan to confirm any cynicism regarding the existence of international friendship. A few years ago Japan, after offering and being refused an alliance with Germany, offered the alliance to Great Britain. The latter entered into the alliance because of suspicions of Russia's plans for expansion. Strengthened by this alliance, Japan went to war with Russia, which had conspired with Germany and France to rob Japan of the rewards of her war with China. Following the war Japan annexed Korea for which country she had always expressed the most solicitous regard, having fought a war with China in order to insure the independence of the Korean kingdom. Now we find the cards all shuffled anew and Russia, Japan and England fighting Germany.

CHAPTER XI

JAPAN'S AIMS IN CHINA

IT has always been a favorite political theory of Americans that small and weak nations should be protected from the strong by international agreements and allowed to work out their own destinies. We have become accustomed to that idea through the success of the Monroe Doctrine which has left the weak South and Central American States free to pursue their own careers without danger of being gobbled up by the European powers. We can point with some degree of pride to Cuba as a practical manifestation of this theory. Our unkind critics sometimes say it is a very comfortable theory for us to expound, for, having all the territory that we desire, it deprives us of nothing that we need or greatly want, thus enabling us to maintain an agreeably virtuous attitude at no cost of self-denial. Lack of covetousness, they say, is not so great a virtue in one who cannot easily take care of more than he already possesses.

However that may be, the idea is firmly fixed in

America and many Americans believe in the soundness of the policy for the old-fashioned reason that it is just. The programs of the many peace organizations which are supported by American members and dollars contemplate no further changes in international boundaries unless it be the voluntary dissolution of ties which bind colonies and over-seas dominions to the mother country, or the peaceful resumption of sovereignty by people now under alien rule. With universal disarmament there could be little further acquisition of colonies and there might be a loss of some. Without militarism, or, more properly, navalism, there would no longer be any but sentimental reasons for New Zealand and Australia to remain in the British Empire. They would no longer need the protection of the British navy for their shores and their trade routes, for with no fighting ships cruising the seas, the danger of attack would disappear. It is easily conceivable that with militarism discarded and every people guaranteed the secure possession of the territory they occupy the ties which bind Australia (to give but one example) to Great Britain would become weaker with the passage of peaceful years. With the present military necessity of allegiance removed, dominions and mother country would in their

natural progress grow apart until the connection between them would be only nominal. Some American theorists dream of a day of universal peace when existing countries and colonies, no longer coerced by military necessity or diverted from their natural destinies by passion for conquest, would be attracted or break up peacefully into groups bound together only by common interests and ideals, and thus find a higher and happier development than is possible to-day.

Practical expression of these ideals has been made in the Monroe Doctrine and in the similar policy of the open door in China. Neither was dictated solely by sentiment. Both were founded on the sound logic of political necessity, but in their effects they have tended to accomplish in part the ideal of substituting justice for might in international affairs.

Whether or not this idea of protection of the weak and backward nations and peoples is a sound one, it is diametrically opposed to the ideas which have dominated Japanese statesmen for a generation. Theirs has been an imperial ideal and they have always looked on their weaker neighbors as fit objects of aggression. They have perhaps been franker than the English or the Americans, for they look on the presence of weak neighbors as

offering providential opportunities for increasing the greatness of Japan, a result which in Japanese eyes needs no ethical justification. Unlike the Americans and the English, they make no pretense that they take up the rule of alien people with a reluctance overcome only by their sense of duty. Where we talk of the white man's burden they rejoice in the brown man's opportunity.

That Japan should ultimately dominate Korea and China was believed by the Japanese more than a generation ago when foreigners were still looking on the Japanese as an amusing race of little brown men who made pretty fans and possessed many queer customs, but need not be taken very seriously. The teachings of Spencer very early found approval in Japan and during his lifetime he was frequently asked for advice by the Japanese statesmen. They applied the law of the survival of the fittest to their own imperial ideas and readily came to the conclusion that as Japan was the fittest in the Far East, others should succumb and Japan survive. Throughout the writings of Japanese statesmen and publicists is to be found this idea of the ultimate survival of the strong military nation accepted as an established fact and with it the corollary that the weaker nations are destined to absorption by the strong. A dozen

utterances from official or semi-official sources might be quoted to illustrate this view. One of the latest is from the pen of Count Okuma, a Japanese statesman who has led in peace movements and has been looked on as the least military of all Japanese leaders. In December, 1914, the Tokyo magazine, *Shin Nihon*, published an exhaustive review of current political questions by Premier Count Okuma. After discussing in some detail the Malthusian theory of population and some principles of evolution, he said:

“Thus those who are superior will govern those who are inferior. I believe within two or three centuries the world will have a few great governing countries and others will be governed by them, will pay homage to the mighty. In other words, about four or five great countries, each having a population of five hundred millions will be developed, and the other countries will be attached to these great ones. For instance England, Russia, Germany and France ^{and America} may be such countries and there may be one or two other independent countries. In that event, woe to the nations which are governed. We should from now on prepare ourselves to become a governing nation and not a nation governed.”

A little farther on in this lengthy but remark-

able article, the Premier frankly indicated the determination of Japan to settle differences with the United States, which, it will be noticed, was not included in the list of great nations which would survive the next few centuries. He said:

“But we must at all costs fight against the Kaiser’s spirit of conquest until we shall have crushed it. But when the spirit of conquest is crushed, the German people shall not be crushed with it. They will only free themselves from the wrong leaders, or be governed by those who have mended their ways. They will be able to show their worth in the future by developing a new civilization.

“Our attitude toward the American people will be the same. We shall attack any mistaken ideas or principles without mercy. We do not, of course, hate individuals. The time now has come when humanity should awaken. The present war has brought about the opportunity. We should free ourselves from the mistaken racial competition which has arisen from prejudice. This is the great lesson to be learned from the war and we hope that the United States, which is our good, friendly neighbor, will at once forget its unreasonable anti-Japanese sentiment which is based on prejudices.”

Within less than a month after the publication of this exposition of the aims and needs of Japan, that country undertook in China one of the most audacious attempts to coerce a peaceful and friendly neighbor that is to be found in a day's journey through volumes of history. The details of this remarkably sordid and conscienceless business will be gone into in a later chapter, but in order to understand thoroughly Japan's aims and the ruthlessness of her policies, it is necessary to review some interesting but little known history which led up to the coup of 1915. If the story of Japan's encroachments in China and of America's attempts to save that country from dismemberment concerned only the rival aspirations of American and Japanese capitalists and merchants it would not be worth the typewriting. But it has a much wider significance than that, for it reveals in a way that cannot be mistaken—or explained away—the ambitions of Japan, the methods to which she will stoop to accomplish these ambitions, and the strange psychology of a people who justify any crime if committed in the name of the Emperor.

It is important that Americans know this. We have been cajoled into a sense of security from Japanese ambitions and deluded by pleasing pic-

tures of a Japan which exists only in the imagination of Japanese press agents. We have depended in the past and must depend in the future on the promises and pledges of Japan and it is important that we know what they are worth. We are constantly assured of Japanese friendship and it is worth while to enquire into the value of that friendship which she has expressed in equally resounding phrases to China. We stand in the path of her ambitions as did China and we should know what to expect if the conquest maddened war party of Japan should turn their attention to us. Those who have recently been appalled at the dangers of the imperialistic policy of Germany and shocked at the wickedness of German plans to dominate Europe should give at least a passing glance to Japan, for her ambitions more seriously threaten us than do any ever hatched in Europe.

Few men are now living who were alive when plans for the dismemberment of China were first formulated. Fifty years ago Anson Burlingame, American Minister to China and later a special commissioner sent by the Chinese government to negotiate new treaties with foreign powers, said of his undertaking: "I hope to procure some mitigation of those aggressive steps and tendencies which are rapidly bringing nearer the par-

celing out of China among the greedy monarchies of Europe." Neither the brilliant efforts of Mr. Burlingame nor of other friends of China prevented the parceling out which was then threatened, but rather it was held in abeyance only because there was some doubt in Europe as to the ability of European troops to cope with the millions which it was believed China might put into the field. When, much to the surprise of the world, Japan easily defeated China the long deferred plans went forward rapidly.


Though not the first nor the only aggressor, Germany's action in seizing Tsingtau in 1897 precipitated the scramble. As the late Empress Dowager of China said in one of her characteristic proclamations: "The various powers cast upon us looks of tiger-like voracity, hustling each other in their endeavors to be the first to seize upon our inmost territory." The pretext on which Germany seized this desirable and undeveloped port and later "leased" the colony of Kiaochau was the murder by a mob of Shantung coolies of two German Catholic missionaries. The other powers while less brutal than Germany in their diplomacy immediately began plans to secure portions of Chinese territory. On various pretexts, none of

which contained an iota of justice, Russia leased Port Arthur and Dalny, Great Britain secured Weihaiwei, France extended her territories in the south, and even Italy, which had little trade and no political interests in the Far East, prepared to get in on the game and asked the powers to support her request for a slice of Chinese territory. The European powers were rapidly coming to complete understandings in regard to the share each country should have. England and Russia were at that time on terms by no means friendly, yet they negotiated an agreement whereby Russia recognized the Yangtze Valley as the special sphere of Great Britain and the latter country conceded the territory north of the Great Wall as within Russia's sphere of influence. Germany reserved to herself Shantung and Japan marked out Fukien. All of the powers were busy taking what they could get at once and also staking out sections of the territory of China to be disposed of as opportunities of the future made dismemberment possible.

The United States was invited to share in this spoliation but declined to do so as contrary not only to enlightened public opinion in America, but also as contrary to a well-established policy to-

ward China. Several years before the Civil War China voluntarily gave to the United States a piece of land which is now one of the most valuable sections of Shanghai. On this was maintained for a few years an American settlement, ruled by America and really a part of the territory of the United States. But retention of the land was contrary to American ideas and the United States surrendered its rights and with the British settlement which adjoined formed the present International Settlement of Shanghai. At various other times it was proposed that the United States secure concessions or establish spheres of influence in China, but no serious moves in that direction were ever undertaken. Instead the government has always insisted that all nations be allowed to trade in China on terms of equality and that Chinese territory remain unmolested.

The proposed dismemberment of China, then as now, was a matter of serious importance to the United States, affecting us in many ways. The most immediate effect is on our commerce, always important and holding vast opportunities for future development. The division of the country into spheres of influence, colonies, or concessions means the building of railways which would grant preferential rates and rebates. It means harbor



dues, taxes and customs, levied and collected in the interest of the country in power so as to shut off competition by any other power.

It threatens the welfare of American mission work in China, an enterprise of vast proportions and incalculable good, for every act of foreign aggression, no matter from what country it comes, serves to intensify the opposition to foreign missions. It threatens us in a military way, for with the establishment of powerful colonies on the western shores of the Pacific by European nations, our shores can be the more easily attacked. Finally, it is a violation of the American ideals suggested at the beginning of this chapter.

The problem of preserving China confronted John Hay who was then Secretary of State and he solved it successfully and brilliantly by his proposal of the Open Door policy. He was not the originator of the policy. It had always been the policy of the United States toward China, but to Hay is due the credit of crystallizing the policy into a definite statement and securing for it the adherence of the European powers. In his proposal Mr. Hay asked the European powers to agree not to take advantage of their "spheres of influence" to levy preferential harbor rates or railway rates, not to interfere with the existing

treaty rights, and not to disturb the existing arrangements for the collection of customs duties by the Chinese government. Compliance with these conditions would, of course, remove the desire for colonies and spheres of influence by depriving the holder of the greatest advantages to be derived therefrom.

Acceptances of this proposal were slow in coming in, for agreement to the principles Hay had set forth meant the abandonment of plans which diplomats had discussed for half a century and whose fulfilment was now about to be accomplished. Mutual jealousies and suspicions prevented any favorable replies except those which were carefully guarded and predicated on an acceptance by other powers. But using these provisional acceptances of one power to bring others into line, Hay at length secured definite and final acceptances by all the powers and China's life as a nation was saved for the time at least. Despite the Boxer madness which broke out only a few months after the final acceptance of this plan to guarantee the integrity of China, the country was enabled to emerge with territory intact. It was a severe strain, but, having passed it safely, the policy of the Open Door was accepted by the world as sufficient to guarantee the integrity of China,

just as the Monroe Doctrine guarantees the independence of South and Central American republics. It may be noted, in passing, that there is no material difference in the effect of the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door policy. The two policies were brought forth under similar conditions and though presented in different ways, they were intended to have the same result, that of protecting weaker powers against the aggressions of the stronger. The policy of the Open Door in China is, in its effects, the "Monroe Doctrine of the Far East."

In subsequent years the principle of the Open Door was strengthened by a number of formal treaties between some of the great powers, Japan leading the way in thus making the policy even more permanent and giving it a fuller and more binding recognition than was implied by the mere acceptance of the conditions proposed in Hay's letter. The reason for Japan's original acceptance of the plan has been explained and, having once accepted it, she was compelled on a number of subsequent occasions to reaffirm the principle, for the time when she could openly or covertly repudiate it had not yet arrived. On January 30, 1902, following prolonged negotiations, Great Britain and Japan concluded their first formal

alliance. The preamble to this document reads:

“The governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the extreme East, being, moreover, specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree,” etc.

Three years later this agreement was replaced by a new document in which the principle of the Open Door was made even stronger than in the first alliance. In the treaty of 1905 the following were set forth as the reasons for which the alliance was formed:

“(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India;

“(b) The preservation of the common interests of all powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.”

These objects were restated in identical terms in the latest treaty of alliance, negotiated in 1911.

In the agreement relating to China signed by

Russia and Japan in 1907, the second article reads:

"The two high contracting parties agree to recognize the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire, and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in the said Empire, and they engage to uphold and defend the maintenance of the *status quo* and the respect of that principle by all peaceful means possible to them."

The same principle is found stated in the agreement between Japan and the United States made on November 30, 1908. The following is one of the clauses:

"The policy of both governments, uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies, is directed to the maintenance of the existing *status quo* in the region above mentioned (the Pacific Ocean) and to the defense of the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China."

The principle is reaffirmed in another clause:

"They are also determined to preserve the common interests of the powers in China by supporting by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire."

In the Franco-Japanese agreement of 1907 there is the following phrase:

“The governments of Japan and France, being agreed to respect the independence and integrity of China, as well as the principle of equal treatment in that country for the commerce and subjects or citizens of all nations,” etc.

Japan had been particularly lavish in her pledges not only to respect the principle of the Open Door, but to actually defend that principle against others who might wish to violate it. Yet at the time Japan was signing some of these pledges she had already made assaults on the “independence and integrity of China,” and she has continued to violate the pledges and agreements, her long list of transgressions finally culminating in the impudent demands on China presented in the early part of 1915. Before taking up this latest attack on the Open Door, it will be illuminating to consider some of Japan’s earlier aggressions—violations of treaty promises less dramatic and less important than her most recent violation.

One of the phrases of the Portsmouth treaty which was signed September 5, 1905, provided that the signatory powers would not “obstruct any gen-

eral measures, common to all countries, which China may take for the development of commerce and industry in Manchuria." This clause was expected to provide an opportunity for China to develop Manchuria and to recover the power and prestige which she had lost through the aggressions of Russia and Japan. Yet within a few months after this treaty was signed Japan negotiated another agreement with China in which the latter country was coerced into agreeing that, prior to the recovery by China of the South Manchuria railway, she would not build any main line in the neighborhood of and parallel to that railway, or any branch line which might be prejudicial to the interest of that railway. China insisted that this agreement be made in definite terms, prescribing a certain distance from the South Manchuria railway, but the Japanese declined to make the agreement so specific. It developed later that Japan intended to use this agreement to block all railway development in Manchuria except that undertaken by Japanese capitalists. That was the beginning of Japan's long and steady campaign to dominate the railway situation in Manchuria, recently brought to a successful close by the 1915 treaty with China. The agreement made earlier

has been used on several occasions not only to block the building of Manchurian railways by foreign capital but by Chinese capital as well.

The proposal made later by Secretary of State Knox would have made effective the promises and pledges of the Portsmouth treaty, but it was opposed and frustrated by Japan. Indeed the only purpose it served was to draw Japan and Russia closer together and increase Japanese resentment at the interference of America. Japan and Russia, alarmed at what they believed to be American aims for encroachments in Manchuria, at once concluded a secret agreement in which the two countries divided between themselves Manchuria and Mongolia, each pledging support to the other in aggressive plans to be carried out in these regions. Both repudiated the agreement made in the Portsmouth treaty not to use their Manchurian railways for strategical purposes and, Japan taking the lead, began a slow encroachment on the very rights which the Portsmouth treaty was designed to protect.

This treaty between Japan and Russia was signed on July 4, 1910, following a number of conversations in which a rather definite understanding was reached. Since then Japan has pursued an aggressive policy toward China, constantly

seeking to find cause for a quarrel and to impress on China the futility of opposing Japan. This policy found expression in a series of incidents, each one trivial in itself, but all revealing a definite aggressive policy in which Japan has insisted upon treating with China as with an inferior and subject state.

On September 11, 1911, some Japanese soldiers at the railway station in Changli (on the South Manchuria railway) stole some fruit from a Chinese pedler. They were detected in the act by a Chinese policeman who compelled them, after the usual wordy argument, to restore the stolen goods. The soldiers then left with threats of vengeance. That night they returned and provoked a quarrel with another pedler, persisting in their abuse until the policeman again interfered. A few minutes later forty armed Japanese soldiers appeared and surrounded the station, the officer at the head of the squad demanding from the Chinese officer at the station the surrender of the policeman who had detected the theft of the fruit in the morning. The Chinese officer attempted to prevent immediate trouble by asking the Japanese to return the following morning when the police superintendent would be on duty. Enraged by this reply the Japanese officer cut down the

Chinese with his sword and then emptied a revolver into him. He then ordered his men to fire three volleys into the group of Chinese policemen and civilians, as a result of which four policemen and one civilian were killed. The railway station was then searched and looted. From there the Japanese went to the Chinese police station, which was also looted, afterward retreating to their barracks. When a Chinese magistrate arrived and conducted the usual inquest over the dead, he was seized by the Japanese soldiers, taken to their barracks, and threatened with death unless he signed a report of the proceedings which they had written. This he refused to do.

There was such a divergence between the reports of the incident as presented by the Chinese and the Japanese that both sides appointed members of a commission, which investigated the matter and confirmed the report of the Chinese as given above. China then made four moderate demands for compensation, but these were ignored by the Japanese government until nearly a year later, when they grudgingly agreed to pay \$13,000 (Mexican currency) to the families of the five murdered policemen and to order their railway guards at Changli to apologize to the Changli magistrate.

In June, 1912, a band of Japanese was engaged

in smuggling arms and ammunition into Mongolia from Korea, by way of the dense forests and hills of the Upper Yalu Valley. The Japanese had a large caravan of military supplies and it is inconceivable to one who knows the efficiency of the Japanese police that the existence of this expedition was not known to the Japanese officials. As they traveled through a sparsely settled and poorly policed part of Manchuria the smugglers terrorized and robbed a number of villages and for a long time met with no resistance. At length a company of Chinese soldiers who had been searching for them came up with the party about night-fall. That night the smugglers attacked the soldiers' camp, and in the fighting which followed nineteen soldiers were killed and eighteen wounded. Three Japanese smugglers were killed, two wounded and thirteen captured. In addition the soldiers captured twenty-five Mongolian and Chinese camp followers and took possession of the caravan consisting of forty-five carts loaded with arms and ammunition, 298 boxes in all. When taken before a Chinese magistrate, the members of the party confessed its object, the Japanese admitting their leadership in the enterprise, the Chinese and Mongolians being merely employees who had been added to the caravan along the way.

In accordance with the provisions of extraterritoriality the Japanese smugglers were turned over to a Japanese consul for trial and punishment. The Chinese officials were prepared to prosecute the case with the irrefutable evidence of the arms and ammunition which they had captured. To the surprise of all who knew the circumstances the Japanese consul declined to take any action in the matter, advancing the original and interesting contention that the Japanese under arrest belonged to the lowest classes in Japan and were therefore beneath his notice. The Japanese Minister in Peking upheld his subordinate and nothing was done until two years later, the Japanese in the meantime being allowed to go free. When Japan did take action she presented China with a demand for the payment of a large indemnity for the captured and confiscated arms, pensions for the families of the dead outlaws, and the transfer or dismissal of all the Chinese officials connected with the incident., China complied with the demands for payment as Japan had at that time stationed a body of troops in Liaoyuan and declined to discuss their removal until these conditions had been complied with.

In August, 1913, soon after the outbreak of the rebellion against President Yuan, Colonel Ka-

wasaki of the Japanese army arrived at the city of Yenchow, the headquarters of General Chang Hsun, the well-known leader of the loyal troops. Yenchow was then under martial law and as a number of Japanese had been found to be enrolled with the rebels, who, it was believed, were receiving support from Japan, the presence of a Japanese near this important military camp was enough to arouse suspicion. Colonel Kawasaki exhibited a great deal of curiosity as to the military establishments in the neighborhood and was promptly arrested. When he explained his identity he was released, but as his presence there was likely to lead to other troubles, he was escorted by a guard to the Tsinanfu station. Japan insisted that this was an insult and immediately presented China with the following demands:

- (1) That the officers directly responsible for the incident be punished.

- (2) That the commandant in charge of the troops at Yenchow be dismissed from the service.

- (3) That the general in command of the Chinese army should proceed to Tientsin and make a personal apology at the headquarters of the Japanese garrison.

- (4) That the Chinese government should send

a note to the Japanese legation at Peking expressing regret for the incident.

China complied with all of these demands.

When Nanking was surrendered by the rebels on September 3, 1913, there followed several days of disorder, during which shops were looted and there was some bloodshed. Two Japanese barbers and two shopkeepers who got in the line of fire were killed. The Japanese government immediately demanded:

(1) The execution in the presence of the Japanese consul of the soldiers who killed the Japanese and looted the Japanese shops; and also the execution or severe punishment of their immediate superior officers.

(2) That General Chang Hsun and his officers be severely reprimanded immediately after the execution.

(3) That General Chang should proceed in person to the Japanese consulate and express his regrets.

(4) That an indemnity be paid to the families of the dead and to the proprietors of the shops which were looted.

(5) That the entire regiment to which the guilty soldiers belonged should march to the Japanese consulate and salute with their arms.

(6) That the Chinese government should apologize to the Japanese government.

Though these demands were excessive and unnecessarily humiliating, the Chinese government accepted them as it was then facing a serious revolution in the south which seemed to derive a large part of its support from Japan. The indemnity was fixed at \$641,845 (Mexican currency, or about \$300,000 United States currency). It is interesting to compare this indemnity of about \$75,000 for each man killed with that paid by the Japanese for the murdered policemen at Changli. In the one case there was no proof that the Japanese had not been killed accidentally; in the other, Chinese policemen on duty were deliberately killed by Japanese soldiers acting on the orders of superior officers. Japan paid about \$1250 each for the Chinese policemen killed and collected \$75,000 for each man killed at Nanking.

The story of the incident would not be complete without the sequel. General Chang Hsun, with true Oriental guile, robbed the Japanese of any satisfaction they might have received from his apology and the salute of his troops. When he started out to do his apologizing he made a day of it, going to all the foreign consulates in Nanking, saluting all and apologizing to all.

On August 17, 1914, some reserve Chinese police were engaged in a fight with bandits in a Manchurian forest near Changtu when a company of Japanese troops arrived. Thinking they were being attacked, they opened fire on the Chinese police, killing three and wounding ten. Two Japanese were wounded, though it was impossible to determine whether they had been hit by shots fired by the police or by the bandits. However, six of the police were taken in charge by the Japanese troops and a detachment of Japanese troops was sent to Liaoyuan, which is well outside the zone where Japan is allowed by treaty to station her "railway guards." The Chinese complied with demands that the police be punished, the officer in command of the police reprimanded, that the garrison commanders at Liaoyuan and Taoanfu be changed and paid an indemnity of \$12,000 to the wounded soldiers. As in the other incident, the presence of troops at Liaoyuan was used to coerce China into this settlement, but the troops there have never been removed.

This list of incidents might be lengthened indefinitely, for there have been many of them, in all of which Japan has either demanded indemnities and apologies which were without justification, or has made her demands excessive and severe. One

more incident may be mentioned. In 1912 China proposed to the signatory powers that her tariff schedule should be revised, for it is regulated as was the tariff of Japan before 1899. China's tariff is a nominal 5 per cent. on both exports and imports, but this is collected on an established valuation of goods made ten years ago for imports and fifty years ago for exports. Prices of commodities have changed a great deal in that time and the result is that China is not receiving the revenue to which she is entitled from her customs tariff. Her loss on imports alone is estimated at \$5,000,000 yearly, her present collections being that much less than the amount which would be collected if duty were paid on the present valuation of goods.

There could be no reasonable objection to this proposal. In fact, it is provided in the treaties that the schedule is to be revised every ten years. Great Britain and the United States assented to the proposal at once. France, Germany, and Russia assented after a little preliminary dickerings. But Japan delayed, evaded, and succeeded in preventing this revision by the presentation of counter proposals to China. One of these counter proposals to which Japan firmly adhered was that China give to Japanese goods the same privileges

as are accorded to goods of Chinese manufacture or origin. As the treaties of the powers with China all contain the "most favored nation" clause, this would have meant the complete stagnation of China's manufactures and the country's bankruptcy for it would cut off a very large part of the customs revenue. By this and other equally unjust proposals Japan managed to prevent the revision of the tariff and the project was still under discussion when the European War broke out.

But one conclusion can be drawn from this series of incidents. It is the conclusion held by all impartial students of affairs in the Far East, that Japan is determined to prey on the weakness of China and to take every possible advantage of her neighbor for her own good. She has not once but many times violated the spirit of the treaties she has signed and presented to the Chinese government demands more humiliating and more unjust than the Austrian demands on Serbia. China has always complied because of the knowledge that to refuse to do so would only precipitate the quarrel for which Japan has been anxious. Any act on the part of China which could be interpreted as hostile would give Japan the opportunity to demand still more, or furnish the pretext for invasion of the country and its military subjugation.

In her long relations with China, there is not one single incident in which Japan has shown anything but a selfish and brutally aggressive spirit. Japan has never failed to take advantage of an opportunity to humiliate the Chinese government, assert Japanese superiority, and flaunt her greater military and naval power before the Chinese. She has sought consistently to prevent the regeneration of China, to weaken the prestige of the Peking government and encourage internal disorder. All of this has been a violation of the spirit if not the letter of the Open Door policy, for like its mate, the Monroe Doctrine, it holds that stronger powers shall not take advantage of weaker ones. But Japan holds steadfastly to the opposing theory—the Bernhardi theory—that it is the destiny of the strong to oppress and dominate the weak.

CHAPTER XII

THE RAID ON TSINGTAU

THE large number of people who share with the Chinese the hope that China may some day be able to regain her complete sovereignty, recover her lost territory, and become a stable and progressive country found some cause for gratification and encouragement in the wording of Japan's ultimatum to Germany which preceded her attack on Tsingtau and her entry into the world war. The declaration was delivered on August 15, 1914. It contained two demands, which were to be complied with within one week if Germany wished to avoid the entry of Japan into the war. The first demand concerned the withdrawal of German warships from the Far East. The second demand read:

“The German government, with the object of its return to China, shall hand over the leased territory in Kiaochau to the Japanese government on or after September 15, without condition and without compensation.”

It was generally known on the Chinese coast that at the outbreak of the war in Europe a move

had been made by China to neutralize Tsingtau and prevent the spread of the conflict to the Far East. This move, it was also generally known, had been frustrated by Japan. It was argued in some quarters that Japan recognized the impracticability of neutralizing a place so well fortified and so admirably suited for use as a naval base. Japan preferred, it was said, the certain success of a military action against Germany which would enable her to pay off the old and half forgotten grudge against that country for aiding Russia in depriving Japan of the fruits of victory in the war against China. The return of Tsingtau to China, it was said, would cement the friendly relations with that country and enable China to make much progress in her campaign for "rights recovery." Japan, besides the satisfaction of having performed a virtuous act, would benefit by the friendship and confidence of China and increased trade in that country.

Tsingtau is one of two places in Shantung held by foreign powers. The other is the British port of Weihaiwei which was taken over seventeen years ago at a time when Great Britain and Russia were at daggers' points. In fact, the hostility of the two countries was clearly revealed in the terms of the lease of Weihaiwei which provided

that it should be held by Great Britain for so long a time as Port Arthur was held by Russia. Though Port Arthur was later taken by Japan, England's ally, the British still retain Weihaiwei. However, no permanent improvements have been made there which would indicate an intention to hold the place permanently. Ambitious plans for its fortification were abandoned years ago and there is every reason to believe that at a favorable opportunity in the future the place will be returned to China. This favorable opportunity would be provided by the return of Tsingtau, for the elimination of the near-by German base would remove the principal if not the only reason for the retention of Weihaiwei. In the light of subsequent events these speculations of the time were vain and foolish, but they were justified by the wording of Japan's ultimatum. The ultimatum was especially pleasing to Japan's friends and well-wishers who have long felt that her aggressive policy in China was both unjust and unwise. "At last," they said, "Japan is going to abandon her old policy toward China, will become the champion of China's rights and by binding her big neighbor to her by ties of gratitude and friendship, will really become the leader in Far Eastern affairs."

The plain wording of the ultimatum was enough to justify this optimism, but as if this were not enough, the Japanese Foreign Office, Premier Okuma and the Japanese official press bureaus made every effort to give wide publicity to this interpretation, advertising abroad Japan's virtuous statecraft. The Japanese government has a very efficient press bureau with ramifications in all parts of the world and is always able to present its views of a question in an effective way. On this occasion the press campaign was unusually vigorous and unusually transparent.

On the day that the ultimatum was presented to Germany the following message from Count Okuma, the Premier of Japan, was circulated through the East and West News Bureau, a New York organization founded to disseminate news and views pleasing to official Japan and maintained at Japanese expense:

"Japan's proximity to China breeds many absurd rumors; but I declare that Japan acts with a clear conscience, in conformity with justice, and in perfect accord with her ally. Japan has no territorial ambition, and hopes to stand as the protector of peace in the Orient."

Three days later in a speech in Tokyo he said:

"Japan's warlike operations will not extend

beyond the limits necessary for the attainment of the object of the defense of her own legitimate interests.

“The Imperial government will take no such action as could give to a third party any cause for anxiety or uneasiness regarding the safety of their territories or possessions.”

On August 24 he cabled to the editor of the *Independent*, New York, a statement in which he said:

“It is my desire to convince your people of the sincerity of my government and of my people in all their utterances and assurances connected with the present regrettable situation in Europe and the Far East.

“Every sense of loyalty and honor obliges Japan to co-operate with Great Britain to clear from these waters the enemies who in the past, the present and the future menace her interests, her trade, her shipping, and her people’s lives.

“The Far Eastern situation is not of our seeking.

“It was ever my desire to maintain peace, as will be amply proved; as President of the Peace Society of Japan I have conscientiously so endeavored.

“I have read with admiration the lofty message

of President Wilson to his people on the subject of neutrality.

"We of Japan are appreciative of the spirit and motives that prompted the head of your great nation, and we feel confident that his message will meet with a national response.

"As Premier of Japan, I have stated and I now again state to the people of America and of the world that Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or other peoples of anything which they now possess.

"My government and my people have given their word and their pledge, which will be as honorably kept as Japan always keeps promises."

The public was quite justified in believing in the sincerity of Count Okuma's statement that China had nothing to fear from Japan's entry into the war and that his reference to a pledge referred to the promise to restore Kiaochau to China, the only pledge or promise Japan had made. This statement, it should be noted, was cabled to the *Independent* on the day after the provocative ultimatum to Germany had expired and at a time when it was apparent that Tsingtau would not be surrendered peacefully.

On the following day when the blockade of

Tsingtau had been begun, a remarkable semi-official statement regarding Japan's policy was sent out by the Kokusai Tsushin-sha, a Japanese news agency which has close official connections with the Japanese Foreign Office and is allied with Reuter's and the Associated Press. This message which was cabled to many papers in America and Europe read:

"On the highest authority Reuter's correspondent is able to state that it is the settled policy of Japan, approved by the Emperor, the Genro, the Privy Council, the Cabinet, and the leading business men, that Japan under all future conditions will act strictly in accord with the terms of the alliance with England and the treaties and agreements with America and her pledge to China. She will restore Kiaochau and will preserve the territorial integrity of China. The ultimatum will be adhered to, whether Tsingtau is taken by force or otherwise."

Any one who lives in Japan or who has kept in touch with recent events there knows the peculiar relationship which exists between the Kokusai-Reuter news agency and the Japanese government and needs no assurance that a statement like this, made by Reuter's, is officially inspired. It may also be pointed out that at this time there was a

very strict censorship on all cables from Japan, and that all press messages not acceptable to the Japanese government were refused transmission. While press cables assuring the world of Japan's good faith in the promise were allowed transmission, others which expressed doubt as to Japan's motives in entering the war found their way to the censor's waste basket.

The Japanese press campaign had its effect, for newspapers all over the world commented on the magnanimity of Japan's actions, and a number of officials in Europe and America made statements in praise of her disinterested motives. As I write this I have before me a file of Tokyo newspapers for the autumn of 1914 and it contains column after column of praise for Japan reprinted from American and European newspapers, most of which was cabled to Tokyo by Japanese diplomatic agents and made public by the Japanese Foreign Office. There is in none of this comment a hint from a responsible quarter that Japan's participation in the war was prompted by any motive other than a desire to carry out what she believed to be her obligations under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, secure peace in the Far East, and restore to China a territory which had been stolen by Germany. Japan's rewards would be found in

the friendship of China and in the awards apportioned to her at the peace conference at the end of the war.

At the beginning of the war in Europe China had declared her neutrality, which was respected by all the combatants, who withdrew their warships from Chinese waters and interned the Yangtze River gunboats. But with the certainty of fighting at Tsingtau it became apparent that it would be impossible to maintain a strictly neutral position, that is, to prevent fighting on Chinese territory. Tsingtau was so fortified as to make attack by sea alone a long and hazardous undertaking. It was evident that Japan, in order to secure an early victory, must make a land attack as well, and to do that would have to move troops over Chinese territory. The situation was much the same as in the Russo-Japanese War, which was fought out on Chinese territory.

At the suggestion of one of his foreign political advisers, a Japanese subject, President Yuan Shih Kai followed the precedent established in that war. He marked out a zone which, according to all neutral opinion, was big enough for any operations which Japan might carry on against Tsingtau. It included the port of Lunkow at which Japan landed troops, and extended far

enough west of Tsingtau to afford Japan perfect freedom in her military operations. Germany protested against the establishment of the zone, insisting that if Japan was to attack Tsingtau she should do so without violating China's neutrality. China's establishment of the zone offered every advantage to Japan and none to Germany, as the position of the latter would have been greatly strengthened if Japan had been compelled to confine her operations to a sea attack.

China's position was exactly the same as that of Belgium. She had no part in the quarrel and was not even suspected of sympathy for either side, but it was expedient for Japan to cross her territory in order to attack Tsingtau just as it had been expedient for Germany to cross Belgium to attack France. China was not able to enforce her neutrality and, unlike Belgium, could look to no powerful friends for help. Candidly admitting the situation, she sought to escape from it as quickly and as easily as possible. The war zone was established as a means to that end; and in order to avoid any possibility of a clash, all Chinese troops were at once withdrawn from the zone.

The first Japanese troops who landed on Chinese soil at once took possession of a section of

the German railroad which connects Tsingtau with Tsinanfu, the capital of Shantung province. This force, instead of advancing on Tsingtau, faced the opposite direction and proceeded west. It soon reached Weihsien, the location of a large Chinese garrison, one hundred miles west of Tsingtau and well outside the war zone as marked out by China. The Japanese troops occupied the Weihsien railway station, and rather ostentatiously located their camp in easy gunshot distance of the Chinese garrison. The encampment of Japanese troops on Chinese soil under the noses of a Chinese garrison was such a patent challenge that it appeared for a time that trouble could not be avoided. Soldiers on each side were itching for a fight, but China averted trouble by removing a large part of her troops.

The Chinese government at once called the attention of Japan to the fact that troops had been sent outside the war zone. Japan's reply was that she did not recognize the war zone and would not be bound by it in any way. She contended that China's neutrality had already been violated by the Germans who had used the Shantung railway for the transportation of supplies to Tsingtau. The contention was a bit of sophistry, for the Shantung railroad had been used only as any

railroad in the United States might be used to ship supplies destined for combatants.

Japan continued to push her troops farther west and some time before the main attack on Tsingtau was begun had occupied the entire line of the Shantung railroad, had stationed troops in Tsinanfu 260 miles from Tsingtau and had taken possession of the German coal mines in Shantung. In all these military operations, as well as in her diplomatic dealings with China, Japan exhibited none of that spirit of friendliness toward China the existence of which was suggested by the promise to restore Kiaochau, and proclaimed by Premier Okuma and other responsible spokesmen for Japan. She in no case showed any appreciation of the painful position in which China was placed, but on the contrary her actions were brusque and provocative. During the entire time of the operations against Tsingtau, clashes between the Chinese and Japanese troops were averted only by the great caution of the Chinese commanders who were carefully instructed by Yuan Shih Kai to avoid the conflict which Japan seemed to be inviting.

When Tsingtau fell into the possession of the Japanese, they lost no time in making the most of their new property. They at once claimed

ownership of the Shantung railroad and of the German coal mines in the province. In fact, experts to operate the railroad and to work the coal mines had accompanied the expeditionary forces and the coal mines (which were under private German ownership) had been operated by the Japanese for some time before the fall of Tsingtau. Before the outbreak of war the coal mines and railway had been operated by a few German executives, all the other employees being Chinese. When the Japanese took possession of these properties they replaced the Chinese with workmen of their own nationality. Formerly all the trainmen on the Shantung railroad and all the foremen in the coal mines were Chinese, but now no Chinese are employed in any way except as coolies. In passing it may be remarked that this is one feature which differentiates Japanese colonization from the colonization of any other power. German occupation of Tsingtau, like British occupation of Hongkong, created employment for the natives and added to native prosperity. The benefits of Japanese enterprise fall to the Japanese alone, for wherever Japanese sovereignty has been extended Japanese have crowded out the native artisan, the small merchant and often the coolie laborer as well.

In Tsingtau the street names were changed at once, the German street signs being taken down and Japanese street names put up. A large and beautiful monument which had been erected to commemorate German occupation of the place was defaced. Even the name of the place, in its Romanized version was changed and is now referred to in all Japanese official publications as Sei-tou.

It was announced that the German non-combatants would not be interfered with in any way and would be allowed to continue in business as before. The usual methods were used to give this announcement wide publicity. However, in a short time after their occupation the Japanese officials began announcing the discovery of evidence that certain business men had taken part in the defense of the place, and these, a few at a time, were sent to Japan as prisoners of war. Out of a former population of several thousand, less than one hundred Germans remained in the place four months after its surrender, and most of the business enterprises they had built up by years of labor passed into Japanese hands.

A similar procedure was followed in regard to German factories, residences and real estate. Investigations carried on by the Japanese officials purported to disclose the fact that certain build-

ings had been used for military purposes and these were confiscated. A popular tourist hotel was confiscated because it was the residence of German officers during the siege and is now in the possession of a Japanese. The confiscated property includes the principal buildings and factories of Tsingtau, the Shantung railroad, the German bank, and the German coal mines in Shantung. For several months after the surrender of the place none but Japanese steamers were allowed to call at the port, and severe restrictions were placed in the way of any foreigner who attempted to go to Tsingtau. On the other hand, the Japanese were allowed free entry and a Japanese steamship line was at once established with regular sailings between Kobe and Tsingtau. So great was the rush to secure the rich pickings afforded by the confiscation of German property and the ruin of German business establishments that more than five thousand Japanese took up their residence there in less than two weeks after the surrender of the place. The cost of Japan's war operations was about \$25,000,000, probably less rather than more, for it was an operation of little more difficulty than the annual fall military maneuvers which it replaced. At the very lowest estimate the value of the confiscated property is

easily twice that amount. The German government had spent \$100,000,000 in the improvement of the place, and much of this money was spent on public buildings, etc., which are now the property of Japan.

The world at large, despite many circumstances which gave it reason to be skeptical, had continued to believe in the sincerity of Japan's promise to restore the colony to China, until the first part of December, when a new statement was made. The Japanese Diet was then in session and Baron Kato, the Foreign Minister, was bombarded with Opposition questions regarding Japan's war policy. A report of these interpellations was sent out on December 9, by the Kokusai news agency, the same institution which had, less than four months before, assured the world "on the highest authority" that Japan would restore Kiaochau no matter under what circumstances the place was secured. The opening paragraphs of the Kokusai report of December 9 were as follows:

"The first interpellation in the new session of the Japanese Diet referred to the subject of the return of Kiaochau to China. The Opposition asked whether Kiaochau would be returned, whether the government was pledged to China or

any other power in the matter of the final disposition of the territory, and whether the clause in the Japanese ultimatum to Germany referring to the final restitution of Kiaochau to China did not bind the action of Japan.

“Baron Kato, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, replied that the question regarding the future disposal of Kiaochau could not at present be answered, but it could be definitely stated that Japan had never committed herself to any foreign power on this point. ‘The purpose of the ultimatum,’ he continued, ‘was to take Kiaochau from Germany and so restore peace in the Orient. The restitution of Kiaochau after a campaign was not thought of, nor was it referred to in the ultimatum.’ ”

At this time the Japanese were in secure possession of Tsingtau. The German combatants had surrendered, and all except the wounded in hospitals had been removed to Japan as prisoners of war. There had been no German war vessels in the Far East for several months, and there were no German troops nearer than Poland. Apparently the Tsingtau campaign was a closed incident. China’s futile war zone, which had never existed except on paper, no longer had any reason for existence even there. Accordingly early

in January a Chinese government proclamation announced that it had been abolished. Japan was at this time in exactly the same position as Germany was at the time the attack on Tsingtau was begun. She was in secure possession of the place, and it was to her advantage, as it had been to the advantage of Germany, to remove any possibility of attack by land. From a military standpoint the abolition of the war zone was to the advantage of Japan and to no one else, just as its establishment had been.

It will be remembered that when the war zone was established Japan had refused to recognize it, and all her actions had been taken without any consideration of the zone. She had carried out her military operations on the assumption, apparently, that she might use any part of Chinese territory that she wished, with or without the consent of China. She had even established a garrison at Tsinanfu, the capital of Shantung, and exercised a censorship over telegrams sent from that place. But it soon developed that though she had refused to recognize the zone, she would not overlook the fact that it had been abolished. A few Japanese soldiers remained within its boundaries, and it was assumed that the action of China in abolishing the zone was a hint that these

soldiers were to be removed. This was construed as an insult to Japan. It was the first act on the part of China which could possibly be regarded as unfriendly, and that portion of the Japanese press which is in close touch with the Foreign Office raged and raved over the incident. They insisted that China pay dearly for the insult and pay at once.

China, alarmed at this unexpected development, immediately canceled the order abolishing the war zone, but this failed to mollify Japan. She had been seeking cause for a quarrel too long to overlook the opportunity and the result was the presentation of the now well-known demands, which revealed for the first time the program with which Japanese statesmen entered the war.¹ It was the opportune time for Japan's ambitious plans to assault the policy of the Open Door. With Russia, France, England and Germany fighting, Japan was left with practically a free hand—Germany powerless, England silenced by Japan's pretensions of sacrifice in support of the alliance,

¹ After the conclusion of the negotiations on these demands it was divulged in a Japanese official publication that the demands on China were embodied in a note of instruction given to the Japanese Minister to Peking on December 3, 1914. Obviously the demands must have been prepared some time before that date and the occasion of their presentation was merely a pretext which had been rather impatiently awaited.

Russia satisfied by a secret agreement which gives Russia a free hand in Mongolia, and France too hard pressed at home to give any attention to affairs in China. There remained only the United States as a possible champion of China's rights, but Japan counted on the peace policies of Secretary of State Bryan to prevent any effective interference from that quarter. They believed that with such a renowned advocate of peace in the chair of Secretary of State they might with safety break their pledges to the United States and fear nothing worse than a mild protest.

CHAPTER XIII

JAPAN'S TORTUOUS DIPLOMACY

HAVING begun the attack on Tsingtau with the oblique idea of provoking China into warlike action, having all through the attack sought to deceive the world as to her real motives, it was not to be expected that Japan would in the discussion of the demands on China show any consideration for the spirit of fair play and regard for truthfulness which one would expect of her much boasted civilization. In her mode of presenting the demands, she sought to insult China, for the note embodying them was not presented to the Chinese Foreign Office, but, in defiance of diplomatic usage and good taste, was handed direct to President Yuan Shih Kai by the Japanese Minister at Peking. Unprecedented diplomatic action like this would be an insult to any country; its offensiveness is manifold to a country so devoted as China to forms and usages. Accompanying the presentation of the demands was a warning that they should be kept strictly secret, accompanied by a threat that demands of even

greater import would be substituted in the event that China made any disclosures regarding them. At the same time that Japan sought to close the mouths of Chinese officials in regard to the nature of the demands, she gave out to the foreign powers interested, what purported to be a memorandum of the demands presented. It was a desperate attempt to deceive the powers and keep them silent until the program in China had become a *fait accompli*.

In the two following documents the actual demands and the memorandum given to the powers have been arranged in parallel columns for comparison. Both translations are official.

Translation of the note handed to Yuan Shih Kai on January 18, 1915.	Memorandum handed to the powers purporting to give Japan's demands on China.
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GROUP I.

The Japanese government and the Chinese government, being desirous of maintaining the peace of Eastern Asia and of further strengthening the friendly relations existing between the two neighboring nations, agree to the following articles:	In relation to the province of Shantung.
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Article 1.

The Chinese government agrees that when the Japanese government hereafter approaches the German government for the transfer of all rights and privileges of whatsoever nature enjoyed by Germany in the province of Shantung, whether secured by treaty or in any other manner, China shall give her full assent thereto.

Engagement on the part of China to consent to all matters that may be agreed upon between Japan and Germany with regard to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions, which in virtue of treaties or otherwise Germany possesses in relation to the province of Shantung.

Article 2.

The Chinese government agrees that within the province of Shantung and along its sea border no territory or island or land of any name or nature shall be ceded or leased to any third power.

Engagement not to alienate or lease upon any pretext the province of Shantung or any portion thereof and any island lying near the coast of the said province.

Article 3.

The Chinese government consents to Japan building a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to join the Tsinan-Kiaochau railway.

Grant to Japan the right of constructing a railway connecting Chefoo or Lungkow and the Tsinan-Kiaochau railway.

Article 4.

<p>The Chinese government agrees that for the sake of trade and for the residence of foreigners certain important places shall be speedily opened in the province of Shantung as treaty ports, such necessary places to be jointly decided upon by the governments by separate agreement.</p>	<p>Addition of open marts in the province of Shantung.</p>
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GROUP II.

<p>The Japanese government and the Chinese government, <i>since the Chinese government has always acknowledged the specially favorable position enjoyed by Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia</i>, agree to the following articles:</p>	<p>In relation to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.</p>
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Article 1.

<p>The two contracting powers mutually agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the term of lease of the South Manchuria and Antung-</p>	<p>Extension of the terms of the lease of Kwantung, the South Manchuria railway, and the Antung-Moukden railway.</p>
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Moukden railways shall be extended to a period of *ninety-nine years*.

Article 2.

<p>Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia in erecting buildings for the purpose of trade and manufacture or for farming shall have the right to lease or own land so required.</p>	<p>Acquisition by Japanese of the right of residence and ownership of land.</p>
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Article 3.

Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and to engage in business and in manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Article 4.

<p>The Chinese government agrees to grant Japanese subjects the right of opening <i>all mines</i> in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, such mining places to be jointly decided upon by the two governments.</p>	<p>Grant to Japan of the mining rights of mines specified by Japan.</p>
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Article 5.

The Chinese government agrees that in respect of the two following subjects mentioned herein below the Japanese government's consent shall be first obtained before action shall be taken:

(a) Whenever permission is granted to the subject of a third power to build a railway or make a loan with a third power for the purpose of building a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

(b) When a loan is to be made with a third power pledging the local taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia as security.

Obligation on the part of China to obtain in advance the consent of Japan if she grants railway concessions to any third power, or procures the supply of capital from any power for railway construction or a loan from any other power on the security of taxes.

Article 6.

The Chinese government agrees that if the Chinese government in South Manchuria or Eastern Inner Mongolia employs advisers or instructors for political, financial or military pur-

Obligation on the part of China to consult Japan before employing advisers or tutors regarding political, financial or military matters.

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poses the Japanese government shall first be consulted.

Article 7.

The Chinese government agrees that the control and administration of the Kirin-Changchun Railway shall be handed over to the Japanese government to take effect on the signing of this agreement, the term to last for ninety-nine years.

Transfer of the management and control of the Kirin-Changchun Railway to Japan.

GROUP III.

The Japanese government and the Chinese government, seeing that Japanese financiers and the Hanyehping Company have close relations with each other at present, and also desiring that the common interests of the two nations shall be advanced, agree to the following articles:

Agreement in principle that, at an opportune moment in the future, the Hanyehping Company should be placed under Japanese and Chinese co-operation.

Article 1.

The two contracting powers mutually agree that

when the opportune moment arrives the Hanyehping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations and they further agree that without the previous consent of Japan, China shall not by her own act dispose of the rights and property of whatsoever nature of the Hanyehping Company, nor cause the said company to dispose freely of the same.

Article 2.

The Chinese government agrees that all mines in the neighborhood of those owned by the Hanyehping Company shall not be permitted, without the consent of the said company, to be worked by other persons outside of the said company, and further agrees that if it is desired to carry out any undertaking which it is apprehended may directly or indirectly affect the interests of the said company the consent of the said

company shall first be obtained.

GROUP IV.

The Japanese government and the Chinese government with the object of effectively protecting the territorial integrity of China agree to the following special article:

The Chinese government agrees that no island, port and harbor along the coast shall be ceded or leased to any *third* power.

Engagement in accordance with the principle of the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China, not to alienate or lease any ports and bays on or any island near, the coast of China.

GROUP V.

Article 1.

The Chinese Central government shall employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial, and military affairs.

Article 2.

In the interior of China Japanese shall have the right to ownership of land for the building of Japanese hospitals, churches, and schools.

Article 3.

Since the Chinese government and the Japanese government have had many cases of dispute between the Chinese and Japanese to settle, cases which cause no inconsiderable misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of important places (in China) shall be jointly administered (by Chinese and Japanese), or that the (Chinese) police departments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese for the purpose of organizing and improving the Chinese police service.

Article 4.

China shall purchase from Japan a fixed ratio of the quantity of munitions of war (say 50 per cent. or more) or Japan shall establish in China a jointly worked arsenal, Japanese technical experts to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased.

Article 5.

China agrees to grant to Japan the right of constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang. Also a line between Nanchang and Chaochow.

Article 6.

China agrees that in the province of Fukien Japan shall have the right to work mines and build railways and to construct harbor works (including dock-yards) and in case of employing foreign capital Japan shall first be consulted.

Article 7.

China agrees that Japanese subjects shall have the right to propagate religious (Buddhist) doctrines in China.

In a very few of the articles, it will be noticed, the two documents are practically the same, but in all where Japan asked for things she knew to be flagrantly in violation of the Open Door policy and likely to arouse the suspicions of the powers,

the demands are toned down, offensive phrases left out, or the demands omitted entirely in the version given to the powers. Thus in the note to the powers the significant word "third" is omitted in the provisions pledging China not to lease any of her territory, while there is no mention whatever of the demands included in group 5. It was later explained semi-officially that the articles in group 5 were "desires" rather than "demands" and for that reason were not mentioned in the memorandum to the powers. However, they were insisted upon with the same persistence as the others and in the final negotiations one at least of these "desires" was conceded by China.

Although China for some time timidly kept the demands secret, the very fact of their secrecy led to many suspicions. It was justly believed that if Japan were asking only for things she had a right to ask for, there would be no need for such secrecy and such extraordinary endeavors to prevent a discussion of the demands. At the beginning of the negotiations the Japanese police issued an order to all newspapers in Japan prohibiting the publication of the text of the demands, or of any purported text, or any message or article giving any idea of what the demands included. This order, supplemented by the vigilance of the cable

censor, made Peking the only source of news regarding the negotiations, and the Japanese official press bureaus at once set to work to discredit these reports in advance. Carefully worded despatches were sent out by the Kokusai agency denying in blanket form the press reports from Peking which were later proven by Japanese official communications to be correct. It was openly charged by the Japanese that German intrigue was at work in Peking trying to stir up the suspicions of the powers against Japan and that the alarming Peking messages giving the purport of the demands were of German origin. Tokyo insisted that only eleven demands had been presented and the Japanese Ambassador in London was so successful in convincing the British press that this was true that the *London Times* in a strong leading article sought to allay the suspicions which had been aroused in Great Britain. The Associated Press correspondent in Peking had very early in the negotiations sent to his agency a copy of the original demands, but the management of the Associated Press had been so thoroughly convinced by the Japanese press campaign that it assumed the Peking correspondent to be wrong and suppressed the despatch.

But as the negotiations proceeded, the news

from Peking continued to be alarming and some American newspapers printed the text of the demands as sent out by the correspondent of a Chicago newspaper. The silence of Tokyo was suspicious. It became evident at last to the managers of the Japanese press propaganda that a statement of such an authoritative nature that it would not be doubted must be sent out and Count Okuma, who had performed similar services for his country in the past, was called upon. On April 3, the Kokusai agency sent out an authorized interview with Count Okuma in which that venerable statesman said:

“Our negotiations in Peking are progressing favorably toward an early and satisfactory conclusion. It is untrue that the Chinese government has endeavored unduly to delay the adjustment, but misinformation has been scattered broadcast largely by German interests and this has given agitators in China an opportunity. Japan’s propositions are in complete accord with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and with all treaties and engagements with other countries guaranteeing equal opportunity and the integrity of China. The criticisms and uneasiness in England and America are caused by misinformation. Japan is not seeking to establish any monopoly in China

or improperly to infringe the rights and interests of other powers. Japan has not demanded the appointment of Japanese advisers; she is not seeking to create a protectorate over China; has not demanded joint policing except at points in South Manchuria where important interests have been threatened by lawlessness. I can assert that deliberate attempts, mostly of German origin, have been made to misrepresent Japan's attitude, especially in America. But now all points have been cleared up and the interested powers are acquainted with the Japanese proposals which largely constitute an endeavor to settle questions of long standing, some since the Russo-Japanese War. In Shantung Japan is only asking for what China had already granted to Germany. When the final disclosures are made it will be found that the entire situation has been grossly exaggerated."

The denial was not as convincing as might have been wished and had little effect in silencing the protests which were being lodged with the British government. If Count Okuma were right, it was argued, why did not Japan silence her critics by making public the full text of the demands? It may be pointed out that many of Japan's defenders have sought to explain this tortuous diplo-

macy by saying that following usual Oriental custom she demanded much more than she expected to get, and that while the original demands contained many things not included in the communication to the powers, that communication really contained all that Japan intended to force from China. The explanation is plausible, but the fact remains that up to the close of the negotiations Japan continued to insist that China grant all the demands. That Japan finally accepted a temporary settlement in which concession of all the demands was not included was due solely to the protests in England. Many embarrassing questions were asked in Parliament and many British patriots wrote letters to the papers denouncing Japanese methods and her encroachments on legitimate British interests in China. There was a similar agitation in America, but it was the uproar in England which Japan heeded.

The demands were presented on January 18 and during their discussion, which lasted over three months, Japan abandoned all pretense of a friendly attitude toward China. The negotiations were carried on as between a victor and a fallen and helpless foe. Complete possession had been taken of the Shantung railroad and a large military force established at Tsinanfu, the western

terminus of the road and within easy striking distance of Peking. Here, two hundred miles from the leased territory of Kiaochau, the Japanese took charge of the Chinese telegraphs and for months established a censorship, coerced Chinese local officials and interfered with Chinese mails. Large bodies of Japanese troops were sent to Manchuria, ostensibly to relieve the garrisons there. According to the official record of the conference held on the demands, the Japanese Minister to Peking was asked on March 23 when the retiring troops would be withdrawn from Manchuria and significantly replied that they would remain until the satisfactory conclusion of the conference. Later, during the early part of May, when Japan's final ultimatum was delivered to China, I was traveling between Seoul and Moukden. Except for the daily passenger train all traffic on the Japanese railways between these cities had been stopped, and large bodies of troops were massed in Korea just below the Manchurian border ready for an immediate attack in the event China did not comply. Japan had gone to war with Germany, and was ready to go to war with China—to preserve the peace of the Orient!

On May 9 the long negotiations came to a close with China's acceptance of a part of the demands.

As a result Japan has secured the following valuable rights and privileges, for none of which is there a hint of compensation for China:

China agrees in advance to assent to any arrangement which may be arrived at between Germany and Japan regarding German rights and concessions in Shantung province. This debars China from a hearing at the peace conference when the disposition of Shantung will be discussed. It gives to Japan, presuming German defeat and the accomplishment of Japanese ambitions, another strategic railway in China by which Japan would easily be able to send troops into the heart of Shantung province and by easy marches across the broad plains of northern China attack Peking itself. Germany, of course, has held this railway and this strategic advantage, but the nearness of Japan to the western terminus of the road and the existence of Japan's admitted ambitions in regard to China makes her possession much more threatening than that of Germany. Though Germany never found the measure necessary, Japan has established troops along the road as railway guards, and, following the precedent established on the South Manchuria railway, may be expected to keep them there.

China agrees not to cede or lease to any power

any portion of Shantung and to give to Japanese capitalists a monopoly of railway building in the province. This debars even the Chinese themselves from railway building in Shantung which has been planned by them and makes Shantung, like Manchuria, a closed preserve for Japan. It gives to Japan greater rights and privileges than were ever held or asked for by Germany.

New treaty ports are to be opened in Shantung and Eastern Mongolia for the residence of foreigners. These places are to be selected after consultation with the Japanese Minister to Peking and will naturally be places so located as to be favorable to Japanese trade.

The leases of Port Arthur and Dalny which were to expire in 1923 are extended to 1997. The lease of the South Manchuria railway is extended from 1938 to 2002 and of the Antung-Moukden railway to 2007. It was possible that China on the expiration of these leases or at some time soon thereafter would have found it possible to redeem this property and thus accomplish one part of her great ambition to regain her complete sovereignty. The new terms put this beyond the possibility of accomplishment in the lifetime of any living man.

Japanese subjects acquire the right of free residence and travel in South Manchuria, also the

right to lease land for business and agricultural purposes. This is one of the most vicious of the agreements wrested from China, for while the Japanese have gained the right of residence and practical land ownership, they also retain the extra-territorial rights possessed by all foreigners in China. Under its terms they will be required only to submit to police ordinances and tax regulations which are approved by the Japanese consuls and in both civil and criminal cases are subject to trial before Japanese officials only.¹ This serves to extend the Japanese administrative machinery from the zone of the South Manchuria railway and a few ports where it is now confined, to all parts of South Manchuria. The residence of a single Japanese in a district of the province gives the Japanese officials a certain power over the local police and tax system. The residence of Japanese in remote parts of the province where the Chinese police system is not able to protect

¹ It should be noted that though foreigners resident in China, as formerly in Japan, are subject only to the laws of their own country and trial by their own officials, their residence is restricted to a limited number of treaty ports, thus reducing the necessary evils of this system to a minimum. The obvious evils of an arrangement such as that which Japan has made have been so well recognized that the free residence of foreigners with extra-territorial privileges has never been insisted on by any other power either in China or Japan.

them from the hostility of the natives, coupled with the extra-territorial rights the Japanese retain and the energy and persistence with which the Japanese government prosecutes injuries to Japanese subjects, makes the constant trouble in South Manchuria unavoidable in the future. With the increase of Japanese residents there it is easy to foresee the development of complications, which will lead Japan to demand still further rights and privileges and to still further curtail China's sovereignty. Taken in conjunction with other rights and concessions, this right of residence goes far toward making South Manchuria what the Japanese hope it will some day be—an actual province of Japan.

Japanese subjects are to be allowed to open gold, coal and iron mines in nine districts in Manchuria.

Japanese capitalists are granted a monopoly in all railway construction in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and in all loans with South Manchurian and Eastern Inner Mongolian taxes as security.

Japanese are to be employed by the Chinese government as advisers or instructors on political, financial, military, and police matters in South Manchuria.

The complete control of the Kirin-Changcun railway (an important feeder of the South Manchurian system) is given to Japan.

The Japanese are promised ultimate domination of the Hanyehping Company (the Krupps of China). Hitherto Chinese control of this important steel mill with its valuable coal and iron mines has been assured by certain legal restrictions as to the ownership of stock, and there have been several proposals to make it a state enterprise. China now pledges herself in advance to consent to any agreement "for co-operation" which may be reached between Japanese capitalists and the owners of the company. China also agrees not to make the concern a state enterprise, not to confiscate it and not to allow it to use any foreign capital other than Japanese. It is quite conceivable that Chinese revolutionists, some of whom have intimate Japanese connections, might gain possession of this plant and use its vast resources against the Chinese government, yet under the agreement wrested from China she would be powerless to retaliate in the most practical and usual way—by confiscation of the property.

China agrees not to cede or lease any bay, harbor or island along the coast of China to any power, and agrees not to use foreign capital in

the construction of a dockyard, coaling station for military use, or a naval base on the coast of Fukien province. As in the present state of China's finances she cannot carry on construction of this sort without foreign capital, this agreement compels her to leave defenseless the coast of this province whose shores can be reached in a few hours from the Japanese colony of Formosa. This agreement wrested from China is a gratuitous affront to American interests, for there has been pending for some years a deal for the construction by Americans of a Chinese naval base in Fukien. Japanese intrigue in the past has prevented the accomplishment of this deal, which is now made definitely impossible.

The other demands, which China did not accept, have been, according to the terms of Japan's ultimatum, postponed for future discussion, which doubtless means that they will be brought forward again by Japan as soon as she sees an opportunity to push them through successfully.² These demands include:

² Japanese press comment since the conclusion of the negotiations shows conclusively that China is expected, sooner or later, to concede all the other demands. There was a great deal of criticism of Baron Kato, the former Foreign Minister, because he did not secure all he asked from China. The Japanese press is especially insistent about the demand for the propagation of

Employment of influential Japanese as advisers to the Central Chinese government.

Japanese churches, schools and hospitals to be granted the right of owning land in the interior of China.

Joint administration by Japanese and Chinese of the police in important places in China.

China to purchase 50 per cent. or more of her war munitions from Japan or establish in China a Sino-Japanese arsenal which is to employ Japanese technical experts and purchase Japanese materials.

Japan to have the right to construct railways, which with existing lines would establish a system from the Wu-Han cities (the location of the plant of the Hanyehping Company) with the coast outlets of Hangchow and Swatow.

A monopoly for Japanese capitalists in the development of Fukien province.

The right of Japanese missionaries to propagate Buddhism in China.

Aside from the actual rights and privileges which Japan has wrested from China in these extraordinary negotiations, and the other rights and

Buddhism in China, pointing out that the success of the Christian missionaries there is undermining Buddhism and lessening the possibilities of Japanese influence in the future.

privileges for which she is still contending, there is left behind a train of evils of which this generation will probably not see the end. Of the many evils probably the most immediate and most important is the tendency to weaken the prestige of the Chinese government at home just at a time when its position seemed most secure. Under the firm hand of Yuan Shih Kai the disorders which followed China's recent revolutions had disappeared. White Wolf and other powerful brigands had been put down and the country had been extraordinarily peaceful for some months. The work of exterminating the growth of the poppy and the use of opium was going on relentlessly and successfully in spite of the discouraging opposition of powerful foreigners interested in the sale of the drug. The confidence of the Chinese people in their government had been shown in the payment of the new taxes which had been imposed, such as the marriage tax, register of deeds tax, etc. In spite of the deep aversion of the Chinese to the payment of any taxes not established by old custom these new taxes met with slight opposition and brought in an amount of revenue surprising to the most optimistic. Still another remarkable achievement of the government was the successful flotation of a domestic loan of \$30,000,000, an

achievement unprecedented in the history of the country. All of China's obligations, including the military bonds floated during the republican revolution, had been paid when due; and the old policy of paying off expiring loans by floating new ones abandoned.

The Chinese, until a few years ago so apathetic regarding their government, were beginning to take a pride in it and to feel that they were being led out of the old hopelessness and helplessness into a new strength which would prevent future encroachments by foreign powers. Now the Japanese demands have revealed to the provinces the weakness of Peking and broken the prestige of Yuan Shih Kai's government. It has furnished the discredited revolutionists with new arguments and made easily possible revolts more serious than that which shook the foundations of the government a few years ago.

The evil results do not end there, for Japan has reopened the old game of scrambling for concessions and rights and special privileges, which was brought to an end by Hay's Open Door policy. She has upset the nicely adjusted balance of power and reestablished more definitely than ever before the old policy of outlining spheres of influence, setting an example of greed more brazen than

that which brought on the Boxer outbreaks. Already Russia, despite the distractions of the European war, has begun negotiations to consolidate and strengthen her position in Mongolia in order to counterbalance the position which Japan has secured for herself in Manchuria. This is but a prelude to what may be expected when the European powers are able to give their usual attention to China.

In the meantime the old promise to restore Kiaochau, of which so much had been heard at the beginning of Japan's entry into the war, had, apparently, been forgotten. At one of the conferences between China and Japan, the Chinese suggested that Japan show her professed friendship by restoring Kiaochau unconditionally and also by giving compensation for damage to Chinese property and loss of Chinese lives during the attack on the place. The Japanese Minister replied that Japan "could not tolerate such demands." Again the promise was referred to after the conclusion of the negotiations. Baron Kato said in the Japanese Diet that if at the end of the war the peace conference gives Kiaochau to Japan, she will return the colony to China under certain conditions. What these conditions are to be will be decided on later, but in view of the events which

followed Japan's first promise to restore the place, no one can be surprised at the complaint of the Japanese Minister to Peking that "even with regard to the offer of the Japanese government to restore Kiaochau to the Chinese government, the latter did not manifest the least appreciation for Japan's good will and difficulties."

The entire incident is interesting to Americans because of the revelations it makes of the sordidness and ruthlessness of Japanese diplomacy and the value that can be placed on Japanese pledges, even when given by her highest and most renowned officials. There is not in the entire record, from the time Japan entered the war until the conclusion of the new treaties with China, a single act of Japan which does her credit. But the most startling phase of the entire procedure was the attitude of the Japanese people. Knowing the extent of the demands on China, knowing the entire lack of provocation, and knowing the extent to which these acts violated Japan's treaties and pledges, there was not one word of protest from a responsible Japanese quarter. Not one Japanese said a word in China's behalf or raised a voice in defense of right against might. The criticism of Baron Kato, the Foreign Minister, which followed this incident was enough to cause

his retirement from the Cabinet and from political life, but the criticism was not because of the ruthlessness of his methods. The greater part of it was because he did not secure from China all the things that had been demanded. A minor strain of criticism was because he had been clumsy enough to arouse the suspicions of the foreign powers. It has not occurred to any Japanese that the entire attitude of the government is wrong and barbarous. On the other hand every Japanese, of high and low degree, has aided to the extent of his abilities the fulfilment of the government's ambitions, has gloried in the humiliation of China and the exaction of unjust agreements which add to the prestige and power of Japan. Such an exhibition of national callousness, of the complete blindness of a people to the most elementary principles of right and justice, has not been seen in modern history. It reveals the Japanese character as nothing before has revealed it and shows that we must throw into the dustbin of discarded ideas all those roseate and imaginary conceptions of the Japanese people with which we have been fed by deluded observers.

CHAPTER XIV

IS JAPAN A MENACE?

IF it had not been for the very persistent and successful publicity campaigns with which Japan has confused and deluded American public opinion, it would probably be unnecessary at this late day to discuss the question which forms the title of this chapter. Every one who has ever studied the Far Eastern question seriously has come to realize the threatening aspects of the situation, has seen at how many important points the interests of the two countries conflict. Indeed, the situation is now and has been for years very much the same as that which existed between England and Germany before the outbreak of the European war. To break England's power was necessary for the ultimate fulfilment of Germany's ambitions; to break the United States is necessary for the fulfilment of Japan's ambitions. Indeed, the United States is much more of a hindrance to the growth of Japan than England ever was to the growth of Germany. For every just cause of quarrel Germany had

against England, Japan has half a dozen against us. Both Germany and Japan are equally confident of the justness of their cause and the superiority of their culture. In their hearts the Japanese believe themselves the superiors of the Americans in everything except wealth. They believe they are destined to play a very large part in the affairs of the world and to dominate the Pacific. The ambitions of the powerful military and naval clans, and what are believed to be the economic needs of the country alike call for a program of expansion and aggression which will eventually bring on a clash with the United States.

But against every proof that Japanese aggression is directed against the United States, that Japanese statesmen have systematically sought to stir up a bitter anti-American spirit in Japan as a prelude to a possible war, we are told of Japanese friendship, assured alike by American peace advocates and Japanese statesmen that Japan entertains for us such an ardent and peculiar friendship that war against us is unthinkable and impossible. Even if the Japanese people did hold for us this extraordinary sentiment of friendship, it would not be of very great importance in gauging the possibility of war. Japanese public opinion exercises little restraining influence on the

acts of Japanese statesmen. In domestic affairs the people may demand a hearing and there may be a limit beyond which the leaders cannot go in their oppressions, but there is no public opinion which would restrain the Japanese leaders from declaring war on the United States or on any other country with which war could be waged with hope of success. Indeed it is this fact, more than any other, which makes Japan a menace, not alone to the United States, but to all civilization. Here is a great power, with enormous military and naval resources which are under the direction of a handful of ambitious men, who are closely allied with powerful moneyed interests, and are subject to no restraints of public conscience. No matter how this great force is used or who may be the victims of its aggression, we can expect no protest from the Japanese people, for, if their past history teaches us anything, it is that we may expect the Japanese people to support, in every way possible, the ambitions of their leaders.

Japanese friendship for the United States exists only in the meaningless conventional phrases of diplomatic usage, in the propaganda of Japanese statesmen and American peace-at-any-price advocates, and in the wine-warmed sentiments of Japanese-American banquets. If it did exist it would

prove the Japanese to be afflicted with a most maudlin and senseless sentimentality. Why should they bestow such ardent friendship on the people who stand most squarely in the way of their national ambitions and, by the immigration agreement and the restrictive legislation regarding the ownership of land, have done the most to humiliate the Japanese and affront their proud and sensitive spirit?

The European war and Japan's raid on China have served to clarify the question of relationship between Japan and the United States by definitely removing this unknown equation. If there remain any trusting persons who still believe in the value of artificially propagated friendships between nations which have nothing in common, they should study the line-up of the European nations which followed the outbreak of the war, and note the cold-blooded purposes of statecraft which were but imperfectly concealed in the rhetoric of pretty speeches. If they believe, as some seem to believe, that the Japanese are actuated by higher and more chivalrous motives than others, they should note the rapacity with which Japan sprang on her peaceful and helpless neighbor for whom she has always expressed a degree of friendship almost as ardent and certainly more reasonable

than that which she has expressed for us. They may go back a little farther if they like, and appraise the value of a friendship a thousand years old which did not prevent Japan annexing Korea the moment it was possible safely to do so.

“Why,” some may ask, “is Japan so insistent in her professions of friendship for us, if no such friendship exists?” There are several reasons why she would find it to her interest to impress on us that we have nothing to fear from her, but one is enough to explain it. If she does intend attacking us, what would be wiser than that she should carefully and persistently seek to impress on us that she is friendly and thus calm our apprehensions? In an armament race with us, Japan would soon be hopelessly distanced, but by constantly talking of her friendship she is able to delay or prevent increases in the military and naval power of the United States. Indeed, it is an interesting fact that the half dozen Americans who have done the most to assure their fellow countrymen of the innocence and harmlessness of Japanese ambitions and of the sincerity of Japanese friendship are also the most prominent advocates of disarmament and peace policies, and—most of them have been decorated by the Japanese Emperor. If Japan does go to war with the

United States these citizens may have the satisfaction of knowing that by their efforts to prevent reasonable military preparation, they have fully earned their decorations!

The question, unclouded by any considerations of sentiment, stands as one of statecraft and expediency for Japan. Japanese problems and ambitions may be definitely and confidently summarized as follows:

- (1) The repeal of all legislation which is in any way discriminatory against the Japanese.
- (2) Securing by Japanese of all the rights of immigration and citizenship that are given to any other people. They insist the Japanese are the equals of any other people and that they be treated as such.
- (3) A free hand in China which will result eventually in Japanese attempts to dominate the country.
- (4) They hope for the domination of the Pacific; that is, to establish such a preponderance of political influence and military strength in the Pacific that Japan will have the final authority on all questions affecting that part of the world.
- (5) To gain European sympathy and possible aid in a conflict with the United States by including the Monroe Doctrine among the points at issue.

It can be stated with equal definiteness and confidence that a decisive victory of Japan over the United States would make possible the accomplishment of all of these desires and ambitions. To the question: What would Japan gain by war with the United States? can be given the answer: She would, if victorious, remove the last barrier to Japanese progress and make possible the accomplishment of the full destiny of the country. It would give Japan free access to all the desirable openings for expansion in the Pacific and would remove the restrictions to immigration and American citizenship. Possession of the Philippines, Hawaii and the Panama Canal, all of which would doubtless be necessary for the accomplishment of a Japanese victory over us, might be made permanent. It is a prospect which may well dazzle Japanese statesmen, arouse the cupidity of Japanese capitalists, and win the support of every Japanese subject.

It is of course possible that some of these causes of difference may be removed peacefully. We may give up all our trading rights in China, withdraw the protection of our policies from that country and allow Japan to make any deal she likes with European powers for the division of Chinese territory. California legislators may be induced to

annul all legislation which is offensive to Japanese. The Supreme Court of the United States, which has never made a decision on the question, may decide that Japanese can be naturalized as citizens of the United States. These are possible solutions of some of the points of conflict. But there remains the immigration issue. A solution of that question by withdrawing all restrictions against the Japanese and allowing a flood of cheap Oriental labor with yellow morals to flood the west coast of America is neither possible nor probable. Let no one delude himself with the idea that because the immigration question has been settled for almost ten years through a peaceful agreement with Japan, that it is settled definitely and finally. From the Japanese point of view, it is but a temporary settlement, to be observed only until the time when Japan may settle it by securing equal rights with all others. Until that settlement is secured, the immigration question remains a serious issue.

Clear cut as is the issue between Japan and the United States, and definite as are the results and benefits which Japan may secure following a victory over the United States, it does not follow that war between the two countries is a certainty of the immediate future. Indeed, though Japanese

may drink to "The Day" and bend every energy toward securing the necessary naval and military strength for victory over the United States, there are many reasons to believe that she must wait for some time before her day of opportunity dawns. Confident as they are of the invincibility of the Japanese army and navy and scornful as they are of the military and naval resources of the United States, the Japanese realize that because of geographical conditions a war on the United States would be a long and expensive undertaking for which Japan is but poorly prepared. There is an old sophism which unthinking people often quote, to the effect that lack of money never prevented any nation from going to war. The author of this much quoted statement would have much difficulty in proving it, for neither he nor any one else could number the nations which have remained peaceful because of empty war chests.

Japan's present financial condition may be counted on to prevent war against the United States for several years to come. She is now almost bankrupt as a nation and cannot float another issue of national bonds except at ruinous rates. Japanese bonds are now selling at a rate which will yield more than six per cent. on the investment and even at that attractive and unprece-

dedented rate for government securities do not find a ready sale. Japan has hoped in the past to augment her financial as well as military resources by an alliance with some European power which shares the Japanese motives and desires for crushing the United States. It was with the hope of accomplishing this that she began cautiously sparring with the Monroe Doctrine several years ago, and has carefully developed a plan of assault on that doctrine which she will be able to bring to public notice at the proper time. At one time the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was looked on as a document which would bring British aid to Japan in case of a war with us, and there was undisguised disappointment in Japan when the alliance was revised in such a way as to lessen this possibility.

However, there is no reason to believe that the Japanese are dismayed by their slender financial resources. Threatened by no possible attack from a foreign foe, their big standing army is growing bigger, and their navy is being constantly increased. Considering the resources of the country, there is probably no other in the history of the world which during times of peace spent such a large amount for military expansion. In spite of the heavy financial burdens with which

Japan emerged from the Russo-Japanese War, Japan is now twice as powerful in a military way as she was when she entered that war. No power but England could hope for success in an attack on Japan in Japanese waters, and, as remarked by the military expert of the *London Times*, "her home territory is unassailable, not only by any single enemy, but by any reasonable or unreasonable combination of enemies." Yet Japan continues to increase her military and naval strength and hopes soon to be thrice as powerful as she was when she challenged Russia. In Japan but little attempt is made to conceal the fact that this increase is being made with a view to possible war with the United States.

It is not impossible that before Japan reaches the point where she can with confidence provoke a quarrel with us, the attention of Japanese statesmen will be directed to domestic problems of far more importance than any of foreign aggression. A breaking point must be reached some time. The Japanese people, though they have proven more docile than any other in the payment of taxes, may some day wake up to a realization of the conspiracy of their statesmen and capitalists to keep them in subjection, make the rich richer, and the poor poorer. By constantly keeping be-

fore the people a dazzling program of foreign expansion, the leaders have attempted to divert the attention of the masses from the domestic problems which demand solution. But this subterfuge cannot continue forever. Every year the present program is continued brings nearer the certain revolution in Japanese affairs which will delay for at least a generation the further imperial expansion of Japan. Japan is a menace, not only to the United States but to all Western civilization, but our protection is found in the inherent weakness of the Japanese state.

THE END

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
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